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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines if leverage can explain stock returns. Due to the overwhelming 
influence of Modigliani and Miller (1958)'s seminal work on capital structure where 
they argue that firm value is independent of financing decisions, limited work has 
been undertaken on leverage as an independent variable or a risk factor in explaining 
stock returns. On the other hand, theoretical finance has always regarded debt as one 
of the principle sources of financial risk. An immediate implication of the Modigliani 
and Miller (1958)'s propositions on equity returns is that they should increase in 
leverage. This thesis sets out to test the relation between equity returns and stock 
returns by undertaking a firm level and portfolio level analysis. This thesis comprises 
four empirical chapters. 
The first empirical chapter undertakes a firm level analysis. f estimate abnormal 
returns on leverage portfolios in the time-series for different sectors. I find for most 
sectors, abnormal returns decline in firm leverage. However, abnormal returns 
increase as average leverage in a risk class increases. The separation of the average 
level of external financing in an industry and of that in a particular firm is important. 
Utilities for which Modigliani and Miller (1958) report their empirical results (i. e. that 
returns increase in firm leverage) are in fact sectors with high concentrations and firm 
leverage ratios very close both to one another and to the industry average. In the 
Utilities risk class, abnormal returns increase in firm leverage. For other sectors, this 
is not the case and abnormal returns decline in firm leverage and increase in industry 
leverage. Results are robust with regard to other risk factors. ' 
This second empirical chapter investigates the effect of a firm's leverage on stock 
returns based on the explicit valuation model of Modigliani and Miller (1958) tested 
in the utilities, oil and gas industries. I test the relationship between leverage and 
stock returns in all risk classes. For utilities, returns increase in leverage. This is 
consistent with the findings of Modigliani and Miller (1958). For the other risk 
classes, returns fall in leverage. Results are robust to other risk factors. 
The third empirical chapter is an empirical study that tests the relationship between 
leverage and stock returns at the portfolio level. I investigate this relationship by 
undertaking a portfolio level analysis of leverage and expected returns using the 
Fama-Macbeth (1973) methodology with modifications. I find that returns increase in 
leverage which is consistent with the findings of Miller-Modigliani (1958). I also 
undertake linearity tests. Results are robust to other risk factors. 
Leverage is an important risk factor which has been ignored in the asset pricing 
literature. The fourth empirical chapter attempts to broaden the focus of the current 
asset pricing literature by forming portfolios mimicking the leverage factor. Returns 
are ranked according to leverage and grouped into two groups of high and low to 
demonstrate the risk factor of leverage in stocks. I argue that leverage is an important 
stock-market factor that explains stock returns. I also undertake robustness checks 
with the Fama-French (1993) factors of size, market-to-book and excess returns on 
market. My results show that our leverage mimicking portfolio capture the variations 
in stock returns better relative to the other asset pricing models. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate if leverage can explain stock 
returns. Substantial research studies have been undertaken on capital structure, 
ranging from theories on capital structure, determinants of capital structure and the 
tests on the existence of an optimal capital structure. However, limited work has been 
undertaken in examining leverage as an independent variable or a risk factor in 
explaining stock returns due to the overwhelming influence of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958, hereafter MM)'s work. In their work MM explained rigorously that i) capital 
structure is irrelevant to shareholders' wealth and ii) equity stock returns should 
increase in leverage due to the risk attached to debt. On the other hand, theoretical 
finance has always argued that leverage can explain firm value (Lintner (1955) and 
Gordon (1959)). This study will focus mainly on Proposition II of MM which I will 
test empirically using different methodologies and using a database of UK listed 
companies. 
The results of the few studies that have undertaken to explain the relationship 
between leverage and returns are contradictory. MM find that returns increase in 
leverage in oil and gas and utilities sectors which are two highly regulated sectors. 
Hamada (1969) established theoretically that returns increase in leverage. Bhandari 
(1988) find that returns increase in leverage by applying the Fama-Macbeth 
methodology (1973). However, his sample included all firms including financial firms 
where the definition of leverage lacks clarity. On the other hand, more recent studies 
contradict early work. For example, Korteweg (2004) find that returns decrease in 
leverage in his sample of pure exchange offers; Dimitrov and Jain (2005) find that 
returns decrease in leverage while examining changes in leverage. George and Hwang 
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(2006) also find that returns decrease in leverage while examining the sensitivity of 
leverage to financial distress risk. 
This study overcomes the restrictions imposed by the small samples and 
different methodologies employed by previous studies such as Hamada (1972), 
Bhandari (1988), Korteweg (2004), Dimitrov and Jain (2005) and George and Hwang 
(2006). 1 use a sample of non-financial companies and, adopt different approaches and 
methodologies to test the relationship between leverage and returns. This study : a) is 
similar with the MM time frames of one year; b) tests the original idea in MM that 
capital structures vary in different sectors as asset structures and production processes 
vary; c) applies book value of leverage measures as the relevant measure of cash 
inflows to the firm which management has discretion in decisions regarding the 
capital structure (Schwartz, 1959); d)finally, additional risk factors of FF (1992), 
Carhart (1997) and the particular environment's cost of borrowing are used to test the 
relation with leverage and returns. 
I argue that the capital structure of a firm which constitutes the leverage it 
employs should explain the stock returns of a company. According to finance theory 
(MM 1958), the greater the proportion of debt in the firm's capital structure the more 
likely it is that shareholders demand higher returns due to the risk involved with debt. 
Hence, this could lead to a positive relation between leverage and returns. On the 
other hand, since capital structure is endogenous, I argue that the optimal financial 
policy is one that advocates low leverage, so as to mitigate agency problems while 
preserving financial flexibility. Firms may keep their leverage levels low so as to 
prevent a proportion of profit being used for interest payments. Thus this leads to a 
relationship where returns decline in leverage. This argument leads to another school 
of thought: i. e., whether firms, in their attempt to keep leverage levels low, avoid 
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taking on profitable opportunities and investments, hence throwing away their firm 
value. The negative relationship between returns and leverage could also be due to the 
market's pricing of the firm's ability to raise funds if need be. 
In the real world of finance, capital structure decisions are critical as a shift in 
the company's attitude to leverage could increase or decrease the financial strains on 
companies. For example, in the 2006 Financial Stability report published in the UK, 
the Bank of England warns that that due to a buoyant leveraged buy-out market, 
pressure on companies to take on more debt is one of the main threats to Britain's 
financial stability as the availability of cheap debt may influence companies to take on 
more debt than they can actually afford. The report concluded that so far, few 
companies have decided to increase their leverage and levels of corporate leverage are 
quite low in the UK (Bank of England 2006). This study undertaken by Bank of 
England goes on to show how leverage plays an important role in the financial health 
of companies. 
In the following section, I provide the motivation of the study by giving a brief 
introduction to the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and the resulting 
propositions, that I empirically test using firm level data in different industries and 
different methodologies using firm and portfolio level analysis. 
1.2 Motivation 
According to MM's seminal work on capital structure, Proposition I postulates 
that the value of any firm is independent of its capital structure. Their Proposition I 
states that, in a world of complete and perfect capital markets with symmetric and full 
information amongst all classes of investors, the financing decision is irrelevant in 
determining value. They argue in their `irrelevance theory' that the shareholders can 
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buy and sell the same financial assets in their own portfolios, hence any change in the 
company's financial structure can be nullified by an opposite change in the 
shareholder's portfolio. They conclude that value of a levered firm is no different 
from that of an unlevered firm. Despite the assumptions of MM being unrealistic and 
restrictive and the subsequent development of the theory allowing for the existence of 
personal as well as corporate taxes and bankruptcy costs (Modigliani and Miller 
(1963), Miller (1977) and Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)), the impact of the 
`irrelevance theorem' is immense and profound. This may be due to the fact that this 
is the first attempt undertaken to address the capital structure issue empirically with a 
small sample. 
The immediate implication of MM's Proposition I on equity returns is that 
equity stock returns should increase in leverage. Hence, the question arises - what is 
the expected return to an investor? MM derived their second proposition regarding the 
rate of return on common stock in companies whose capital structures include some 
leverage. They argued that the expected return of a share is equal to the capitalization 
rate plus a premium related to the financial risk. MM's Proposition 2 stated that with 
frictions and imperfections such as corporate taxes, the expected return on equity is 
positively and linearly related to leverage because the risk to equity holders increases 
with leverage and hence there is no optimal capital structure. 
Empirical finance has ignored leverage as a determinant of returns due to the 
overwhelming influence of MM's work. This has led to limited studies on examining 
leverage as an explanatory variable of returns. Instead most of the empirical work on 
capital structure has carried out tests on capital structure where these tests have 
analysed the effects of assumptions (MM 1958) such as increasing agency and 
bankruptcy costs as leverage increases and market reactions to debt and equity issues 
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and studying determinants of capital structure. Empirical studies on equity issues have 
employed factors such as past performance (Lakonishok et al 1994, Debondt and 
Thaler 1995), price to earnings (Campbell and Schiller 1988), market risk, size (Banz 
1981, Chan and Chen 1991), and market-to-book (Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok 
1991) or a combination of those (Fama and French 1992; 1996). However, leverage as 
an explanatory variable of returns has been largely ignored in the finance literature. 
The limited studies such as Hamada (1969), Bhandari (1988), Korteweg (2004), 
Dimitrov&Jain (2005)) have contradictory results. This is due to limited samples, and 
different methodologies adopted. The following section sets down the main objectives 
of this study. 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
In the first empirical chapter, I test the relation between leverage and returns 
by estimating cumulative abnormal returns in excess of the market return. I also 
investigate the effect of industry leverage on stock returns. I investigate the 
relationship between leverage and returns not only in the full sample but also in the 
various sectors with the exception of financial companies. I undertake the analysis 
at firm level. In the second empirical chapter, I undertake to test the relationship 
between leverage and returns by estimating returns in excess of the risk-free using 
an improved version of the MM procedure. I also test for linearity of the 
relationship between leverage and stock returns. In the first two empirical chapters, 
I undertake the analysis at the firm level. Next, I undertake the analysis at the 
portfolio level to analyse if the results differ from that of a firm level analysis. 
In the third empirical chapter, I undertake a portfolio level analysis of leverage 
and expected returns using the Fama-Macbeth (1973, hereafter FM) methodology. I 
modify the FM methodology by forming portfolios from ranked leverage computed 
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from data of one time period but then using a subsequent time period to obtain the 
leverage of the portfolios that is used to test the relationship between leverage and 
expected returns. I also test for the linearity of the relationship and also undertake 
robustness tests with other risk factors. 
The fourth empirical chapter aims to investigate the relationship between 
returns and leverage by constructing a leverage factor to explain the variations in 
returns. Following Fama and French (1993, thereafter FF) procedure in forming size 
and market-to-book mimicking portfolios, I form leverage mimicking factor portfolios 
to explain the returns in the full sample as well as in the different sectors. I also 
undertake tests to examine if returns can be explained by firm leverage even if 
portfolios constructed to mimic other risk factors related to size, market-to-book, 
market risk and momentum to capture variation in returns is in the time-series 
regressions. 
Leverage does explain returns; however the relationship does not necessarily 
have to be positive as per the findings of MM. I also find that the segregation of 
companies into various sectors provide a more meaningful result when compared to 
the previous studies. It is also imperative to undertake an analysis at the firm level and 
portfolio level to get a better understanding of the relation between returns and 
leverage. The next section provides the findings of each empirical chapter undertaken 
to investigate the relation between leverage and returns. 
1.4 Summary of Main Findings 
In the first empirical chapter, I integrate MM into an investment approach 
by estimating cumulative abnormal returns in excess of market return on leverage 
portfolios. I find that firms in sectors such as the utilities and oil and gas sectors have 
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abnormal returns that increase in leverage. These results are similar to the findings of 
MM, who employ these industries in their empirical tests. Firms in most other sectors 
experience abnormal returns that decrease in leverage, supporting the findings of 
authors who use mixed samples of firms (Korteweg 2004, Dimitrov and Jain 2005). 
Results are robust with regard to other risk factors. I also find that returns increase as 
the average leverage in a sectors increases. 
In the second empirical chapter, I test the relationship between leverage and 
returns by using an improved version of estimating returns of the MM procedure. 
Here, I estimate returns in excess of the risk free rate. I find that returns decline in 
leverage, which contradicts the findings of MM (1958). Results are robust to other 
risk factors. I also test for linearity of the relationship between leverage and stock 
returns. Results are robust to other risk factors and the relationship is linear. Hence it 
is evident from the results of the first two empirical chapters that returns decline in 
leverage i. e. firm leverage, supporting the findings of authors who use mixed samples 
of firms (Korteweg 2004, Dimitrov and Jain 2005). Thus, there is a strong need to 
undertake analysis at a portfolio level, given that I find returns increase with average 
leverage of a sectors and the results are robust with alternate estimations of returns. 
In the third empirical chapter, I test empirically the effect of portfolio leverage 
on expected stock returns by using the FM (1973) methodology. I find that firms have 
a positive relationship between leverage and returns which is similar to the findings of 
MM. Finally the results are robust when I use other risk factors such as size, market 
risk and market-to-book. 
In the fourth empirical chapter, I construct a leverage mimicking factor 
portfolios in explaining stock return variations. I find that the leverage factor explains 
the stock market variations better than CAPM or the FF three factor model in the 
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various sectors. I also undertake tests to examine if returns can be explained by firm 
leverage even if portfolios constructed to mimic other risk factors related to size, 
market-to-book, market risk and momentum to capture variation in returns is in the 
time-series regressions. The results reveal that returns decline in firm leverage which 
once again support the findings of the first two empirical chapters. 
Hence it is evident that analysis of leverage at firm and portfolio level that 
leverage does explain returns though the signs differ in each case. One possible 
explanation could be an econometric one, i. e. the manner in which leverage is 
estimated at the portfolio level; where leverage is averaged across firms and time. 
Secondly it could be due to economic issues where the availability of cheap debt has 
prompted profitable firms to increase their leverage levels and these firms appear in 
the portfolios when portfolio analysis is undertaken. Finally, firms belong to various 
sectors and some of these sectors may be capital intensive and these may lead to 
different results at the firm and portfolio levels. The next section gives a description 
of what each chapter entails. 
1.5 Structure 
This thesis has eight chapters. The first chapter which we have seen gives an 
introduction to the whole purpose and aims of the study. The second chapter will look 
into the review of literature on value effects of capital structure. The third chapter 
deals with data and methodology proposed for the study. The fourth chapter 
essentially presents the findings of the relationship between leverage and returns. 
Here I investigate if capital structure is value relevant to equity investors. The main 
purpose of the fifth chapter is to test empirically the relation between leverage and 
returns by estimating returns in excess of the risk free rate by using the MM procedure 
with improvements. I also test for its linearity on stock returns. The main purpose of 
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the sixth chapter is to test empirically the relation between leverage and expected 
stock returns at the portfolio level using the FM methodology with modifications to 
estimate portfolio leverage and expected stock returns. The seventh chapter is to 
explore the effect of leverage mimicking factor portfolio in explaining stock return 
variations. Following FF procedure in forming size and market-to-book mimicking 
portfolios, I form leverage mimicking factor portfolios to explain the variations 
returns in different sectors as controlled by leverage. I also test for the explanatory 
power of firm leverage after FF factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factors are 
priced. The eight chapter provides the conclusions and further scope for research. The 
next section provides the conclusion for this chapter. 
1.6 Conclusion 
This thesis aims to investigate the relation between leverage and stock returns 
by undertaking a comprehensive analysis. I employ different methodologies and 
approaches in a UK database to address the controversy in the results of the earlier 
empirical studies. 
My main contributions to this study are as follows: The sample in this study 
allows me to undertake a cross-sectional approach to test if leverage can explain 
returns on all listed non-financial companies and also undertake analysis in each 
sectors. This is important because the financing needs of each company could differ 
according to the sectors they belong to. Schwartz (1959) argued that firms in 
various industries have developed typically different asset structures and that the 
composition of these structures must help determine the financing of the firm. He 
states that the external risk of a firm is largely influenced by the nature of the 
industry in which the firm is engaged in. MM also argued that capital structures 
vary in different sectors as asset structures and production processes vary. 
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Following Schwartz (1959), I estimate leverage at book values since it is a 
presentation of gross risk, where, gross risk is the sum total of the external risk 
indicated by the nature of the industry and the internal risk or financial risk of its 
capital structure (Schwartz 1959). The difference between the book and market 
values of leverage is captured by the market-to-book factor which is an explanatory 
variable used in this study. I also undertake robustness tests of additional variables 
including FF factors. This chapter provides the motivation, objectives, findings and 
structure of this study. The next chapter presents the literature review undertaken. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
I now provide a detailed review of prior research on the relationship between 
stock returns and leverage. I will first provide details of the MM theory of capital 
structure, the resulting propositions and their implications to the theory of capital 
structure. Next I undertake a review of the empirical work undertaken to investigate 
the relation between leverage and returns which is the main focus of this study, taking 
into account the various measures of leverage and the need to undertake analysis in 
various sectors. Finally, I provide details on the theories of capital structure, 
determinants of capital structure and the studies undertaken on the existence of 
optimal capital structure though it must be stressed that these studies do not examine 
the effect of leverage on stock returns. Nonetheless, their contribution to the finance 
literature has been immense. 
2.2 Leverage and Returns 
2.2.1 Introduction 
In this section, I discuss the origins of the MM theory of capital structure, the 
resulting propositions and the implications of these propositions. MM explained that 
financing decisions do not matter in perfect capital markets. They argued rigorously 
that the total value of a firm is the same irrespective of the debt equity ratio. As a 
result, limited work has been undertaken to examine the relation between leverage and 
stock returns. However, for practitioners, capital structures do matter as it is one of the 
key corporate decisions that affect the performance of firms. 
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2.2.2 The MM Theorem 
The MM theorem is a cornerstone of corporate finance. In MM's seminal 
work on capital structure, they introduced the question `what is the cost of capital to a 
firm? ' They argued that this question has posed an issue to three main classes of 
economists mainly a)the financial economist concerned with the techniques of 
financing firms so as to ensure continued existence; (b)the managerial economist 
concerned with capital budgeting; and (c) the economics theorist concerned with 
investment behaviour at the micro and macro levels. 
According to the economist theorists (Somers (1955), Hicks (1946)), the two 
main decisions-making criteria are (i) maximization of profits and (ii) maximization 
of market value. In the case of the first criterion, a physical asset is worth acquiring if 
it will increase the net profits of the firms. But the net profits will increase only if the 
expected rate of returns of the asset exceeds the rate of interest. In keeping with the 
second criterion an asset is worth purchasing only if it increases the value of the 
owners' equity. i. e. it increases the market value of the firm. 
However, MM discounted the first criterion of profit maximization. They 
argued that what ought to be considered is the utility function (or risk preferences) of 
the owners. Conversely, they explained that the management would find it difficult to 
take into the risk preferences of owners whilst deciding on the projects to take on. 
Hence, MM explained that the criterion that should guide the managers in decision- 
making is if the value of the shares will increase if the project is taken on i. e. a market 
value approach should be adopted. This would help the management to make their 
decisions independent of the tastes of the owners. More importantly, under the market 
value approach, the market prices would reflect the owners' as well as potential 
owners' preferences. They argued that though the market value approach is 
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advantageous, there is a lack of an adequate theory to study the effect of financial 
structure on market valuations. In line with this argument, they explained how the 
market value approach can be used to answer the cost-of-capital question and led to 
the foundations of a theory of the valuation of firms and shares in 'a world of 
uncertainty i. e. the two main MM propositions on capital structure. 
Proposition I states that the market value for a firm is independent of the 
financing decisions. The main assumptions of the MM model are: (1) investment 
opportunities of the firm remain fixed; (2) investors have homogeneous expectations 
about future corporate earnings and the volatility of these earnings; (3) capital markets 
are perfect. There are no transaction costs and taxes. Investors can borrow at the same 
rate as companies; (4) there are no bankruptcy and reorganisation costs; (5) debt is 
risk free and the interest rate on debt is the risk-free debt; and (6) the business risk of 
a firm can be measured by the standard deviation of earnings and firms can be 
grouped into distinct business sectors. In their theoretical model, Proposition 1, took 
the following form: 
Vi 
= 
(Sj + Dj) = Xj, for any firm j in class k 
where 
Vj = market value of firm 
Sj 
= the market value of its common shares 
DD 
= the market value of the debt of the company 
XX 
= expected return on the assets owned by the company. 
They argued rigorously that in a world of complete and perfect capital markets 
with symmetric and full information, no taxes and bankruptcy costs, the firm value is 
independent of the financing decision; the value of a firm is determined by its real 
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assets and not by the securities it issues. Their theory implies that a firm could make 
its investment decisions independent of its financing decisions since there are 
arbitrage opportunities that can be used to produce costless instantaneous increases in 
wealth. Thus capital structure is irrelevant as long as the firm's investment decisions 
are taken as given. In the real world, we have to relax the assumptions to actually test 
MM's propositions as capital markets and investors are imperfect and debt is not risk 
free and there exist taxes and bankruptcy costs as we will see in the next paragraph. 
However, five years later, MM (1963) corrected their earlier views on capital 
structure after incorporating the tax advantage on earnings. They claimed that the tax 
advantage of debt financing is greater than what was originally suggested. They 
explained that because debt provides the firm a tax shield in the form of interest 
deductibility, it may benefit firms to issue debt. They claimed that the market values 
of firms in each class must be proportional in equilibrium to their expected returns net 
of taxes. 
But this traditional view was challenged by Miller (1977). He said when all 
tax rates are set to equal to zero the gain from leverage is equal zero. And when the 
personal tax rate on income from bonds is the same as that on income from shares, 
then the gain of leverage is the same as market value of a levered firm with corporate 
tax rate. But when the tax rate on income from shares is less than the tax on income 
from bonds, the gain of leverage will be less than corporate tax rate of the market 
value of a levered firm. He argued that even in a world in which interest payments are 
fully deductible in computing corporate income taxes, the value of the firm in 
equilibrium will still be independent of its capital structure. He explained that the 
advantage of corporate tax is off set by the personal income taxes and hence there was 
no tax advantage. He also argued that if the optimal capital structure was a matter of 
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adjusting or balancing the tax advantage against bankruptcy costs, why have observed 
capital structures shown so little change over time. Finally in his argument on 
bankruptcy costs, he said the trade off between bankruptcy costs and tax advantage 
will not apply especially to big businesses and low- levered firms. 
Myers (1977) argued that if Miller's model was correct, and taxes are 
irrelevant to the firms' debt equity ratio then some other reason must be sought to 
explain why firms use debt. This argument led to further research in this area that 
came to be known as The Trade off Theory; this is discussed in Section 2.2 in the 
theories of capital structure section. As far as the objectives of our study is concerned, 
this study is primarily interested in Proposition II of MM which was derived from the 
aforementioned Proposition I. 
Proposition II stated that the rate of return on common stock of companies 
whose capital structure includes some debt is equal to the appropriate capitalization 
rate for a pure equity stream plus a premium related to financial risk which was equal 
to the debt-to-equity ratios times the spread between the capitalization rate and risk 
free rate and took the following form (MM): 
ij 
= Pk+(Pk-r)Dj/Sj 
Where 
ij = expected yield of a share of stock 
Pk = capitalisation rate for a pure equity stream in the class 
r= cost of debt 
DD/Sj = debt-equity ratio 
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The return on equity capital is an increasing function of leverage. This is 
because debt increases the riskiness of the stock and hence equity shareholders will 
demand a higher return on their stocks. MM tested Proposition II in the electric 
utilities and oil and gas companies. They defined returns as the sum of interest, 
preferred dividends and stockholders income net of corporate income taxes. They 
found that in the electric utilities, the beta co-efficient to be 0.02 and in the oil 
companies the co-efficient is 0.05 which is expressed in the following: 
Electric Utilities z=6.6 +. 017h 
Oil Companies z=8.9 +. 051h 
Where 
z= percentage of return to equity shareholders 
h= debt-equity ratio 
MM also undertook linearity tests between leverage and returns. Contrary to 
the traditionalists' theory of leverage, MM did not find a hint of a curvilinear or a U- 
shaped relation which is believed to hold between the costs of capital and leverage. 
They argued that the linear relationship that they found between returns and leverage 
provides evidence of the rising costs of borrowed funds as leverage increases. 
Thus, with the development of these two propositions, MM argued that the 
cost of capital of firms is a constant for all firms and is independent of the firms' 
financial structure. Hence, the value of a firm is determined by the rate of return on 
real assets. They also asserted that Proposition II which is a derivation of Proposition I 
stated that the return on equity has a linear relation with leverage. 
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I argue that MM's approximation of returns is crude. In MM tests of 
proposition II, returns to shareholders are approximated by actual shareholder net 
income and estimations are made in the cross section of all firms in a sectors for a 
single year. I represent returns to shareholders as stock returns in excess of the return 
on market following the approach described in Schwartz (1959) and FF (1992). In the 
second, third and fourth empirical chapters, I estimate returns in excess of the risk- 
free rate. I use panel data that contains information for twenty five years and 
combines the cross section with the time series. Furthermore, I test the relationship 
between leverage and returns by testing the relation at the firm level in Chapters 4and 
5 and at the portfolio level in Chapters 6 and 7. 
MM defined leverage as ratio of the market value of bonds and preferred debt 
to the market value of all securities; I measure leverage as the ratio of the book values 
of total debt to total capital following Schwartz (1959). He proposed the ratio of total 
debt to net worth as the best single measure of gross risk. He argued that the narrow 
definition of financial structure-restricted to stocks and bonds- ignores the large 
measure of substitutability between the various forms of debt and thus a broader 
definition that encompasses the total of all liabilities and ownership claims must be 
used. Firms in various industries have different asset structures that are financed by 
cash flows generated from various forms of debt and equity. 
My analysis is based on the same understanding. The use of book values of 
debt and equity in defining the capital structure ensures that I measure capital 
structure at the time funds are raised to finance the assets. Nevertheless, I account for 
the difference between the book value and market value of equity explicitly by using 
the market-to-book ratio as a risk factor following FF (1992) and Kayhan et al (2007). 
FF (1992) found that leverage based on book values is associated with lower average 
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returns, whereas leverage based on market is associated with higher returns. They 
concluded that this variation in their findings is explained and absorbed by the 
market-to-book effect. 
In MM, they do not consider all the factors that may have a systematic effect 
on stock returns; the only independent variable is the leverage ratio to test for the 
linearity of the relationship. In my study, on top of the leverage ratio, I use three 
additional variables that reflect average leverage in every sectors and idiosyncratic 
risk, including the FF risk factors. 
MM conduct, their tests in two industries representing a regulated sectors 
each, namely the oil sector and the utilities sector. I do not limit my research to just 
two sectors. Instead this study encompasses all the non-financial firms across the nine 
sectors which cover all the different sectors. 
To conclude, the immediate implication of MM propositions on equity returns 
is that, they should increase in leverage. Their impact on corporate finance is immense 
but the original sample they used is very limited. Further empirical work uses much 
larger samples but results are mixed which we shall see in the next section. Some 
authors (Hamada, 1972; Bhandari, 1988) show that returns increase in leverage, 
others show that they decrease in leverage (Kortweg, 2004, Dimitrov and Jain, 2005, 
George and Hwang, 2006, Penman, 2007). 
2.2.3 Empirical Studies on the Relationship between Leverage and Returns 
In this section, I shall discuss the limited studies following MM which have 
examined the relationship between leverage and returns. Some authors (Hamada 
(1972); Bhandari (1988)) showed that returns increase in leverage, others show that 
they decrease in leverage (Hall (1967), Kortweg (2004), Dimitrov and Jain (2005)). It 
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is evident that these studies show that leverage can explain returns. However the 
results are contradictory. This could be due to the fact that there may be differences in 
the, methodologies adopted, samples used and the definitions of leverage used. 
Thus in the four empirical chapters of this study, I adopt different approaches 
and methodologies to examine the relation between leverage and returns. In the first 
empirical chapter (Chapter 4), 1 examine the relation between leverage and returns by 
estimating cumulative abnormal returns in excess of market return. In Chapter 5,1 
examine the relation between leverage and returns by estimating returns in excess of 
the risk-free rate. In Chapters 6 and 7,1 examine the relation between leverage and 
returns using portfolio returns which is in excess of the risk-free rate. My sample 
encompasses all non-financial firms across nine sectors. Financial firms are excluded 
since the treatment of leverage lacks clarity amongst these firms. Following Schwartz 
(1959), leverage is estimated at book values in all the empirical chapters. In all the 
empirical chapters, I use the risk factors described by FF that reflect idiosyncratic risk. 
In Chapter 4.1 use five additional variables including FF factors that reflect 
idiosyncratic risk and the particular environment's cost of borrowing in order to 
account for changes in the cost of capital in the time series that explain abnormal 
returns. 
Hamada (1969) theoretically proved that Proposition II holds well by 
concluding that the capitalization rate for a firms' equity, or the rate of return by 
investors, increases linearly with the firm's leverage ratio. The main limitation of this 
work is that it is of a theoretical nature. Hamada (1972) tests the relationship between 
a firm's leverage and its common stock's systematic risk over a cross-section of all 
firms. He concluded that firms which have debt had higher returns since financial risk 
was greater. He uses industry as a proxy for business risk, since his sample lacks a 
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sufficient number of firms to undertake separate analysis of different sectors. In my 
study, I do not make a distinction between firm's capital structures. My sample size 
enables me to undertake cross-sectional analysis separately for each sectors. I control 
for business risk by using beta as well as other risk factors. 
On examining the literature on announcements and leverage, Masulis (1983) 
showed that change in leverage is positively related to change in stock returns. He 
studied daily stock returns following exchange offers and re-capitalisations where 
recapitalisations occur at a single time. However, his work contains limitations. His 
sample contains a group of all companies that have gone through pure capital 
structure changes, which group, in and of itself, might represent a certain class of risk. 
Therefore, it is not reasonable to assume that characteristics of firms in this sub- 
sample are representative of all firms. The study analyses short term value changes as 
a result of changes in leverage brought about by exchange offers and recapitalisations. 
Korteweg (2004) also tests the aforementioned MM proposition. His tests are also 
based on pure capital structure changes (i. e., exchange offers). He controls for 
business risk by assuming non-zero debt betas and uses a time series approach. In my 
study, I use a cross-sectional approach to test whether leverage is value-relevant by 
investigating excess returns generated by holding portfolios based on a company's 
leverage. Since my sample is not limited and includes a cross-section of all firms, I do 
not assume zero debt betas and avoid additional assumptions when calculating 
separate debt betas and asset betas. I aim to undertake the analysis of returns and 
leverage at the firm and portfolio level. I also adopt various measures of returns 
estimations in each empirical chapter. 
Bhandari (1988) indirectly tested the second of MM's propositions by 
examining whether expected common stock returns are positively related to the ratio 
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of debt in the cross-section of all firms without assuming various industry-defined 
sectors. His results provide evidence that leverage has a significant positive effect on 
expected common stock returns. His returns are adjusted for inflation. He controls for 
idiosyncratic risk through size and beta whereas I use six additional variables 
including the FF factors to control for idiosyncratic risk. He includes all firms 
including financial companies in his sample, whereas I exclude financial companies 
from my sample due to the lack of clarity of the treatment of leverage in financial 
companies. Here, the principal difference with that of my work is the manner in which 
leverage has been calculated. Bhandari (1988) uses the FM methodology to estimate 
beta whereas I estimate the leverage for my sample using the FM methodology. He 
conducts his tests in the cross section of all firms without assuming different sectors, 
where as I conduct or tests for each sectors separately. He also undertakes seasonality 
tests looking at the January effect which falls outside the scope of my study which is 
primarily concerned with examining the relation between stock returns and leverage 
irrespective of seasonality and policy changes. 
Arditti (1967) tested the relationship between leverage and returns. He defined 
returns as the geometric average of returns and leverage ratio as the ratio of equity at 
market value to debt at book value. His sample of firms included industries, railroad 
and utilities. He found a negative but insignificant relationship between leverage and 
returns. He argued that this could be because some inter-firm risk variables which are 
positively correlated with returns but negatively correlated with the leverage ratio 
have been omitted. He added that these omitted variables must relate to some non- 
income information since all other information relating to income has been included 
in the regressions. Hall et al (1967) argued that capital structure is an important 
component in explaining returns. They examined the relation between returns and the 
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ratio of equity to assets which is inversely related to leverage. They defined returns as 
returns on equity which was profits after tax. Their sample included the top 500 
largest industrial corporations. They found a negative relation between ratio of equity 
to assets and returns and argued that since large amounts of leverage (i. e. low ratio of 
equity to assets) imply high risks, one would expect a negative relationship between 
returns to equity holders and the ratio of equity to assets. Another study by Baker 
(1973) examined the relationship between leverage and industry returns. He measured 
leverage inversely as the ratio of equity to total assets for the leading firms in an 
industry over the period. He too found that relatively large amounts of leverage (i. e. 
low ratio of equity to assets) tend to raise industry profit rates, more leverage 
implying greater risks. My work differs in respect of the returns and leverage 
estimations. My work is primarily concerned with the analysis of returns and leverage 
at the firm and portfolio level. 
Hull (1999) measures market reaction to common stock offerings with the sole 
purpose of debt reduction and reports a negative immediate response-increasingly 
more so for firms further from the industry norm. In my work, I aim to undertake 
analysis of returns and leverage at the firm and portfolio level. My sample is not as 
limited as Hull's and includes a cross-sectional examination of all firms. In Chapter 4, 
I include the leverage in a particular industry as an explanatory variable to explain 
returns. Additionally, I do not employ a short-run perspective. While Hull measures 
immediate wealth maximisation using three-day cumulative returns, I assume a one- 
year holding period for my portfolios, which assumption is in keeping with MM and 
Schwartz (1959). I adopt various measures of returns estimations in each empirical 
chapter. In Chapter 4, I estimate returns in excess of the market return; in Chapters 5, 
6 and 7,1 estimate returns in excess of the risk-free rate. 
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Dimitrov and Jain (2005) measure the effect of leverage changes on stock 
returns as well as on earnings-based measures of performance. Their results reveal a 
negative correlation between leverage and risk-adjusted stock returns. The authors 
studied how changes in levels of debt are negatively associated with contemporaneous 
and future-adjusted returns. Similarly, Nissim et al (2003) examined the effect of 
leverage on profitability. They also made a distinction between the profitability of 
operations and that of financing. Furthermore a distinction between contemporaneous 
and future profits is also made. When they form portfolios sorted by financial 
leverage, they find that the portfolios with the lowest financial leverage perform better 
than portfolios with high financial leverage. They argued that this is because firms 
with profitable operating assets have more operating liability leverage and less 
financial leverage. When they examined the effect of total leverage i. e. leverage 
arising from operating and financing activities, they find that leverage has a negative 
relationship with future returns. 
It is evident that these studies have found that leverage can explain returns. 
However, the results are contradictory. Thus, I undertake a comprehensive analysis of 
the methodologies adopted, sample sizes and leverage definitions. To sum up, my 
contributions are as follows: I define returns as market adjusted returns in the first 
empirical chapter (Chapter 4) and in the subsequent empirical chapters returns are 
defined as in excess of risk-free rate. In Chapter 4, I represent equity returns as 
cumulative abnormal returns for a holding period of one year, which representation is 
easier for an investor to interpret, as well as monthly returns. I use panel data that 
contains information for a 25-year period and combines the cross-section with the 
time series. In MM, the only independent variable is the leverage ratio and its square 
to test the linearity of the relationship. In this study, in addition to the leverage ratio, I 
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use five additional variables that reflect idiosyncratic risk, including the risk factors 
described by Fama and French (1992) and the particular environment's cost of 
borrowing in order to account for changes in the cost of capital in the time series that 
explain abnormal returns. Also, I examine the effect of industry leverage on stock 
returns. MM conduct their tests within two industries, each representing a highly 
regulated sectors, namely the oil and utilities sectors. I, however, do not limit our 
research simply to two sectors. Instead, my study encompasses all non-financial firms 
across the nine sectors that cover all the various classes of risk. The analysis of 
leverage is undertaken at the firm level and industry level. 
My second contribution in the second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) where I 
estimate returns in excess of risk free rate to examine the relation between leverage 
and returns. I also undertake linearity tests between leverage and stock returns. Here I 
also use FF factors which include size, beta and market-to-book. The main distinction 
between Chapters 4 and 5 is the manner in which returns are estimated and to examine 
if results differ as a result. The analysis of leverage is undertaken at the firm level. 
In Chapter 6,1 examine the relation between leverage and returns by 
estimating portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free. Here I adopt the FM 
methodology and the analysis is undertaken at the portfolio level to examine if results 
differ between a firm level and portfolio level analysis. Here I also use FF factors 
which include size, market risk and market-to-book. 
In Chapter 7,1 examine the relation between leverage and returns by 
constructing a leverage factor to explain the variations in returns. Following FF 
procedure in forming size and market-to-book mimicking portfolios, I form leverage 
mimicking factor portfolios to explain the returns in the full sample as well as in the 
different sectors. The main aim of this test is to test if the leverage factor is able to 
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I 
capture stock returns variations as well as the FF model. I also undertake estimations 
using firm leverage and portfolios constructed to mimic risk factors related to market 
risk, size, market-to-book and momentum. The aim of this estimation is to assess if 
returns can still be explained by firm leverage even if portfolios constructed to mimic 
risk factors related to market risk, size, market-to-book and momentum is in the time 
series regressions 
We have now examined the various studies that have investigated the 
relation between leverage and returns. I have also discussed that though these studies 
do explain returns, their results are contradictory. Hence I aim to undertake a 
comprehensive analysis taking into account the different methodologies, samples and 
leverage definitions used in these studies. In the following section, I provide a detailed 
discussion on the measure of leverage used in this study. 
2.2.4 Measures of Leverage 
Given the various measures of leverage that have been used in the 
previous studies, it is only appropriate to define what this study means by this term. 
Rajan et al (1995) argued that the most relevant measure depends on the objective of 
the analysis. The main objective of this study is to examine if leverage can explain 
returns. Hence the most relevant measure of leverage would be one that is able to 
capture risk in its entirety and hence explain returns. 
Schwartz (1959) proposed the ratio of total debt to net worth as the best single 
measure of gross risk. He argued that the narrow definition of financial structure- 
restricted to stocks and bonds- ignores the large measure of substitutability between 
the various forms of debt and thus a broader definition that encompasses the total of 
all liabilities and ownership claims must be used. Firms in various industries have 
different asset structures that are financed by cash flows generated from various forms 
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of debt and equity. The use of book values of both variables ensures that I am 
measuring the capital structure via the cash flows generated at the time those assets 
were financed. Schwartz (1959) also argues that an optimum capital structure for a 
widely held company is one which maximises the long-run value of the common 
stock per share. My analysis is based on the same understanding. The use of book 
values for debt and equity has the additional advantage of using the market value of 
equity neither to define the change in value nor in concurrent capital structure. 
Following Fama and French (1992), I account for the difference between the two by 
using market-to-book ratio as an additional risk factor. 
MM defined leverage as ratio of the market value of bonds and preferred debt 
to the market value of all securities. Bhandari (1988) indirectly tested the MM II 
proposition by examining whether expected common stock returns are positively 
related to the ratio of debt in the cross-section of all firms without assuming various 
industry-defined sectors. He used the book value of debt to the market value of equity 
to measure leverage. Korteweg (2004) tests are based on pure capital structure 
changes (i. e., exchange offers). He defined leverage as ratio of total debt to total 
capital both in market values and does not account for the difference between the 
book and market values of leverage. 
Dimitrov and Jain (2005) measured the effect of leverage changes on stock 
returns as well as on earnings-based measures of performance; the authors measured 
leverage as ratio of total debt to total capital, both in market values. In a related study, 
Penman et al (2007) examined the market-to-book effect in stock returns by 
accounting for leverage. They break-down the book to price component into 
enterprise book-to-price which reflects the operating risk and a leverage component 
that reflects financing risk. They find that indeed leverage is negatively related to 
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returns and found this evident in firms with both high and low book-to-price 
companies. They defined leverage as net debt divided by the market value of equity. 
Rajan et al (1995) argued that following the agency problems associated with debt, 
this measure of leverage would relate to how the firm has been financed in the past 
and hence this measure will be used to assess the relative claims on firm value held by 
debt and equity. 
Maroney el al (2004) explored the risk and return relation in six Asian equity 
markets affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. They found leverage to be a key 
feature in the current financial crisis models. They found evidence that firm leverage 
in the six countries showed that changes in leverage are associated with cross- 
sectional differences in average returns. They asserted that increased leverage 
contributed to the rise in equity betas and raised expected returns. Valuation ratios 
decline as prices reflect the rise in leverage. Hence capital losses are necessarily 
created to make higher expected returns possible. They argued that since leverage is 
difficult to measure and the data is likely to consist of annual book values, they used 
indicators of leverage. Price-to-book ratio, price-earnings and exchange rates lagged 
one week were included as a leverage proxy. I argue that since my study examines 
leverage as independent variable in explaining returns, I measure leverage as the ratio 
of the total debt in book value to the ratio of total equity in book values. I account for 
the difference between the two by using market-to-book ratio as an additional risk 
factor. 
George and Hwang (2006) find a negative relation between returns and book 
leverage. They argued that this is due to estimates of default probabilities (i. e. distress 
factors) are positively related to leverage. They explained that firms that suffer most 
(least) in financial distress maintain low (high) leverage. Thus, the return premium to 
34 
low leverage firms relative high leverage firms appear to be a form of compensation 
for the financial distress costs. They defined leverage as total debt divided by total 
assets. I acknowledge that indeed the distress factor could be one of the reasons that 
firms maintain low leverage. However, I argue that since the study was measuring 
financial distress, a flow measure like the interest-coverage ratio is more relevant. 
Rajan et al (1995) argued that the measure of leverage denoted by total debt divided 
by total assets fails to incorporate that there are some assets that are offset by specific 
non-debt liabilities. I base my leverage estimations on book values and argue that this 
variation between market and book values is absorbed by the market-to-book effect, a 
variable ignored by several studies (MM(1958), Bhandari (1988), George and 
Hwang(2006)). 
Thus, I reiterate that since the main objective of this study is to examine the 
relation between leverage and returns, the best measure of leverage would be one that 
would be the best single measure of gross risk. In the next section I lay down the 
reasons for dividing my full sample into various sectors to undertake analysis. 
2.2.5 Industry, Leverage and Returns 
In this section, I present the review of literature that constitutes the basis 
of as to why this study undertakes an examination of the relationship between 
leverage and returns not only in the full sample but in the various sectors with the 
exception of financial companies. Schwartz (1959) argued that there exists an optimal 
capital structure for each firm as long as the firms attempt to maximise the long run 
market value of the shares. He classified total risks of a company into two, namely, 
external risk which was to a large extent dictated by the nature of the industry the firm 
was in and the internal risk which was the financial risk of its capital structure. For 
e. g. an industrial firm facing heavier external risk is more than likely to experience a 
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relatively sharp rise in financing charges if its leverage ratio exceeds certain 
proportions. He argued that since it is a well known fact firms in various industries 
have developed typically different asset structures and that the composition of these 
asset structures must necessarily help determine the financing of the firm. I test the 
original idea in MM that capital structures vary in different sectors as asset structures 
and production processes vary. MM undertook their tests in two sectors, namely 
utilities and oil and gas. I argue that this is too restricted a sample to draw inferences 
from. Additionally, these two sectors are highly regulated and capital intensive 
sectors. Hence in my study I assess the returns by taking into account the risks 
imposed by the sectors the industries belong to and the capital structure of these 
companies. This is mainly because the financing needs of each company could differ 
according to the sectors they belong to. 
Hull (1999) found that the stock value is influenced by how a firm changes its 
leverage in relationship to its industry leverage ratio, measured by median. He 
concluded that the market's reaction to leverage-decrease announcements depends on 
how a firm's leverage changes relative to its industry leverage norm. He concluded 
that the industry debt-to-equity ratio is a useful benchmark with which investors can 
evaluate a stock's attractiveness. 
On the other hand, Bradley at al (1984) measured industry leverage using the 
mean of the leverages of the firms in a sectors. Bowen et al (1982) find statistically 
differences between mean industry financial structures. Thus following Bradley et al 
(1984) and Bowen et al (1982) I use mean industry leverage as I argue that this 
facilitates comparison of leverage with relative of firm leverage and also has greater 
explanatory power than median industry leverage. 
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There is a considerable amount of literature on the differences in leverage due 
to industry characteristics. Hall et al (1967) argued that firms within particular 
industries do have differing capital structures. They explained that profit 
maximization or sales maximization would require some optimal rate of borrowing 
which differs from industry to industry depending on such things as stability and 
growth prospects. Brown et al. (1982) show that there is a difference between mean 
industry capital structures and that each industry tends to have an optimal debt ratio 
due to tax benefits. Campello (2003) provides evidence that firms that rely on debt is 
more likely to reduce their investment in market share-building during downturns. 
Arditti (1967) explained that some risks are indigenous to each industry 
grouping and hence the true nature of the leverage return relationship can be disclosed 
only by testing this relationship within industries. Further work by Barclays et al 
(1985) find that leverage is high for regulated firms and firms in low-tech sectors, and 
it is low in high-tech industries. Bradley (1984) found that leverage decreases with 
R&D expenditures. Hall et al (1967) argued that capital structure is an important 
element in explaining returns in industries. This is because sales maximisation or 
profit maximisation would require some optimal rate of borrowing which differs from 
industry to industry dependent on factors such as stability and growth prospects. 
Baker (1973) investigated the effect of financial leverage on industrial 
profitability. His examination of the leverage variable for the major firms in his 
sample of industries indicated that firms in the same industry tend to have similar 
amounts of leverage. Hence this suggests that industry conditions play a role in 
determining the leverage ratios firms select. Mackay et al (2005) examined how 
industry affected firm financial structure. They found that in addition to standard 
industry fixed effects, financial structure also depends on a firms' position within its 
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industry. Bradley et al (1984) found strong industry influences across the firm 
leverage ratios. They found that 54% of the variation in firm leverage is explained by 
industry classification. Bowen et al (1982) provide additional evidence on the 
relationship between leverage and industry classification both cross-sectionally and 
across time. 
Studies have also been undertaken on the interaction of finance and product 
markets (Brander and Lewis, 1986 and Maksimovic, 1988). Baker (1973) found that 
the predictability of output fluctuations and the effect of output changes on total costs 
and hence on profit fluctuations may separately influence financial leverage decisions. 
Campello (2003) provided evidence from business cycles of firm and industry-level 
evidence of the effects of capital structure on product market outcomes for a cross 
section of industries. He concluded that debt financing has a negative impact on firm 
relative to industry sales growth in industries in which rivals are relatively unlevered 
during recessions, but not during boom periods. Campello (2006) found evidence that 
debt can hurt and boost performance based on the interaction between firms' 
financing decisions and its product market performance. 
Miao (2005) presented an equilibrium model of industry dynamics and capital 
structure decisions. He concluded that the interaction between financing and 
production decisions is important in an industry equilibrium. Kale et al (2007) found 
that a firms' debt level has a positive relation with the degree of concentration in 
supplier/customer industries. Hou et al (2006) found that firms in highly concentrated 
industries earn lower returns. Durnev et al (2004) found that capital budgeting seems 
to be closely related with market value maximization in industries whose stocks 
exhibit greater firm specific return variation. 
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From the above discussion it is clear that dividing my sample into various 
sectors will enable me to undertake a more meaningful analysis of my results since 
firms in various industries have different asset structures that are financed by cash 
flows generated from various forms of debt and equity. I also argue the fact that debt 
requirements for each sectors differ and that certain heavy industries require a higher 
leverage, while also acknowledging that average leverage levels within a sectors may 
differ due to macroeconomic factors such as interest rates, yet each company within a 
sectors may have its own unique reasons for a capital structure preference. In the 
following section, a discussion on leverage as a risk factor and how it can explain 
stock returns variations is carried out. 
2.2.6 Leverage as a Risk Factor in Stock Returns 
Empirical finance has identified size, market-to-book, beta and momentum 
as risk factors. Banz (1981) found that size, measured as market capitalization i. e. 
stock price times number of shares outstanding has a reliable power in explaining the 
cross-section of average returns. Chan et al (1991) also found that market-to-book has 
a strong role in explaining the cross-section of average returns on Japanese stocks. 
FF (1992) concluded that the two variables, namely, size and market-to- 
book relate to economic fundamentals and present information in prices about risk 
and expected returns. They argue that size is a common risk factor that might explain 
the negative relation between returns and size. FF (2006) examined how value 
premium vary with firm size. Likewise, the positive relation between market-to-book 
and average return suggest that market-to-book is a source of common stock risk 
factor. 
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Beta is a measure of a stock (or portfolio)'s volatility in relation to the rest of 
the market. It is the the risk measure which was suggested by researchers (Sharpe 
(1964), Lintner (1965) Fama and Macbeth 1973) to explain the common stock returns. 
They find that a positive relation exists between volatility and stock returns. 
The momentum effect, first discovered by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), 
found that past returns have a strong ability to predict future returns; a strategy of 
buying past winners and selling past losers results in abnormal returns of 1% per 
month. In this thesis, I account for the risk factors of size, market-to-book, market risk 
and momentum. 
Ball (1978) concluded that there exists an association between market 
evaluation ratios and expected returns. He argued that these ratios pick up expected 
return variation as prices move opposite to expected returns. Ferguson et al (2003) 
illustrated that firm leverage is directly related to valuation ratios. 
Bhandari(1988) argued that leverage can be used as a proxy for the risk of 
common equity when an adequate measure of risk is not known or cannot be 
calculated from available information. Thus, I argue that leverage which theoretical 
finance has always regarded as one of the basic sources of financial risk should be 
able to capture these variations in stock returns. Leverage is an important risk factor 
which has been ignored in the asset- pricing literature due to the overwhelming 
influence of MM. 
FF (1993) identified five common risk factors in the returns on stocks and 
bonds that explained average returns on stocks and bonds. There are size, market- 
book, excess returns on the market portfolio for the stocks and for the bonds, maturity 
and default risk. They formed portfolios constructed to mimic risk factors related to 
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size and book-to-market and found evidence that indeed it is proxy for sensitivities to 
common risk factors in stock returns. 
FF (1996) show that their three factor model is able to capture most CAPM 
related anomalies but is unable to capture the momentum effect. Thus, Carhart (1997) 
formed portfolios constructed to mimic the , momentum factor and found that the 
momentum mimicking portfolio tend to explain persistence in mutual funds 
performance. 
Maroney et al (2004) introduced an asset pricing model that used portfolios 
managed by valuation ratios that incorporated the impact of changes in leverage and 
business risk in average returns. They found evidence that leverage has an important 
role in explaining the likelihood of financial crises. They concluded that familiar 
valuation ratios postulate that when leverage increases, beta will increase and average 
returns fall because capital losses are necessary for higher average returns. Although 
the main aim of this study is to explain the relation between leverage and returns and 
not to predict the likelihood of financial crisis, the important point to be noted here is 
the role that leverage plays as a valuation ratio. FF (1993) showed that by forming 
size and market-to-book mimicking portfolios, they were able to study variations in 
stock returns. Similarly, I argue that by forming leverage mimicking portfolios, I 
identify a proxy for risk in the form of leverage in returns. 
Penman et al (2007) concluded that leverage explains differences in returns 
not captured by market-to-book. Thus, I argue that leverage which theoretical finance 
has always regarded as one of the basic sources of financial risk should be able to 
capture variations in returns. 
Dimson et al (2003) examined the value premium of UK stocks by calculating 
FF factors for the UK stocks. Thus it is evident these factors also work in the UK and 
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hence I aim to study the effect of leverage mimicking factor portfolio in addition to 
the factors of size, market-to-book, momentum and excess returns on the market 
portfolio to explain the average return variation in stock returns across all sectors in 
my sample size. 
My sample contains information for twenty five years and combines the cross 
section with the time series to undertake the tests in various sectors as well. I compute 
the leverage factor as the difference each month between the simple average of the 
returns of the bottom 30% deciles of the high levered portfolios and the simple 
average of the returns on top 30% deciles of the low levered portfolios FF (1993) 
examined all companies including financial companies. In my study I exclude all 
financial companies due to the lack of clarity of the treatment of leverage in financial 
companies. 
Additionally, my sample size enables me to undertake analysis separately for 
each sectors. I study the effect of leverage mimicking factor portfolio in addition to 
the factors of size, market-to-book and excess returns on the market portfolio to 
explain the average return variation in stock returns. 
George and Hwang (2006) constructed a leverage factor and showed that it 
explained a significant amount of time series variation in returns which was distinct to 
those explained by the other Fama-French factors. They used the differences between 
the coefficients of the low and high leverage dummies in the regression to construct 
the leverage factor. They argued that leverage and market-to-book factors appear to 
capture return premiums. They concluded that the leverage factor has great 
explanatory power. 
In Chapter 7,1 estimate the leverage factor following FF (1993). 1 argue that 
this is a more robust manner of estimating the leverage factor than that of George at 
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al)2006). My portfolio HLMLL (high leverage minus low leverage) meant to mimic 
the risk factor in returns related to leverage, is the difference, each month between the 
simple average of the returns on the three(deciles 8,9,10) high levered portfolios and 
the simple average of the returns on the three(deciles 1,2,3) low levered portfolios. 
Thus HLMLL is the difference between the returns on high levered and low levered 
portfolios. I also undertake estimations using firm leverage and portfolios constructed 
to mimic risk factors related to market risk, size, market-to-book and momentum. The 
aim of this estimation is to assess if returns can still be explained by leverage even if 
portfolios constructed to mimic risk factors related to market risk, size, market-to- 
book and momentum is in the time series regressions 
In this section, we have looked at arguments as to why leverage should be 
priced as a risk factor and hence given due importance in the asset pricing literature. 
The following section presents the conclusions of this entire section. 
2.2.7 Conclusion 
The main focus of this study is to examine if leverage can explain returns. In this 
section, I have introduced the MM theory, their propositions and implications; I have 
also undertaken a literature review of the limited studies that have undertaken direct 
tests on capital structure by examining if leverage can explain returns; my 
contributions to the existing literature; the various measures of leverage; importance 
of undertaking industry analysis; and the importance of pricing leverage as a risk 
factor. The main conclusion from the limited empirical studies is that leverage can 
explain returns. However, the relation can be positive or negative. Hence to bridge 
this gap, I intend to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the samples, 
methodologies and definitions of leverage to address this controversy. In the 
following sections, I provide details of the literature on the theories of capital 
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structure, determinants of capital structure and the studies undertaken on the existence 
of optimal capital structure. 
2.3 Theories of Capital Structure 
2.3.1 Introduction 
In this section, a review of the theories of capital structure is carried out. I 
would like to stress that although these studies undertook research on the determinants 
of capital structure, I aim to discuss the existence of these theories and their 
contribution to the vast capital structure literature; the individual variables suggested 
by these theories that affect capital structure and how some of these variables will be 
used in my research.. 
MM's seminal work led to the development of different theories on capital 
structure including the trade-off theory, the pecking-order theory, agency theory, 
market timing theory, corporate control theory and product cost theory. The trade-off 
theory states that the capital structure is a result of a trade-off between the tax 
advantage and potential bankruptcy costs; the pecking order theory states that firms 
follow a particular order of financing whereby firms will first use their retained 
earnings, then debt and lastly new equity; the agency theory concludes that debt can 
be used as a disciplinary mechanism in controlling agency conflict; the market timing 
theory propagate that firms issue debt when there is information asymmetry and 
hence equity issue is timed accordingly; the corporate control theory states that 
capital structure affects the outcome of take-over contests and the product cost theory 
which were developed in recent times examined the relationship between capital 
structure and the product market strategy. These theories carried out indirect tests on 
capital structure. I aim to investigate the relation between leverage and stock returns. 
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2.3.2 The Trade off theory 
The trade-off theory argues that firms have an optimal capital structure and 
when displaced from this revert back to it over a period of time (Scott 1977). Studies 
on the trade-off theory by capital structure by MM (1963), Lintner (1956), Gordon 
(1959), Krauz and Litzenberger (1973), Miller (1977), DeAngelo et al (1980) and 
Dammon and Senbet (1988) were of a theoretical nature. On the other hand, work by 
Shyam-Sunders et al (1999), Fama and French (2002) and Mayer and Sussman (2004) 
were of an empirical nature. The trade off theory stemmed from MM (1963)'s study 
where MM explained that due to the tax advantage of debt, it would be beneficial to 
the shareholders to have debt in the capital structure. It is divided into static trade off 
theory and dynamic theory. According to the static trade-off theory, there are 
advantages and disadvantages to the use of debt as against equity and firms select an 
optimal capital structure that balances these at the margin (Scott 1977). Initially the 
theory was restricted to the trade-off between tax advantages and the bankruptcy 
costs of debt. It was later extended to include agency costs as well (Jensen et al 1976). 
The traditional view is that there are tax advantages to debt but that beyond a certain 
level, these are counter balanced by costs associated with bankruptcy and financial 
distress. Firms unable to provide collateral will have to pay higher interest, or will be 
forced to issue equity instead of debt (Scott 1977). Thus a positive relationship 
between tangibility of assets and leverage is predicted. Myers (1977) analysed the link 
between debt financing and firm value when interest is a tax-deductible expense 
ignoring bankruptcy costs. He concluded that the amount of debt issued by the firm is 
that amount which maximises the market value of the firm. 
However, Fischer et al (1989) in their dynamic trade-off theory, found that 
even in a trade off setting with a fixed cost of issuing equity, firms may stray away 
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from their target capital structure adjusting leverage only when it strays' beyond 
extreme bounds. This is because when a firm earns profit debt gets paid off and 
leverage falls automatically. Only periodically will large readjustments be made in 
order to capture the tax benefits of leverage. Thus profitable firms will be less levered 
even if the trade off theory is at work and the adjustment costs are taken into account. 
Leland (1994) also presented a dynamic trade-off model where firms let their leverage 
fluctuate over time reflecting accumulated earnings and losses and do not adjust it 
toward the target as long as the adjustment costs exceed the value lost due to sub- 
optimal capital structure. 
Early empirical evidence on the trade-off theory yielded mixed results. As 
seen earlier, the Miller (1977) model discounted the tax advantage of issuing debt as it 
gets off set by personal taxes. Miller (1977)'s model led to attempts to reconcile his 
model with the balancing theory of capital structure. Subsequently another theory was 
developed to demonstrate that Miller's model worked well when modified to allow 
for on the benefits of non-debt tax shields. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) showed that 
the presence of corporate tax shield substituting for debt implies a market equilibrium 
in which each firm has a unique interior capital structure. He found that the existence 
of non debt tax shields such as depreciation deductions and investment tax credits, 
together with an asymmetric corporate tax code that does not rebate losses is 
sufficient to overturn the irrelevance of Miller (1977). They argued that there exists a 
`substitution effect between the level of non-debt tax shields and the tax benefits of 
corporate leverage. 
Kim (1982) also found that if leverage related costs such as bankruptcy costs 
and agency costs are significant and if the income from equity is untaxed, then the 
marginal bondholders tax rate will be lower than the corporate rate and there will be a 
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positive net tax advantage to corporate debt financing. Gul (1999) observed in his 
study on 5308 listed Japanese companies that non-debt tax shields argument that high 
growth firms have lesser non-debt tax shields to be similar to DeAngelo and 
Masulis(1980). 
Krauz and Litzenberger (1973) examined the direct and indirect costs of 
bankruptcy and tax advantage of debt. They concluded that the taxation of corporate 
profits and the existence of bankruptcy penalties are market imperfections that are 
central to a positive theory of the effect of leverage on the firm's market value. 
However, they argued that if the firm's debt obligation exceeds its earnings the firms' 
value is not necessarily a concave function of its debt obligation. 
The Trade-off theory of capital structure has generated substantial research 
with some studies supporting the theory and others finding the pecking order theory 
better at explaining the financing patterns of firms'. In the next section, I 'will examine 
the pecking order theory. 
2.3.3 The Pecking Order Theory 
The pecking order theory was first suggested by Donaldson (1961). He 
concluded in his study of a sample of large corporations that management strongly 
favoured internal generation as a source of new funds as compared to external funds. 
Myers (1984) further developed the theory and presented the pecking order theory 
about how firms finance themselves and about the capital structures that result from 
these pecking order decisions. Myers-Majluf (1984) showed that if investors are less 
informed than firm insiders, then equity may be mispriced by the market. If firms are 
required to finance new projects by issuing equity, under-pricing may be so severe 
' For more papers and their findings on the Trade-Off Theory, please refer Appendix 1 
47 
that new investors capture more than the NPV of the new project resulting in net loss 
to existing shareholders. In such a case, the project will be rejected even its NPV is 
positive. This under-investment can be avoided if the firm can finance the new project 
using a security that is not so badly undervalued by the market. To avoid this 
distortion, managers follows what Myers (1984) called the pecking order. He said 
they financed projects first with retained earnings which involved no asymmetric 
information, then with low risk debt for which the problem is negligible then with 
risky debt. Equity is issued only as a last resort when investment so far exceeds 
earnings that financing with debt would produce excessive leverage. Stoja et al(2005) 
found that firms follow a pecking order to financing or time their equity when 
markets are buoyant. 
Kraser (1986) tested the pecking order model and his results were similar with 
that of Myers (1984). Aybar-Arias et al (2004) examined the pecking order theory in 
small and medium entreprises (SMEs) and found the results similar with the model. 
Narayanan (1988) and Heinkel and Zechner (1990) obtained results which were 
similar to that of Myers (1984) although they do conclude that there can be over- 
investment i. e. investment in negative NPV projects when the information asymmetry 
concerns only the value of the new project. Narayanan (1988) explained that when 
firms are allowed to issue debt or equity, all firms either issue debt or reject the 
project. He found that new issues of debt and in the case of Heinkel and Zechner 
(1990), existing debt reduces the over-investment problem relative to equity 
financing. Other studies have tested the pecking order theory indirectly. Korajczyk et 
al (1991) and Choe et al (1993) examined if equity issuance is timed to avoid periods 
of greater asymmetric information problems. Choe et al (1993) find that firms are 
likely to issue equity in boom periods when investors have a favourable outlook on 
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the economy while Korajczyk et al (1991) found firms time their equity offerings 
soon after they report earnings. 
On the contrary, Helwege et al (1996) directly tested the existence of a 
pecking order by examining the financing choices of small firms as they age. Their 
empirical results provide little support of the pecking order theory. They find the 
probability of obtaining external funds is unrelated to the shortfall in internal sources 
of cash. However their results do show that firms with surplus cash do avoid the 
capital markets. Frank and Goyal (2003) tested the pecking order theory of corporate 
leverage and found that contrary to the theory, net equity issues track the financing 
deficit more closely than do net debt issues. Debt financing does not dominate equity 
financing in magnitude. They concluded that equity is more important than debt. 
Graham et al (2001) found mixed results in their survey of 392 CFOs in testing the 
pecking order theory and very little evidence that executives are concerned about 
asymmetric information. Similarly, Jong and Weld (2001) in their study on capital 
structure decisions of Dutch companies do not find their results supporting the 
adverse selection costs of Myers and Majiuf (1984). Agca et al (2004) argued that the 
conflicting evidence of the pecking order theory is more due to the differences 
between the financing practises of large and small firms, and the skewness of the firm 
size distribution. They found that the theory does not hold for small firms because 
they have low debt capacities that are quickly exhausted, forcing them to issue equity. 
In their work on comparing the trade-off and pecking order theories, Mayer et 
al (2004) found that financing patterns are more similar with the trade-off than the 
pecking order theory. According to Mayer and Sussman (2004), the pecking order 
theory of Myers-Majluf (1984) does not provide a theory of capital structure. Instead 
it is a theory of debt, which explains why equity is dominated by debt and is never 
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used in equilibrium'. They find clear evidence that capital structures reverting back to 
previous levels of leverage after an investment spike. Additionally, firms do not 
exhaust internal resources before turning to external finance. In his study on Nepalese 
listed firms, Gajurel (2005) finds evidence of both the trade-off and pecking order 
theories. Fama and French (2002) also contrast the pecking order and trade-off 
theories and find that leverage is inversely related to firm profitability and is similar 
with the pecking order theory but also find that leverage is negatively related to 
earnings. 
However, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) tested the theory directly and 
found that the pecking order is an excellent explanation of corporate financing. They 
concluded that compared to a static trade off theory, the pecking order theory explains 
more of the variation in firms financing decisions. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
explained that the trade off model should be abandoned as a first order explanation of 
financing decisions However, Chirinko and Singha (1999) argued that the pecking 
order theory is a non-linear model and that this non-linearity has not been captured in 
Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999)'s study. He explained that Shyam-Sunder et al 
(1999) assumed that firms meet their deficit-in-funds by relying only on debt finance. 
Hence their model is likely to indicate rejection if the firms goes to equity market for 
new capital. 
The pecking order theory is based on the existence of asymmetric 
information where firms' managers or insiders are assumed to possess inside 
information about the firms' returns stream or investment opportunities and how this 
private information influences capital structure. In his work on capital structure, Ross 
(1977) presented a model where capital structure served as a signal of private insider 
information. In his model, managers are fully aware of the firms' returns but the 
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investors are not. Managers benefit if the firms' securities are more highly valued by 
the market but are penalised if the firm goes bankrupt. Investors take larger debt 
levels as a signal of higher quality. This is because of managers of lower quality firms 
have higher marginal expected bankruptcy costs for any debt level and hence 
managers of these firms will not imitate higher quality firms by issuing more debt. He 
concluded that choice of the capital structure of a firm is a `signalling' factor to 
outsiders about the information of insiders. Ross (1977) predicted a positive relation 
between leverage or value and bankruptcy probability. He explained that the values of 
firms will rise with leverage, since increasing leverage increases the market's 
perception of value. He said firm financing decisions are actually signalling devices to 
the market, conveying information to the investors about the firm's business risk and 
probability. On the other hand, Leland and Pyle (1977) developed a model based on 
managerial risk aversion to obtain a signalling equilibrium in which the capital 
structure is obtained. Here, increases in firm leverage allow for managers to retain a 
larger fraction of the risky equity. The larger equity share reduces managerial welfare 
due to risk aversion, but the decrease is smaller for managers of higher quality 
projects. Thus managers of higher quality firms can signal this fact by having more 
debt in equilibrium. Hence, Leland and Pyle (1977) predicted a positive relation 
between value and equity ownership of insiders. 
While the models explained above concentrated on capital structure being 
`signalling' factors to the market based on insider information, the pecking order 
examined the financing choices sequence in order to mitigate inefficiencies in the 
firms' investment decisions that are caused by information asymmetry (Harris and 
Raviv 1991). Hence the signalling models of Ross (1977), Leland and Pyle(1977) and 
Heinkel (1982) do not obtain pecking order results. This is because the models 
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concentrate in capital structure being "signalling" indicators to the markets based on 
insider information rather than concentrating on firms' financing choices. 
The pecking order theory of capital structure looked at how firms met their 
financing needs; firms would first use their retained earnings, then debt and finally 
new equity financing2. As we have seen some studies support the theory whilst others 
find evidence in support of other theories such as the agency costs theory. In the next 
section, I shall review the agency costs theory. 
2.3.4 The Agency Costs Theory 
The models based on agency costs study how capital structures can help 
contain the agency costs by aligning the interests of the shareholders, managers and 
debt holders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) identified 2 types of conflicts i. e. conflict 
between equity shareholders and managers and secondly between equity shareholders 
and debt holders. Liu(2006) found that capital structure can act as a mechanism to 
implement the optimal trade-off between ownership control and managerial incentive. 
He provides a new theory that firm should use external financing even if its not 
financially constrained since external financing has merits in terms of inducing 
commitment. On the other hand, Oliver (2005) found that when management 
confidence is high firms have higher levels of debt. 
The conflict between the shareholders and managers arise because they 
disagree on an operating decision and this problem cannot be solved through contracts 
based on cash flows and investment expenditure (Harris and Raviv 1991). Hence debt 
helps to mitigate the problem by giving the investors the option to force liquidation if 
cash flows are poor. Jensen (1986) concluded that debt payments reduce free cash 
2 For more papers and their findings on The Pecking Order Theory, please refer Appendix 1 
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flow available to self-interested managers. Therefore capital structure is determined 
by trading-off these benefits of debt against costs of debt. Stulz (1991) concluded that 
debt payments will limit the amount of free cash flow available for profitable 
payments. DeAngelo et al (2006) find that low leverage, substantial equity payouts 
and moderate cash holdings to control agency costs while preserving financial 
flexibility. They argued that although high leverage mitigates agency problems, it also 
reduces financial flexibility because the utilisation of the current borrowing capacity 
translates into less availability in the future. 
The conflict between debt-holders and shareholders arise because the debt 
contract gives the shareholders an incentive to invest sub-optimally. If an investment 
yields large returns, well above the face value of the debt, the shareholders capture 
most of the gains. However, if an investment turns out to be a loss, the debt-holders 
has to bear the consequences. As a result of this the shareholders may actually take on 
very risky projects at the expense of the debt holders. Thus, the cost, s to invest in 
value decreasing investments created by debt is borne by the debtholders. This is 
generally called the `asset substitution effect' and is an agency costs of debt financing. 
Williamson (1988) stated that the benefits of debt are the incentives provided to 
managers by the rules under which the debt holders can take over the firm and 
liquidate the assets. The costs of debts are that the inflexibility of the rules can result 
in liquidation of the assets when they are more valuable in the firm. Hence, he 
concluded that assets are more re-deployable should be financed with debt. 
Agarwal and Mandelker (1987) found that the security holdings of managers 
of firms with a debt equity ratio that increases are larger than those for which the 
ratios decrease. Thus when firms make financing decisions, executive holdings seem 
to have a role in reducing agency problems. Harvey et al (2004) focussed on the effect 
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of capital structure as a governance mechanism in emerging markets. They find that 
actively monitored debt helps to creates value to firms that have potentially high 
agency costs which arises out of mis-aligned managerial incentives and over 
investment problems. Hovakimian et al (2001) found that the negative relation 
between past stock returns and leverage increasing choices is similar with agency 
models where managers have incentives to increase leverage when stock prices are 
low. Their results are also similar with the theory that managers are reluctant to issue 
equity when they view their stocks as being under-priced. Biais et al (1999) analyse 
the optimal financing of investment projects when managers must exert unobservable 
effort and can switch to less profitable riskier ventures. Optimal financial contracts 
can be implemented by a combination of debt and equity when risk shifting is the 
most severe while stock options is also needed when the effort problem is the most 
severe. 
However, Mao (2003) found that if the volatility of project cash flows 
increases with investment scale, risk shifting by equity shareholders will mitigate the 
under-investment problem. This finding contradicts the theory that total agency cost 
of debt increases with leverage. Jong and Veld (2001) in their study of capital 
structure decisions of Dutch companies found that Dutch managers avoid the 
disciplining role of debt, hence this allows them to over invest. Dybvig and Zender 
(1991) showed that capital structure is irrelevant in solving the agency conflict if the 
owners can provide incentives to the managers that are independent of capital 
structure. Ahn (2006) found that in diversified firms, the disciplinary benefit of debt is 
offset by the managerial discretion in debt allocation due to the organizational 
structure in diversified firms. Hence discretionary allocation of debt service in 
diversified firms has important valuation consequences. 
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The agency costs theory primarily looks at how capital structures can help 
contain the agency costs by aligning the interests of the shareholders, managers and 
debt holders. Some studies to find that debt can be used as a disciplinary mechanism 
and others find that it may debt may actually prompt managers to over-invest3. In the 
section I examine the market timing theory. 
2.3.5 The Market Timing theory 
This theory primarily advocates that capital structure evolves as the 
cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market (Baker and Wurgler 
2002). According to the market timing theory, firms prefer equity when the relative 
cost of equity is low and prefer debt otherwise. There are two versions of market 
timing. The first is the information asymmetry developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) 
which we have seen in the pecking order theory. Lucas et al (1990) and Korajczyk et 
at (1992) examined adverse selection that varies across firms. Choe et al (1993) 
studied adverse selection that varies across time. Their results were similar with that 
of Korajcyzk et a] (1991) who found that firms tend to announce equity issues 
following releases of information which may reduce information asymmetry. 
Additionally, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) find that equity issues cluster 
around periods of relatively smaller announcement effects. In another study by 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) they found that unconstrained firms time their issue 
choice to coincide with periods of favourable macroeconomic conditions while 
constrained firms do not. Korteweg (2004) found that companies may initiate equity- 
for-debt offers when equity is overvalued and debt undervalued and vice versa for 
debt 
-for -equity offers and these may be undertaken for market timing reasons. 
3 For more papers and their findings on The Agency Cost Theory, please refer Appendix 1 
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The second version of the market timing theory involves equity market timing 
and irrational investors or managers and time-varying mis-pricing. Managers issue 
equity when they believe its cost to be irrationally low and repurchase equity when 
they believe its cost is irrationally high (LaPorta et al 1997). Here the critical 
assumption is that managers can time the market. Graham and Harvey (2001) in their 
survey found that CFOs try to time the equity market and two thirds of the CFOs have 
admitted that they issued equity depending on the amount by which their stock is 
undervalued or overvalued. Hovakimian et at (2004) also found evidence of market 
timing. They find that high stock returns increase the probability of equity issuance 
but have no effect on target leverage. Baker and Wurgler (2002) documented that the 
theory of capital structure is the result of `equity market timing' and not a quest to 
maintain target capital structures. Instead they related capital structure to past market- 
to-book ratios. Using a sample of 5000European firms, Gaud et al (2005) examined 
the driving forces of capital structure policies in Europe. They find that market timing 
has an impact on capital structure. However, Oliver (2005) did not find his results to 
be similar with the market timing theory of Baker and Wurgler (2002). Alti (2006) 
also examined the capital structure implications of market timing. He measures 
market timing in the context of IPOs. He finds that overall, the results shows that 
market timing is an important determinant of financial activity in the short run but its 
long run effects are limited. Huang et al (2005) found that publicly traded US firms 
fund a larger proportion of their financing requirements with external equity when the 
cost of equity is low. Small growth firms rely heavily on debt financing and resort to 
equity only when the cost of equity is low. However, Marsh (1982) in his study on the 
choice between equity and debt found that evidence that companies appear to make 
their choices of financing instruments as if they have target levels of debt in mind. 
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Hovakimian (2006) found that debt issues have a more significant long lasting effect 
on capital structure than equity issue. Mahajan et al (2007) investigated the market 
timing hypothesis of capital structure in the G-7 countries. They found that leverage 
of firms is negatively related to the historical market-to-book ratios of all G-7 
countries. However, they argue that this negative relation cannot be attributed to the 
market timing theory. Instead they find evidence that the results are more similar with 
the dynamic trade-off model. 
The market theory primarily advocates that capital structure evolves as the 
cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. A few studies support 
this hypothesis and other support the hypothesis that it is more of the managers timing 
the market to take advantage of mispricing of equity issues. In the next section, I will 
examine the corporate control theory of capital structure. 
2.3.6 The Corporate Control Theory 
The corporate control theory studies the linkage of capital structure with take- 
over activities. This theory of corporate control and capital structure was proposed by 
Harris and Raviv (1988&1991), Stulz (1988) and Israel (1991). The insight offered by 
Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) is that capital structure affects the outcome 
of take-over contests through its effect on the distribution of votes between 
management and outside investors. On the other hand Israel (1991) studied how 
capital structure affects the outcome of take-over though its effect on the distribution 
of cash flows between voting rights and non-voting rights. 
In their study, Harris and Raviv (1988) concluded that the optimal capital 
structure results from a trade-off between increases in management's voting power 
and the increases in the likelihood that the firm will go bankrupt, causing the 
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incumbent management to lose its benefits of control. Stulz (1988) showed that a 
higher equity fraction held by management decreases the probability of a take-over 
but increase the premium offered if a bid is made. However Israel (1991) obtained 
contradicting results where he explained that as the bargaining power of the target 
shareholders' decreases, the target optimally issues more debt and the fraction of the 
take-over premium as a result falls. Israel (1991) stated that the choice of capital 
structure is based on its effect on both the probability that value-increasing 
acquisitions will materialise and the division of synergy gain between the various 
parties. He concluded that the optimal debt level balances a decrease in the probability 
of acquisition against a higher share of the synergy for the target's shareholders. He 
found that the probability of firms' becoming targets decreases with leverage; also 
that acquirers' share of the total equity gain increases with targets' leverage. He also 
found that when an acquisition is initiated, it leads to an increase in the targets' stock 
price and debt levels and also the acquirers' firm value increases. The basic idea is 
that managers select capital structure and ownership structure in order to gain 
advantages in future take-over battles. Israel (1992) used debt as a mechanism that 
enabled the incumbent management to obtain the maximum value from the rival. He 
showed that firm value depended on both capital and ownership structures. 
Indirect studies on the market for corporate control have produced evidence 
that capital structure can be used as an anti-takeover device (Dann and DeAngelo 
(1988) and Amihud et al (1990)). Wald et al (2007) examined the impact of takeover 
and payout restrict laws on firms' capital structure decisions. They found that payout 
restrictions appear to reduce leverage for firms that have not been incorporated 
outside their home states. They concluded that these constraints help explain part of 
the negative relation between profitability and leverage. Studies by Agrawal and 
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Mandelker (1987), Amihud et al (1990) and Kim and Sorensen (1986) found that 
leverage is positively correlated with the extent of managerial equity ownership. 
These studies find that equity ownership by managers seems to play a role in both 
managerial behaviour and capital structure. In particular, Agarwal and Mandelker 
(1987) found that when managers own a larger share of the equity they tend to choose 
higher variance targets. Additionally, Friend et al (1988) found that leverage is lower 
in firms with dispersed outside ownership. Jandik and Makhija (2005) found that 
increases in target leverage have a positive impact on returns to target shareholders. 
Palepu (1986) concluded there is a negative relationship between leverage and the 
probability of successfully being taken over. This is similar with the findings of Dann 
and DeAngelo (1988). Garvey et al (1999) find that firms protected by second 
generation state anti-takeover laws substantially reduce their debt and that unprotected 
firms do the reverse. They find evidence that support the findings that managers take 
on debt which they would otherwise avoid in the face of a hostile take over. 
Safieddine et al (2006) found that targets that terminate takeover offers significantly 
increase their leverage ratios. They concluded that leverage increasing targets act in 
the interests of shareholders when they terminate takeover offers and that higher 
leverage helps firms remain independent not because it entrenches managers but 
because it commits manager to making the improvements that would be made by 
potential raiders. 
The corporate control theory of capital structure links capital structure to take- 
over activities. Most of the studies reviewed here support this theory. In the next 
section, I will examine the last theory of capital structure i. e. the product cost theory. 
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2.3.7 The Product Cost Theory 
Capital structure models based on product are theories that were developed in 
recent times. These studies examined the relationship between capital structure and 
either product market strategy or characteristics of product inputs (Harris and Raviv 
1991). Brander and Lewis (1986) found that oligopolists will tend to have more debt 
than monopolists or firms in competitive industries. Titman (1984) observed that 
liquidation of a firm may impose costs on its customers (or suppliers) such as inability 
to obtain the product, parts and/or services. He showed that capital structure can be 
used to commit the shareholders to an optimal liquidation policy by incorporating 
these costs which are normally ignored. Singh et al (2003) find that corporate leverage 
is positively related across product lines but negatively related to geographic 
diversification. Campello (2003) provided firm and industry level evidence of the 
effects of capital structure on product outcomes for a cross-section of industries. His 
results showed that firms which rely more heavily on external financing are more 
likely to reduce their investment in market share building during downturns and that 
the competitive outcomes resulting from such actions are jointly determined by the 
firm's and by its rivals' capital structures. Stomper and Zulehner (2004) examined the 
effect of leverage on investments. They found evidence that showed that leverage and 
debt maturity affects corporate strategy. Norton (1995) studied the issue of 
franchising and capital structure. He concluded that franchising is clearly a capital 
structure issue and that the role of debt incurred by franchisees as potential screening 
and bonding devices. Campello (2006) in his study sought to establish if debt boots or 
hurts a firms' product market performance. He identified leverage as creditors' 
valuation of assets. He found that moderate debt taking is associated with relative-to- 
rival sales gains; high indebtedness how leads to product market underperformance. 
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Kale et al (2007) investigated how the inclusion of suppliers and customers as 
stakeholders affects a firm's leverage choice. They find that a firm's leverage is 
negatively related to the R&D intensities of its suppliers and customers. They also 
find that their results are similar with the bargaining role for debt where they find a 
positive relation between firms' debt level and the degree of concentration in 
supplier/customer industries. Hence it can be seen that capital structure has an impact 
on a firm's products and pricing policies. These studies have explored the relationship 
between capital structure and their marketing strategy or characteristic of products or 
inputs. As this is a relatively new theory, more work needs to be done to substantiate 
the existing research undertaken. 
The product cost control theory is a relatively new theory of capital structure 
which has evolved in the recent times. Studies have found evidence supporting that a 
relationship indeed exists between capital structure and either product market strategy 
or characteristics of product inputs. 
2.3.8 Conclusion 
As can be observed from the discussion of the various theories on capital 
structure, these studies have looked into the benefits of debt, the hierarchy followed 
by firms to meet their financing needs, leverage as a disciplinary mechanism to 
control managements vs shareholder conflict, capital structure and market timing, 
leverage and its role in takeovers and capital structure and its impact on a firm's 
products and pricing policies. However, it must be noted that these studies have 
undertaken indirect tests on capital structure. This work aims to fill the gap by 
undertaking a direct test on capital structure and how it can explain stock returns. In 
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the next section, I shall now look at the studies undertaken on the determinants of 
capital structure. 
2.4 Determinants of Capital Structure 
2.4.1 Introduction 
We have now examined the various important theories of capital structure. 
Next we will examine the various variables or determinants of capital structure as 
suggested by these theories and which will be used in this study to explore the effect 
of leverage on stock returns. 
What factors would influence a company's choice of debt? Several studies 
have been undertaken in this area. Miller (1977) examined the effect of tax advantage 
as a determinant. Since debt provides the firm a tax shield in the form of interest 
deductibility, it may benefit firms to issue debt. However, he concluded that the tax 
advantage of corporate tax is off-set by the personal income taxes and hence there was 
no tax advantage. Marsh (1982) summarised that a company's choice of financing 
will depend on the difference between its current and target debt ratios. Myers (1984) 
examined the effect of information asymmetry on capital structure and concluded that 
insider information played a role in the financing choices of a company. Jensen 
(1986) examined agency costs as a factor influencing the capital structure. He 
concluded debt payments reduce free cash flow available to self-interested managers. 
Therefore capital structure is determined by trading-off these benefits of debt against 
costs of debt. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) in their study on the determinants of capital 
structure choices defined the variables as asset structure, non-debt tax shields, growth, 
uniqueness, industry classification, size, earnings volatility and profitability. 
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Uniqueness was classified as research and development expenditures. They concluded 
that leverage are negatively related with uniqueness (-) and profitability (-), and 
positively related to size (+). They did not find support for an effect on debt ratios 
arising from asset structure (0), non-debt tax shields (0), growth (0), industry 
classification (0), and earnings volatility (0). Harris and Raviv (1991) concluded that 
leverage increases with fixed assets (+), non-debt tax shields (+), investment 
opportunities (+) and firm size (+) and decreases with volatility advertising 
expenditure (-), the probability of bankruptcy (-), profitability (-) and the uniqueness 
of the product (-). 
Bergman and Callen (1991) found that the debt capacity of the firm, i. e. the 
maximum amount of debt it can issue in equilibrium is inversely related to the 
shareholders' bargaining power. They explain that management of firms with a larger 
proportion of intangibles to total assets are in a better position to renegotiate away 
from their debt-holders. Consequently such firms can borrow less in equilibrium. A 
larger proportion of intangibles entails a larger shareholders' bargaining-power index, 
which in turn implies a smaller optimal debt-equity ratio. Empirical work carried out 
have suggested that firms selected capital structures depending on attributes that 
determine the various costs and benefits associated with debt and equity financing. 
Berger et al (1997) found a negative relationship between managerial entrenchment 
and firm leverage. Their results indicate that entrenched managers seek to avoid debt. 
Studies have also been undertaken in developing and developed countries to 
find if variables which explain the capital structures in US and European countries are 
also relevant in developing countries (Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al 
2001). Rajan and Zingales (1995) studied four factors in their study on capital 
structure of G-7 countries. The four factors were tangibility of assets (the ratio of 
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fixed to total assets), the market-to-book ratio (usually thought to be a proxy for 
investment opportunities), firm size and profitability. They found a negative 
relationship between leverage and tangibility of assets (-), market-to-book (-) and 
profitability (-). On other hand, a positive relation was found between size (+) and 
leverage in their study on G-7 countries. Booth et al (2001) in their study on capital 
structures in developing countries chose their variables by considering the three 
principal theoretical models of capital structure: the Static Trade-off Theory, the 
Pecking Order Theory and the Agency Theory. They found that leverage decreases 
with average tax rate (-), tangibility of assets (-), return on assets or profitability (-), 
and increases with size (+). Market-to-book (proxy for growth opportunities) and 
business risk was important in isolation but they could not find an overall significant 
for these two variables. The following sections will provide a detailed literature on 
work undertaken on a number of determinants of capital structure. These determinants 
include profitability, size, growth, volatility of earnings which this study would focus 
on mainly. The other determinants such as structure of assets, tax, non-debt tax 
shields, bankruptcy and liquidation costs and macro-economic conditions will also be 
studied. 
2.4.2 Profitability 
Donaldson (1961) and Myers (1984) suggested that firms prefer using retained 
earnings, then from debt and then lastly from issuing new equity. This could be due to 
the asymmetric information or transaction costs involved (Myers and Majluf 1984). 
The past profitability of a firm and hence the amount of earnings available to be 
retained should be an important determinant of capital structure. The pecking order 
theory stated that there is a negative relationship between profitability and debt ratio. 
This is because when firms earn more profits, they will have more retained earnings 
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which could be used to invest in new projects. However firms with low profitability 
levels would need to borrow more since their retained earnings will be insufficient to 
finance new projects. Hence this leads to an inverse relationship between profitability 
and leverage. On other hand the static trade off theory stated a positive relation 
between leverage and profitability. This is due to the advantage of tax shields where a 
tax shield in the form of interest deductibility may benefit firms to issue debt. 
The pecking order suggests an inverse relationship between leverage and 
firms' profitability. This is because when firms earn more profits, they will have more 
retained earnings which could be used to invest in new projects. However firms with 
low profitability levels would need to borrow more since their retained earnings will 
be insufficient to finance new projects. Hence this leads to an inverse relationship 
between profitability and leverage. Baskin (1989) and Chaplinsky and Niehaus(1993) 
find support for the model's prediction that leverage ratios fall with profitability and 
the availability of internal funds. Allen (1993) examined the pecking order hypothesis 
in Australia and found them to be similar with the pecking order's prediction that 
leverage is negatively related to profitability 
Titman and Wessels (1988) used the ratios of operating income over sales 
(OUTS) and operating income over total assets (OI/TA) as indicators of profitability. 
They found an inverse relationship between debt ratios and profitability. They 
concluded that transaction costs may be an important determinant of capital structure 
choice and explained that additional evidence relating to the importance of transaction 
costs is provided by this negative relation between past profitability and current debt 
levels. Graham et al (2000) also found that the leverage ratios of large, profitable 
firms are too low and suggested that a possible reason for this negative relation could 
be the high transaction costs involved in debt issue and equity issues as well. 
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Although Chen et a] (2004) found a negative relationship between profitable firms 
and leverage, they concluded that high transaction costs solely cannot be the 
explanation for this inverse relationship. Wald (1999) in his study on capital structure 
with dividend restrictions found that profitable firms have lower debt/equity ratios. 
Korajczyk et al (2003) found a negative relation between operating income and 
leverage ratios which is similar with the pecking order theory. He defined profitability 
as the ratio between operating income and book assets. Frank and Goyal (2004) also 
found that firms with more profits have lower leverage levels while testing the 
pecking order theory of capital structure. Hovakimian et al (2001) found profitable 
firms to have low leverage They also found that profitable firms are more likely to 
issue debt than equity and more likely to repurchase equity than retire debt. 
Pandey (2001) also found results that are similar with the pecking order. In his 
work, he concluded that profitability seems to be the most dominant determinant of 
debt ratios of Malaysian firms. He defined profitability as earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets and found that profitability has a significant 
inverse relation with all types of book and market value debt ratios. Deesomsak et al 
(2004) studied the determinants of capital structure in the Asia pacific region. 
Profitability was one of their variables and defined as it as ratio of earnings before 
interest, tax and depreciation (EBITD) to total assets. He found that profitability has 
significant influence on the capital structure of Malaysian firms and concluded that 
the importance of the determinants of capital structure varies across countries. Allen 
and Mizuno (1989) undertook a cross-sectional regression analysis of the 
determinants of the company debt to value ratios of a sample of 125 Japanese 
industrial and commercial companies. Profitability was one of the variables used by 
them and profitability was measured by taking earnings before interest and taxes 
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(EBIT) and dividing them by total assets. They found that profitability and industry 
effects are the most significant determinants of Japanese companies' capital structure. 
Kester (1986) in a cross-sectional study of debt ratios in the USA and Japan found 
that profitability has a negative influence on debt ratios. Nivorozhkin (2004) found in 
his study in five EU accession countries that profitability has an inverse relation with 
leverage that once again supports the pecking order theory. He defined profitability as 
ratio of income before interest, tax and depreciation (EBITD) to total assets. Fattouh 
et al (2005) found high levered firms to have a negative relation with profitability. 
Farooqi (2006) found profitability to have an inverse relation with leverage in both 
listed and unlisted companies in Sweden. Rajan and Zingales (1995) also found a 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage in their study on G-7 
countries. They defined profitability as earnings before interest, tax and deprecation 
divided by book value of assets. Booth et al (2001) in their study on ten developing 
countries also found that the more profitable a firm is the lower the debt ratio is. They 
defined profitability as earnings before tax (EBT) divided by total assets. 
Graham(2000) found that large, liquid and profitable firms with low distress costs to 
use debt conservatively. 
From the above discussion, we can see that all the studies report a negative 
relationship between leverage and profitability. It is important to note the same results 
were obtained even when different measures of profitability such as earnings before 
interest tax (EBIT), earnings before interest, tax and depreciation (EBITD), ratios of 
operating income over sales (OL/TS) and operating income over total assets (OI/TA) 
are used. The results are also similar over different countries such as G-7, Asia pacific 
and developing nations. The findings are also similar with the pecking order theory 
that states a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. This variable is 
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important in our study as higher profitability might lead to higher returns, and returns 
might as well have a negative relation to leverage (Dimitrov&Jain 2005). 
2.4.3 Size 
Leverage may be related to firm size. The costs of issuing debt and equity 
securities is also dependent on firm size. The costs incurred in issuing equity and long 
term debt would be higher for small firms than for larger firms. Hence this suggests 
that small firms may be less leveraged than large ones and may prefer short term debt 
to long term debt or equity due to the lower costs associated with short-term debts. 
Warner (1977) suggested that direct bankruptcy costs appear to constitute a larger 
proportion of a firm's value as that value decreases. Additionally relatively large firms 
tend to be more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy. Hence large firms should be 
more highly leveraged (Titman and Wessels 1988). Harris and Raviv (1991) also 
explained that leverage increases with size. This is similar with the results of Frank 
and Goyal (2004) who tested the pecking order theory of capital structure of publicly 
traded companies for the period 1971-1998. They defined size as log of sales. Their 
results provided evidence that firm size is critical and found a positive relation 
between size and leverage. 
A large number of studies found a significant positive relation between size 
and debt ratio. Berger et al (1997) in their work on managerial entrenchment and 
capital structure decisions found a positive relation between size and leverage. They 
defined size as the logarithm of book value of total assets. Barclay and Smith (1995) 
defined size as the volume of total sales and found a positive relation between size 
and leverage in their study on determinants of capital structure and dividend policies. 
Lasfer (1995) also found a positive relationship which was similar with the results 
obtained in the other studies. Hovakimian (2004) found a positive relationship 
68 
between leverage and size in their work on the determinants of capital structure in the 
case of dual issues of debt and equity. They defined size as the logarithm of sales. 
Marsh (1982) concluded that his results are similar with the theory that the debt ratios 
are functions of company size. He defined size as the logarithm of capital employed, 
logarithm of total assets and logarithm of equity market capitalisation. His results 
were similar with all the three measures of size. Fattouh et al(2006) found a positive 
relation between leverage and size in the case of low levered companies and an 
inverse relation in highly levered companies. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) in their study of capital structure of G-7 countries, 
namely, UK, USA, Germany, Japan, France, Italy and Canada found a positive 
relation between leverage and size in the UK and a negative one in Germany. They 
defined size as the logarithm of sales. Pandey (2001) in his study of capital structure 
of Malaysian firms found a positive relation between size and leverage. He defined 
size as logarithm of sales. He found positive relation to all types of book and market 
value of debt. Booth et al (2001) in their study on capital structure of developing 
countries defined size as log of sales both in local currency units and converted to US 
dollars at year-end exchange rates divided by 100. They found a positive relation 
between size and leverage and concluded that size is one of the key variables affecting 
capital structures which are significant in developed nations as well. Deesomsak et al 
(2004) in their study on capital structure determinants in the Asia-Pacific region found 
a positive relationship between size and leverage. They defined size as the natural log 
of sales. They found evidence that supported size is an important variable in capital 
structure decisions. They concluded that may be due to the fact that after the Asian 
financial crisis, lenders became more inclined to lend to larger firms in an attempt to 
reduce default risk. Nivorozhkin (2004) found a positive relationship between the size 
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of a company and its leverage in his study on firms in five EU accession countries. 
They defined size in their study as the logarithm of total assets. Gajurel (2005) found 
a positive relation between size and leverage. On the other hand, Farooqi (2006) 
found size to be negatively correlated to leverage in his study on listed and unlisted 
companies of Sweden. 
However, there were studies that report contradictory evidence. Kim and 
Sorensen (1986) defined size as represented by the balance sheet value of the assets 
i. e. the average level of total assets in billion of dollars during the years 1975-1980. 
They found the size variable to be insignificant. They also found the results to be 
insignificant when alternative definitions of size such as sales and market value of 
equity was used. They concluded that there should be no similar relationship between 
size and debt capacity. Studies by Kester (1986) and Remmers et al (1974) also found 
no effect of size on debt ratios. They defined size as the volume of total assets. Bevan 
et al (2002) found size to be negatively related to short term bank borrowing and 
positively correlated to all long 
-term debt. Allayannis et al (2003) in their study on 
capital structure and the decision to use natural local, synthetic and foreign currency 
debt found that size and tangibility affect the different use of debt. 
With the empirical evidence presented here, we can conclude that on the 
whole, size is an important variable in capital structure decisions. We measure size in 
our study by the market capitalization of the firms. 
2.4.4 Growth 
According to the trade-off theory, retained earnings of high growth firms 
increase and they issue more debt to maintain the target debt ratio. Hence, a positive 
relationship exists between leverage and growth prospects. The pecking order theory 
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supports this relationship as well. Myers (1984) suggested that the agency problem 
can be mitigated if the firm issued short term rather long term debt. Hence this leads 
to a positive relationship between short-term debt and growth opportunities. 
However, Titman and Wessels (1988) argued that these agency costs will be 
higher for firms in growing industries since they have more flexibility in their choice 
of future investments. Hence expected future growths will be negatively related to 
long term debts. Although growth opportunities add value to the firm, they do not 
generate current taxable income and cannot be collateralized. Hence there could be a 
negative relation between debt ratios and growth opportunities. In his study on listed 
and unlisted companies in Sweden, Farooqi (2006) found a negative relation between 
growth and leverage. Graham (2000) found that in addition to growth options, product 
market factors, low asset collateral and planning for future expenditures lead to 
conservative debt usage. Lang et al (1996) found a negative relation between leverage 
and future growth at the firm level and for diversified firms at the business segment 
level. They concluded that leverage does not reduce growth for firms known to have 
good investment opportunities, but is negatively related to growth of firms whose 
growth opportunities are either not recognized by the capital markets or are not 
sufficiently valuable to overcome the effects of debt overhang. Ahn et al (2006) 
studied the relation between leverage and investment opportunities particularly in 
diversified firms. They concluded that the impact of leverage on value in diversified 
firms is different in for focussed firms. In focussed firms, leverage constrains over- 
investment thereby enhancing value. However in diversified firms, it constrains 
investment in high q segments and reduces the constrain on investment in low q 
segments. Diversified firms invest a disproportionate share of their debt service 
burden to their higher q and non-core segments. 
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Pandey (2001) found a significant positive relationship between growth and 
leverage ratios in his work on Malaysian firms. He measured growth as one plus 
growth rate derived by regressing log of sales to time (four years). 
-His results 
supported the trade-off and pecking order theories. His results implied that firms 
employ more debt as growth and size increases and but reduce debt when profitability 
increases. Baskin (1989) reported a significant positive relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage while testing the pecking order theory. He defined growth 
as a regression of sales for the sample period of 1965-1972. Kester (1986) found a 
positive correlation between debt and growth opportunities. He defined growth as the 
compound average annual rate of growth in revenue between 197-1982. Harris and 
Raviv (1991) also found that growth opportunities and leverage were positively 
related. Oliver (2005) found market 
-to-book, a proxy for growth opportunities to be a 
significant determinant of capital structure. 
On the other hand, Frank and Goyal (2004) found that market-to-book have a 
negative relation with leverage. They defined market-to-book as book value of assets 
less the market value of equity. Hovakimian et al (2004) found that firms with high 
market-to-book ratio have good growth opportunities and therefore have low debt 
ratios. They defined growth as total assets minus book value of equity + market value 
equity/total assets. Gajurel (2005) found a negative relation between growth and 
leverage in his study on twenty non-financial firms listed in Nepal. Kim and Sorensen 
(1986) found a negative relationship between growth and leverage. They measured 
growth as the annual growth in earnings before interest and taxes. They concluded 
that firms with large growth opportunities may use less debt in optimality. They also 
explained that this may also be due to the availability of internal funds. Hence firms 
with high growth opportunities may not require large funds and thus turn to have low 
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levels of debt. Lasfer (1995) and Barclay et al (1995) also found similar results. 
Barclay et al (1995) defined growth as market-to-book as well as a ratio of research 
and development costs to value. Hovakimian(2006) find that average market-to-book 
ratios have significant effects on current financing and investment decisions. They 
found that market-to-book averaged over time reflect slow changing growth 
opportunities. Ahn et al (2006) found that among low growth firms, the positive 
relation between leverage and firm value is significantly weaker in diversified firms 
than in focussed firms. In focussed firms, leverage constraints overinvestment thereby 
enhancing value. Dang (2007) found that firms with high growth opportunities reduce 
leverage. However they find that debt maturity is not related to growth opportunities. 
Bevan et al (2002) researched the capital structure determinants in the UK. 
They defined growth as the ratio of book value of total assets less the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity to the book value of total assets. They found a 
negative relationship between leverage and the level of market-to-book when leverage 
is measured at market value. Rajan and Zingales (1995) in their study of capital 
structure in G-7 countries found leverage to be negatively related to market-to-book 
ratio which was a proxy used for growth opportunities of firms. They explained that 
the negative relation was because firms with high market-to-book ratios have higher 
costs of financial distress and that is why a negative correlative is expected. They 
defined growth as the ratio of the book value of assets less the book value of equity 
plus the market value of equity all divided by book value of assets. Deesomsak et al 
(2004) studied the determinants of capital structure in the Asia pacific region. They 
defined growth opportunity as the book value of total assets less the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of assets. They found 
a negative relationship between growth and leverage in all the countries except 
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Australia. This gives support to the prediction agency theory that high growth firms 
use less debt since they do not wish to subject themselves to possible restrictions 
imposed by lenders. Hovakimian et al (2001) found that stock prices play an 
important role in determining a firm's financing choice. They find that stock prices 
increases are associated with growth opportunities which lower a firm's optimal debt 
ratio. 
However, Titman and Wessels (1988) found that growth opportunities did not 
have an effect on leverage. They defined growth as capital expenditures over total 
assets (CE/TA) and the growth of total assets measured by the percentage change in 
total assets (GTA). They also explained that firms who generally engaged in research 
and development to generate futures investments could denote the ratio of research 
and development over sales as indicator of growth attribute. However, when the 
definition of research and development was used, they found a negative relation 
between leverage and research and development expenses. Allen et al (1989) studied 
the determinants of capital structure of Japanese companies and found that the effect 
of growth was unclear. He defined growth by taking the first difference of total assets, 
scaled by total assets. Booth et al (2001) in their study on capital structures of 
developing nations found market-to-book variable was important in isolation but they 
could not find an overall significance for this variable. They defined this variable as 
the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. 
From the discussion above, we can see that the results obtained are mixed. 
When definition of growth as the ratio of book value of total assets less the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity to the book value of total assets is 
used, most studies tend to get similar results (i. e. a negative relationship between 
growth and leverage) However, when alternative definitions are used (Kester (1986), 
74 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Baskin (1989) and Pandey (2001)), the results obtained 
are conflicting. In our study, growth is a variable which will be tested and is defined 
as the ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets (similar to Booth et al 
2001). 
2.4.5 Volatility of Earnings 
The volatility of earnings may have an impact on capital structures. Higher 
volatility of earnings increases the probability of financial distress, since firms may 
not be able to fulfil their debt servicing commitments. Thus, firm's debt capacity 
decreases with increases in volatility of earnings. This leads to an expected inverse 
relationship between leverage and volatility of earnings. Titman and Wessels (1988) 
thus suggested that a firm's optimal debt level is a decreasing function of the volatility 
of earnings. 
Marsh (1982) views operating risk as an important variable. He stated that 
higher operating risk companies showed some tendency towards low debt ratios. He 
defined operating risk as the standard deviation of scaled earnings changes where the 
scaling factor was taken as total assets. He found an inverse relationship between 
leverage and volatility of earnings. Bhandari (1982) argued that an increase in the 
debt to equity ratio of a company will increase the risk of its common equity and 
hence the increase in risk should be compensated by higher returns. He further argued 
that leverage may be a good proxy for risk, in addition to beta. Pandey (2001) in his 
work on capital structure of Malaysian firms found a negative relation between 
earnings volatility and long term debt. He computed risk as a variation in earnings 
before interest and tax (EBIT) over four years. Desai et al (2006) found that political 
risk increase the volatility of multinational firms operating returns prompting firms to 
adjust their capital structures. Hence the parent companies mitigate the cost of return 
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volatility by adjusting their capital structures. In another study by Aydemir et al 
(2006), they examined the effect of financial leverage on stock return volatility. They 
concluded that financial leverage contributes more to the dynamics of stock return 
volatility for a small firm. Farooqi (2006) found a negative relation between leverage 
and volatility of earnings. Hecht (2000) studied the expected firm returns and found 
that capital structure effects play an important role in understanding many security- 
specific asset pricing issues. He argued that the possibility of capital structure 
heterogeneity amplifies the cross sectional variation in expected returns. Welch 
(2004) identified stock returns as the primary known component of capital structure 
and capital structure changes. He examined the variables for forecasting capital 
structures and concluded that stock returns play an important role in explaining capital 
structure in comparison with other proxies used in the literature. Drobetz et al (2007) 
also provided European evidence that stock returns are far more superior than 
previously identified capital structure proxy variables in explaining current corporate 
capital structures. Both these studies use returns as an independent variable in 
examining its effect on capital structure while my study use returns as a dependent 
variable. Hou et al (2006) in their study on the impact of stock returns and industry 
concentration find that in the cross-section leverage is positively related to industry 
stock returns which is represented by sales 
However, Titman and Wessels (1988) did not find an effect on debt ratios 
arising from volatility. They defined volatility as the standard deviation of the 
percentage change in operating income. They concluded that this may be due to the 
fact that errors may have prevailed in their measurement model. Deesomsak et al 
(2004) studied the determinants of capital structure in the Asia Pacific region. They 
defined volatility of earnings as the absolute difference between the annual percentage 
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in earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and the average of this change over the 
sample period. They found in their study that volatility has no effect on leverage in 
any country. They concluded that this may occur if the risk and costs of entering into 
liquidation is low. Also, if the borrowing level of the firms is well below the debt 
financing capacity, as may be the case in Australia and if ownership is concentrated 
and family based in Thailand. Booth et al (2001) in their study on capital structures of 
developing nations found business risk to be significant in isolation but no overall 
significance. 
In my study, I use beta, the risk measure which has been suggested by 
researchers (Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) Fama and Macbeth (1973)) to explain the 
volatility in common stock returns. From the discussion above, I can conclude that 
volatility of earnings is an important factor that influences capital structure choices. In 
my study, volatility of earnings will be measured by beta (Fama and Macbeth 1973). 
2.4.7 Conclusion 
As from the discussion above, we can see that substantial work has been 
undertaken to investigate the determinants of capital structure4. These studies have 
undertaken indirect tests in order to examine the factors that affect capital structure 
choices. Although this study aims to undertake a direct test to examine if leverage as 
an independent variable can explain stock returns, these factors or at least a few of 
them will help us understand better the relation between leverage and returns. The 
following section will look into studies undertaken to find out if there exists an 
optimal capital structure. 
° For a discussion on other determinants of capital structure, please refer Appendix 1 
77 
2.5 Optimal Capital Structure 
2.5.1 Introduction 
From the discussions above, it is evident that capital structure has generated a 
lot of interest and questions in finance. We have now looked at the different theories 
of capital structure and the determinants of capital structure. In this section I will 
look into studies undertaken on optimal capital structure. There are many methods 
for the firm to raise its required finance. It could utilise its retained earnings, debt or 
issue equity. The firms' mix of different securities is known as its capital structure. 
Thus the question arises, `Is there an optimal debt equity ratio that maximises firm 
value? ' If there exists an optimal debt equity ratio, how is it defined? 
Traditionalists such as Lintner (1956) and Gordon (1959) argued that there exists an 
optimal leverage ratio that equates the marginal benefits of debt (increase in tax 
shield) to the marginal costs of debt (increase in expected bankruptcy costs). 
2.5.2 Studies on Optimal Capital Structure 
What is meant by `optimal capital structure? ' Schwartz (1959) defined an 
optimal capital structure for any widely held company is one that maximises the long- 
run value per share of the common stock on the market. He concluded that there exists 
an optimal capital structure for each individual firm as long as the assumption that 
firms will attempt to maximise the long-run market value of the ownership shares. He 
explained that the optimal capital structure varies for firms in different industries 
because asset structures and stability of earnings, which determine inherent sectors, 
vary for different types of production. Arditti(1973) illustrated that in order to arrive 
at an optimal capital structure, the firm's goal should be the minimization of the 
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before tax weighted average cost of capital(WACC). He argued that a minimization of 
the after tax WACC would lead to a non-optimal capital structure. 
Researchers have developed model optimal capital structures without actually 
focussing on its effects on firm value. Fama (1978) explained that under perfect 
capital market, firm value is always the value implied by an optimal capital structure, 
irrespective of the capital structure chosen by the firm. This is because if there exists 
an optimal capital structure but the firm does not choose this capital structure, then the 
investor can provide the optimal capital structure by lending and borrowing 
accordingly in the market. This is done by buying equal proportions of the firms' 
securities and issuing the same proportion on the personal account. If the market value 
of the firm is less than the value implied by the optimal structure than the investor 
could make arbitrage profits. However, once again the main assumption that markets 
are perfect and investors have access to all information cannot be ignored. Hence this 
implies that increases in debt are not a risk factor that is priced. 
Fama & French (2002) noted that firms' debt ratios adjust slowly towards their 
target. Firms may appear to take a long time to return their leverage to its long run 
mean or what may be called the optimal level. This may be due to the adjustment 
costs involved in re-adjusting to the target. Marsh (1982) provided evidence that 
companies do appear to make their choice of financing instrument as though they had 
target levels in mind for both the long term, and the short term debt ratio. Antoniou et 
al (2003) in their study on market based and bank based economies found evidence 
that both types of economies indicated the firms have target debt ownership structure 
and the UK firms adjust their debt ownership more quickly. Beattie et al (2004) in 
their survey of 192 listed UK companies found that highly-geared companies are 
more likely to adopt a target capital structure. Alti (2006) found evidence of capital 
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structure policies to be largely similar with the existence of leverage targets. Motyka 
(2005) argued that financial executives today are targeting an optimal capital structure 
that not only helps to eliminate the cost of holding excess capital but also avoids the 
cost of raising capital when the risk environment changes. Hovakimian et al (2001) 
find that the firms may face impediments to movements towards their target ratio and 
that the target ratio may change overtime as the firm's profitability and stock price 
changes. Leary et al (2005) examined if firms engage in rebalancing their capital 
structures while allowing for costly adjustment. They found that firms actively 
rebalance their capital structure to stay within an optimal range. They concluded that 
the presence of adjustment costs often prevents this rebalancing to occur immediately. 
Drobetz et al (2007) found results which were similar with evidence of dynamic 
rebalancing of the capital structures within a target range in the presence of 
adjustment costs. 
From the above discussion, it can be observed that there is evidence that a target 
optimal debt ratio exists and this implies that the firm value may be maximised. So 
how is the target defined? The trade-off theory purports that the optimal capital 
structure is the point where the benefits of tax and costs of bankruptcy are traded off. 
Nantell et al (1975) concluded that the weighted average cost of capital is valid for 
determining the optimal capital structure that maximises the value of the firm. This is 
done by the inclusion of the impact of debt financing on firm value. The impact is 
measured by taking into account the tax benefit of debt financing. Beattie et al (2004) 
indicated that the target was internally constrained rather than externally. In their 
survey, they found that companies fixed a target beyond which debt financing should 
not be surpassed; this debt level was defined by reference to a limit placed on balance 
sheet and/or income statement gearing ratios. Ju et al (2005) in their analysis reveal 
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that firms do not regularly adjust their capital structures to maintain their target levels 
when equity values change. They also find that the impact of capital structure is firm 
value is small. Titman&Tsyplakov (2002) presented a time model of a firm that 
extends traditional static models by introducing dynamics into the capital structure 
choices. They suggested that firm values are endogenously determined by continuous 
investment and financing choices. On the other hand, Frydenberg (2003) presented a 
dynamic empirical model for capital structure and he found that companies that are 
below debt ratio targets are more likely to issue debt than equity and vice- versa. 
Hence he concluded that the firms set a target level for their debt structure. 
Hahnenstein et at (2002) presented a neo-classical model by studying the 
indirect value increasing effect of hedging via a shift in optimal capital structure. The 
static trade off model between the bankruptcy costs and corporate taxes is applied and 
is extended by granting management the opportunity to hedge costlessly the firms' 
output price risk with a forward contract. However, they concluded that the optimal 
amount of debt outstanding is increased by corporate hedging if and only if the firms' 
probability of bankruptcy can be reduced. Huang et at (2003) developed an optimal 
capital structure with stochastic interest rates as they explained that a model of 
optimal capital structure with constant interest rates cannot simultaneously price risky 
corporate debt and determine the optimal capital structure appropriately. Stoja et at 
(2005) found that firms have a long run target leverage ratio but in the short run may 
follow a pecking order of financing or time their equity issues when markets are 
buoyant. Chowdhry et at (1998) showed that a subsidiary capital structure that 
involves the use of mainly debt or mainly equity is optimal only when the tax rates in 
the two countries are sufficiently different. DeAngelo et at (2006) found that firms 
exercise their financial flexibility by borrowing but they will seek to re-establish 
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conservative leverage, but rebalancing may be sluggish because it can be 
accomplished only to the extent that future earnings and capital market conditions 
allow. Kayhan et al (2007) found that although firms' histories strongly influence 
their capital structures, over time their capital structures tend to move towards target 
debt ratios that are similar with the trade off theories of capital structure. 
On the other hand, Baker and Wurgler (2002) explained that although equity 
issues have a persistent impact on corporate capital structures, capital structures are 
the cumulative outcome of historical market timing efforts rather than the result of a 
dynamic optimising strategy. Welch (2004) also concluded that equity price shocks 
have an impact on capital structures but interpreted the results as evidence against 
firms re-balancing their capital structures towards optimum. Hennessy et al(2005) 
developed a dynamic trade-off model with endogenous leverage, distributions and real 
investment. They conclude that a target leverage ratio is non-existent. However, Leary 
et al (2004) found evidence which was similar with the findings of Baker et al (2002) 
and Welch (2004). They concluded that corporate financial policy is similar with 
dynamic re-balancing after accounting for costly adjustment. Pettit et al (2005) adopts 
an ALM (asset liability management) approach and suggest that capital structure 
optimization goes beyond simple choices of rating and leverage. It involves more a 
question of ALM that involves large assets such as cash and investments, as well as 
pension, environmental, litigation and other liabilities. Gaud et al(2005) found that 
European firms limit themselves to an upper barrier to leverage. 
2.5.3 Conclusion 
It can be observed from the above discussion that substantial work has been 
undertaken in capital structure. The theories of capital studied the benefits of debt 
financing by way of tax advantage, debt as a disciplinary mechanism in controlling 
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agency costs, timing equity issues, effect of debt for market for corporate control and 
the linking of capital structure to product costs. The determinants of capital structure 
looked at the factors affecting the capital structure of a firm. Factors such as 
profitability, size, growth and other factors could have a major impact on the capital 
structure of firms. The discussion on optimal capital structure revealed that most 
studies do believe that an optimal capital structure exists and firms do re-balance their 
capital structure in order to maintain a target level they perceive as optimal. It is clear 
that all these studies have undertaken research on the theories of capital structure, 
determinants of capital structure and the presence of an optimal capital structure. Few 
studies have researched the influence of leverage on returns. This study proposes to 
fill the gap by undertaking a direct test on capital structure by investigating if leverage 
can explain stock returns. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to review literature on capital structure. 
Theories of capital structure, determinants of capital structure and optimal capital 
structure carried out indirect tests on capital structure. Hence, there limited work that 
shows leverage as an independent variable can explain returns. This study aims to 
carry out the direct test of examining leverage as an independent variable in stock 
returns. 
Chapter 3 presents the data and methodology details of the thesis. In Chapter 
4, I examine the relationship between leverage and returns by integrating the MM 
framework into an investment strategy. Here, I estimate the cumulative abnormal 
returns in excess of the market return. I also include the industry leverage as an 
additional variable to explain returns. In Chapter 5,1 investigate the relationship 
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between leverage and returns by estimating returns in excess of the risk-free rate. In 
Chapters 4 and 5,1 undertake a firm level analysis of returns and leverage. On the 
other hand, in Chapter 61 undertake a portfolio analysis of returns by adopting the 
FM methodology. Here I aim to examine the relationship between leverage and 
returns at the portfolio level. I form portfolios from ranked leverage computed from 
data of one time period but then using a subsequent time period to obtain the leverage 
of the portfolios that is used to test the relationship between leverage and expected 
returns. 
Following FF (1993), Chapter 7 explores the effect of leverage mimicking 
factor portfolio in explaining stock return variations. Finally, I also undertake 
estimations using firm leverage and portfolios constructed to mimic risk factors 
related to market risk, size, market-to-book and momentum. The aim of this 
estimation is to assess if returns can still be explained by leverage even if portfolios 
constructed to mimic risk factors related to market risk, size, market-to-book and 
momentum is in the time series regressions. The following chapter presents the data 
and methodology section for the entire study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives a detailed description of the types and sources of data, 
variables used and the methodologies applied in this thesis. The main focus of this 
thesis is to examine if leverage can explain returns. Previous studies reveal conflicting 
results. For e. g. Studies by MM and Bhandari (1988) show that returns increase in 
leverage, other studies (Korteweg 2004, Dimitrov and Jain 2005) show that returns 
decrease in leverage. Hence, this thesis aims to address this controversy in empirical 
literature by undertaking a comprehensive empirical analysis of sample, 
methodologies and leverage definitions. I estimate returns in various forms such as 
abnormal returns, expected returns and portfolio returns, and leverage at the firm 
level, industry level and portfolio level. Thus, the methodologies adopted vary in each 
chapter accordingly. I also undertake robustness tests using the risk factors such as 
size, market-to-book etc that have been used in previous studies. Estimations are 
undertaken in the (a) full sample and (b) various sectors. Following MM, this study 
uses a time frame of one year. The study uses an unbalanced panel of UK firms that 
was collected from Datastream, a database that maintains both cross-sectional and 
time-series company accounting and financial data. The explanatory variables used 
are leverage, beta, size, market-to-book, price-earnings ratio, interest rates, average 
industry leverage, market risk, leverage mimicking factor portfolio (HLMLL), size 
mimicking factor portfolio(SMB), market-to-book mimicking factor portfolios(HML) 
momentum mimicking factor portfolio (MOMENTS) and market risk (ExRM). The 
dependent variable is stock returns. 
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3.2 Data 
3.2.1 Selection of the Sample 
I begin with all 2673 companies listed in the London Stock Exchange from 
1980 to 2004. All dead companies are removed from the sample. The requirement for 
each firm year observation to enter the sample is (a) the availability of a fiscal year- 
end debt ratio and stock price series for at least the twelve months preceding the given 
year; (b) exclusion of financial companies including banks, investment companies, 
insurance/life assurances and companies that change the fiscal period's end date 
during the research period. Thus, 1092 financial companies are removed, 490 
companies are removed because they do not have matching year-end leverage ratios 
and stock prices for all subsequent years, A further 173 companies with short 
quotation experience are removed and finally, a further 126 companies with a market 
value of less than 1 million is removed. This finally results in a sample containing 
7954 firm year-end observations from 792 companies listed from 1980 onwards. 
Following similar studies by Bradley(1984), Titman(1984), Lang et al(1996), 
Hull(1999) and Mackay et al (2005) based on leverage and industry classification, I 
classify the sample industry wise to examine the impact of firm and industry leverage 
on returns. The sample firms are grouped into different sectors using the four-digit 
industry classifications5. I classify each sectors into nine main industries as per the 
datastream industry classification which is similar to the SIC Industry Classification 
System followed in other studies (Bradley (1984), Titman(1984)). These are: oil & 
gas (0001), basic materials (1000), industrials (2000), consumer goods (3000), 
healthcare (4000), consumer services (5000), telecommunications (6000), utilities 
(7000) and technology (9000). 
5 Refer Appendix 2 for Datastream Industrial Classification List 
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3.2.2 Variables 
The main focus of this thesis is to examine if leverage can explain returns. In 
order to test this relationship, I estimate returns in various forms such as abnormal 
returns, expected returns and portfolio returns, and leverage at the firm level, industry 
level and portfolio level. In addition to leverage, I use other explanatory variables 
which have been identified in previous studies as risk factors to explain stock returns. 
These risk factors include price-earnings ratio (Campbell and Schiller (1988)), size 
(Banz (1981) and Chan and Chen (1991)), market-to-book ratio (Chan, Hamao and 
Lakonishok (1991)) and a combination of these, including beta (Fama and French 
(1992; 1996)). 1 also assess the impact of macro-economic factor such as interest rates 
on stock returns. Following FF (1993), 1 also undertake to test if leverage is an asset 
pricing factor. Here I construct leverage mimicking factor portfolio similar to the size 
mimicking factor portfolio (SMB), market-to-book mimicking factor 
portfolios(HML), momentum mimicking factor portfolios. The dependent variable is 
stock returns. The following section describes the variables used in the study. 6 
a) Stock Returns 
Stock returns for each company are calculated on a monthly basis and using 
percentage change in consecutive closing prices that were adjusted for dividends 
splits and rights issues (Fama et al 1969). For Chapter 4, the stock returns are 
estimated in excess of market return. For the remaining empirical chapters of 5,6 
and 7, I estimate returns in excess of the risk free rate represented by the 1 month 
UK Treasury discount bill and is obtained from Datastream (LDN: FT). The monthly 
returns calculated for each firm are over the twelve months from May IS` of the year 
following the announcement of the leverage ratios. I use excess returns as this is a 
6 Refer Appendix 3 for other variable definitions. 
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more robust measure of returns as I investigate whether capital structure is value- 
relevant to the equity investor by estimating excess returns over a period of one 
year. My focus here is to show that leverage ratios can be used as the basis of a 
profitable investment strategy. 
b) Leverage 
I use the capital gearing definition (Datastream code: WC08221) to represent 
the leverage of companies in the sample. It represents the total debt to total financing 
of the firm and is defined as: 
Leverage (%) 
= 
Long term debt+ Short term debt & Current Portion of Long term debt 
Total Capital+ Short term debt & Current Portion of Long term debt 
Schwartz (1959) argues that the narrow definition of financial structure-i. e., 
that it is restricted to stocks and bonds-ignores the large measure of substitutability 
between the various forms of debt; thus, a broader definition encompassing the 
breadth of all liabilities and claims of ownership must be used. He proposes the ratio 
of total debt to net worth as the best single measure of gross risk. Firms in various 
industries have different asset structures that are financed by cash flows generated 
from various forms of debt and equity. The use of both variables' book values ensures 
that I measure the capital structure via the cash flows generated at the time those 
assets are financed. Schwartz (1959) also argues that an optimum capital structure for 
a widely held company is one which maximises the long-run value of the common 
stock per share. My analysis is based on the same understanding. The use of book 
values for debt and equity has the additional advantage of using the market value of 
equity neither to define the change in value nor in concurrent capital structure. 
Following Fama and French (1992), I account for the difference between the two by 
using market-to-book ratio as an additional risk factor later. 
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c) Interest Rates 
I include interest rates as an additional explanatory variable in my study as I 
would like to examine the effect of a macro-economic variable in explaining stock 
returns. Since the study examines the relationship between leverage and returns, 
interest rates seems to be the most appropriate macro-economic variable. Interest rate 
(Datastream code: LCBBASE) is the average monthly Bank of England (BoE) rate 
observed over the portfolio holding period. 
d) Industry Leverage 
Following Bradley et al (1984), 1 include industry leverage to examine strong 
industry influences across the firm leverage ratios. Industry leverage is calculated by 
averaging the leverage of each individual company in each sectors in May of year t 
(Bradley et al 1984). 
e) Leverage Factor (HLMLL) 
Following Fama and French(1993), I construct the portfolio of high leverage 
minus low leverage meant to mimic the risk factor in returns related to leverage. It is 
the difference, each month between the simple average of the returns on the three 
(deciles 8,9,10) high levered portfolios and the simple average of the returns on the 
three(deciles 1,2,3) low levered portfolios. Thus HLMLL is the difference between 
the returns on high levered and low levered portfolios. 
f) Size Factor (SMB) 
The portfolio SMB (small minus big) is meant to mimic the risk factor in 
returns related to size (FF 1993). It is the difference, each month between the simple 
average of the returns on the three small stock portfolios (S/L, S/M, and S/H) and 
the simple average of the returns on the three big-stock portfolios (B/L, B/M and 
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B/H) Hence, SMB is the difference between the returns of the small and big stock 
portfolios. 
g) Market-to-Book Factor (HML) 
The portfolio HML (high minus low) is meant to mimic the risk factor in returns 
related to market-to-book equity (FF 1993). It is the difference each month between 
the simple average of the returns on the two high-ME/BE portfolios(S/H and B/H) 
and the average of the returns on the two low ME/BE portfolios (S/L and B/L). 
Thus, HML is the difference between the returns of the high ME/BE and low 
ME/BE stock portfolios. 
h) Momentum Factor (MOMENTS) 
The portfolio MOMENTS (high minus low) meant to mimic the risk factor in 
returns related to momentum (Carhart 1997). It is the difference each month 
between the simple average of the returns on the three (deciles 8,9,10) high returns 
portfolios and the average of the returns on the three(deciles 1,2,3) low returns 
portfolios. Thus, MOMENTS is the difference between the returns of the high and 
low returns stock portfolios. 
i) Market Risk Factor (ExRM) 
Finally, following FF (1993), ExRM is the proxy for the market factor in stock 
returns which is the excess market return over the one month UK treasury discount 
bill. 
91 
3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Summary Statistics of Capital Structure and Stock Returns 
Panel A in Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the seven variables: 
stock returns, leverage, beta, size, price-earnings ratio, market-to-book, and interest 
rates7. The sample's mean and the median stock returns are 0.03% and 
-0.50%, 
respectively. The distribution is dispersed with a standard deviation of 12.03% and a 
range between 
-86.98% and 142.16%. As can be clearly observed from the JB 
statistic, non-normality exists in the data set with a skewness coefficient of 0.79 and a 
kurtosis coefficient of 9.60. 
The mean and median of the leverage variable are quite similar, at 27.15% and 
25.86%, respectively. The standard deviation is 19.45% with a range between 0% and 
99.67%. The leverage has a skewness coefficient of 0.63 and a kurtosis coefficient of 
0.63; the JB statistic shows non-normality. The mean and median of the price- 
earnings ratio are disparate, at 26.08 and 14.90 times, respectively, and the skewness 
and kurtosis coefficients are high with the JB test accordingly indicating non- 
normality. 
The mean and median of the industry leverage are quite similar, at 27.15% and 
27.45%, respectively. The standard deviation is 19.45% with a range between 5.05% 
and 57.36%. The leverage has a skewness coefficient of 0.07 and a kurtosis 
coefficient of 6.04; the JB statistic shows non-normality and is not rejected. 
Beta coefficients have a mean of 0.82 and a median of 0.83 with a standard 
deviation of 0.52. The distribution of beta coefficients is negatively skewed; the 
kurtosis coefficient is high; and the JB statistic indicates non-normality. 
7 Please refer Appendix 4 for the correlation matrix of the independent variables. 
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Size measured as'the logarithm of companies' market capitalization has a 
mean of 2.20 and a median of 2.10 with a standard deviation of 0.77. The skewness 
and kurtosis coefficients are 0.64 and 2.98, respectively, and the JB test indicates non- 
normality. 
The mean and median of the price-earnings ratio are disparate, at 26.08 and 
14.90 times, respectively, and the skewness and kurtosis coefficients are high with the 
JB test accordingly indicating non-normality. 
The market-to-book ratio has a mean of 3.43 times and a median of 1.89 times. 
The standard deviation is high (12.42 times), indicating a dispersed distribution with 
high skewness and kurtosis coefficients and, thus, non-normality as indicated by the 
JB test. 
The annual interest rates (BoE lending rate) have a mean of 7.45% and a 
median of 5.96% with a standard deviation of 3.23%. The lowest observed annual 
interest rate is 3.71% (in 2003) and the highest is 15.25% (in 1980). The kurtosis and 
skewness coefficients are 2.77 and 0.94, respectively, and the JB test indicates non- 
normality. Later, we consider the properties of the sample in empirical estimations 
using Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) to carry out cross-sectional 
regressions that include all the variables in our study. 
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TABLE 1-Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for our sample. We have a total of 7954 year-end observations 
for a sample of 792 companies for the period 1980-2004. Stock returns for each company are calculated on a 
monthly basis and are defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices adjusted for 
dividends, splits and rights issues. The returns are accumulated from May of year t over a one-year period 
(CAARs). Leverage is observed as of the beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It 
represents the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in equation (1). The price-earnings 
ratio (Datastream code: PER) is the price divided by the earnings rate per share and is taken as of the 
beginning of May of year t. The market-to-book value (Datastream code: MTBV) of companies is the share 
prices of companies divided by the net book value and is observed as of the beginning of May of year t. The 
market value (Datastream code: MV) of companies represents the size factor of companies in the sample. 
This is the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue as of the beginning of May of 
year t. The market risk measure is the beta coefficients estimated over five years using monthly data and is 
observed as of the beginning of May of year t. Interest rates are obtained from Datastream (Code: 
LCBBASE). The interest rates observed as of the beginning of May of year t to the end of April of year t+1 
are averaged over the 12-month period. Portfolio assignments are made yearly at the beginning of May in 
year t until the end of April of year t+1. All non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are allocated to the 10 debt 
portfolios. Each debt group is then subdivided into 10 price-earnings portfolios, followed by 10 price-to- 
book portfolios, then 10 size portfolios, and finally 10 beta portfolios. Average industry leverage ratios are 
calculated by averaging the leverage of each company in each industry sector in May of year t. Correlation 
refers to the correlation of firm leverage with average industry leverage. 
PANEL A 
CAARs Leverage Price/ Market-to- Size (log) Risk Interest Earnings Book 
Mean 3.34 27.15 26.08 3.43 2.20 0.82 7.45 
Median 3.02 25.86 14.90 1.89 2.10 0.83 5.96 
Std dev. 40.07 19.45 97.34 12.42 0.77 0.52 3.23 
Kurtosis 33.72 3.20 48829 973.39 2.98 5.00 2.77 
Skewness 1.72 063 19.08 27.40 0.64 "0.12 0.94 
Minimum "231.86 000 0.60 0.12 1.00 "2.53 3.71 
Maximum 849.36 99.67 3777.80 581.61 5.26 2.97 15.25 
JB statistic 
316803.9' 531.5484' 78533994' 3.130008' 550.8656' 1342.717' 1200.058' 
PANEL B 
oil & Gas Basic Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Goods Healthcare 
Consumer 
Services Telecommunications Utilities Technology 
kan 2399 27.48 28.38 27.79 26.63 25.25 27.84 40.07 18.57 
flan 22.45 27.94 27.50 27.06 23.45 22.38 24.65 43.07 13.10 
µd dfv. 16.59 15 67 18.88 18.61 19.96 21.19 20.80 17.94 19.12 
(ortosb 1.98 5 42 3.14 3 06 2.59 3.24 3.94 3.29 4.69 
{kswness 0.17 0.78 0.55 0.52 0.55 0.80 1.03 
-0.04 1.33 
Oink"Um 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 
AaxInwm 65 82 97.15 99.67 91.69 89.06 98.88 91.43 92.36 95.54 
, 
0n1800n 031 015 023 024 022 023 046 058 028 
Panel B in Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of firm leverage for each 
sectors. The leverage in the Oil & Gas industry has a mean and median of 23.99% and 
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22.45%, respectively, with a standard deviation of 16.59% and a minimum ranging 
from 0% to 65.82%. The skewness and kurtosis coefficients are 0.17 and 1.98, 
respectively. The correlation of firm leverage to the average industry leverage is 0.31. 
The Basic Materials industry has a mean and median of 27.48% and 27.94%, 
respectively, with a standard deviation of 15.67% and a minimum ranging from 0% to 
97.15%. The skewness and kurtosis coefficients are 0.78 and 5.42, respectively. The 
correlation of firm leverage to the average industry leverage is 0.15. 
The leverage in the Industrials sector has a mean and median of 28.38% and 
27.50%, respectively, with a standard deviation of 18.88% and a minimum ranging 
from 0% to 99.67%. The skewness and kurtosis coefficients are 0.55 and 3.14, 
respectively. The correlation of firm leverage to the average industry leverage is 0.23. 
The Consumer Goods industry has a mean and median of 27.79% and 27.06%, 
respectively, with a standard deviation of 18.61% and a minimum ranging from 0% to 
91.69%. The skewness and kurtosis coefficients are 0.52 and 3.06, respectively. The 
correlation of firm leverage to the average industry leverage is 0.24. 
The Healthcare industry has a mean and median of 26.63% and 23.45%, 
respectively, with a standard deviation of 19.96% and a minimum ranging from 0% to 
89.06%. The skewness and kurtosis coefficients are 0.55 and 2.59, respectively. The 
correlation of firm leverage to the average industry leverage is 0.22. 
The leverage in the Consumer Services industry has a mean and median of 
25.25% and 22.36%, respectively, with a standard deviation of 21.19% and a 
minimum ranging from 0% to 98.88%. The skewness and kurtosis coefficients are 
0.80 and 3.24, respectively. The correlation of firm leverage to the average industry 
leverage is 0.23. 
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The Telecommunications industry has a mean and median of 27.84% and 
24.65%, respectively, with a standard deviation of 20.80% and a minimum ranging 
from 0% to 91.43%. The skewness and kurtosis coefficients are 1.03 and 3.94, 
respectively. The correlation of firm leverage to the average industry leverage is 0.46, 
which finding is quite high. 
The Utilities industry has a high mean and median, at 40.07% and 43.07%, 
respectively, with a standard deviation of 17.94% and a minimum ranging from 
0.03% to 92.36%. The skewness and kurtosis coefficients are 
-0.04 and 3.29, 
respectively. The correlation of firm leverage to the average industry leverage is 0.58. 
The mean and median leverage in the Technology industry is 18.57% and 
13.10% with a standard deviation of 19.12% and a minimum ranging from 0% to 
95.54%. The skewness and kurtosis coefficients are 1.33 and 4.69, respectively. The 
correlation of firm leverage to the average industry leverage is 0.28. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Introduction 
I use the following empirical methods to examine if leverage can explain 
returns: a) For the first empirical chapter, I form portfolios based on leverage and use 
panel data estimated by Generalised Methods of Moments(GMM); b) For the second 
empirical chapter, I estimate returns in excess of the risk-free rate and use the explicit 
valuation model of MM; c)In the third empirical chapter, I adopt the Fama-Macbeth 
methodology with modifications to estimate expected returns at the portfolio level and 
d) finally, in the last empirical chapter, following FF(1993), I examine if leverage is a 
asset pricing risk factor and form leverage mimicking factor portfolio. 
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3.3.2 Methodology of Capital Structure and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The main aim of Chapter 4 is to test if leverage as an independent variable can 
explain abnormal returns. It investigates whether capital structure is value-relevant to 
the equity investor by estimating cumulative abnormal returns over a period of one 
year. I use excess returns as this is a more robust measure of returns as I investigate 
whether capital structure is value-relevant to the equity investor by estimating excess 
returns over a period of one year. My focus is to show that leverage ratios can be used 
as the basis of a profitable investment strategy and the relationship might indeed be 
negative or u-shaped for some sectors as they have differences in asset structures and 
production processes. Thus, I integrate MM into an investment approach by 
estimating abnormal returns on leverage portfolios in the time-series for various 
sectors as defined by the industries they operate in. The following sections lay down 
the steps of the methodology used to establish the relationship. 
a) Estimation of Normal Returns 
Stock returns for each company are calculated monthly using percent change 
in consecutive closing prices that have been adjusted for dividends splits and rights 
issues (Fama et al. (1969)) across the leverage deciles for the entire sample as well as 
for each sectors. Decile 1 contains the firms with the lowest leverage and decile 10 
contains those with the highest. For the overall portfolio, the returns were 
accumulated over one-year period (MM 1958). 
I define R; t as the return for firm i for month t. For all the empirical chapters in this 
thesis, monthly returns are continuously compounded by taking the percentage 
differences of two consecutive prices. It is calculated as follows: 
P, 
PI-I 
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b) Calculation of Abnormal Returns 
In this study, the excess returns were calculated by taking the difference 
between the actual return and return on the market, following the market model 
(Campbell et al 1997). The market model is a statistical model that relates the return 
of any given security to the return of the market portfolio. In applications a broad 
based stock index is used for the market portfolio. In this study, the returns on FTSE 
All Share stock index was used. Rmt is the market return on month t, calculated as the 
percentage differences of index levels of FTSE All Share for two consecutive months. 
I calculate the market adjusted abnormal returns for month t as: 
ARa=R,, 
-Rm 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAARs) are calculated for the 12 months following the 
period of portfolio formation and t-tests (Brown and Warner (1985) and Campbell, Lo 
and MacKinley (1997)) are used to test if CAARs are significantly different from zero 
using the following equations: 
12 
CAAR 
r= 
AR 
r. r 
(1) 
. =t r=t 
CHAR, (2) 
s(CAAR)T 
where s(CAART) = s(ART)/(T+1)'ßz; and s(ART) is the variance over T months. 
The next step in our analysis is to determine whether cumulative abnormal 
returns at the stock level can be explained by the leverage of the firms and to examine 
a number of idiosyncratic risk factors in the cross-section and interest rates that 
control for changes in cost of capital within the environment of the time series. 
Idiosyncratic risk factors include: market risk; size price-to-earnings ratio; and price- 
to-book ratio. 
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c) Portfolio Creation and Ranking 
After the estimation of CARs, I create portfolios of the CARs based on 
leverage, size, price-earnings, market- to- book and beta values. I first rank the CARs 
on the basis of the leverage of firms, from low to high. Then, ten levered portfolios 
are created annually. Next each leverage-ranked decile is sorted into ten size 
portfolios, with decile 1 denoting small firms and decile 10 denoting big firms. This 
exercise is repeated to obtain ten price-earnings, market-to-book and beta portfolios. 
For example, in 1980, if there are ten stocks, I rank the CARs of these ten stocks on 
the basis of leverage from low to high, forming ten levered portfolios. Then the CARs 
of these 10 levered portfolios are then ranked according to size, forming 10 `size' 
portfolios. These 10 `size' portfolios are then ranked according to market-to-book, 
forming 10 market-to-book portfolios. This is repeated till we get ten price-earnings 
and beta portfolios. 
For the full sample, portfolio assignments are made annually based on the 
leverage of the firm in each industry. For risk-class sub-samples, firms in each 
industry are ranked according to the leverage that is available from annual reports 
with year-end dates of December 31. The number of company year observations in 
each decile varies between eight and fifty seven and in the panel we have about seven 
hundred and ninety observations in each decile. 
To ensure that I avoid forward-looking biases, the annual decile assignments 
are made according to the available information as of May 1 of the following year, at 
which point all of the annual reports are published. Next, I sort the leverage deciles 
according to price-earnings (PE) ratios, decile 1 denoting the lowest PE and decile 10 
the highest. I repeat the exercise with sub-samples based on size (SIZE), which is 
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defined as total market capitalization of the company, market-to-book ratio (MTBV) 
and market risk (BETA). 
d) Regressions 
First, I run the following regression. Then I partition the data according to the 
different sectors represented by each industry, formally testing for the effect of 
leverage in each sectors while accounting for the effect of these additional factors on 
CAARs. 
CAAR, 
=a+ß, LEVERAG4 +ß2RISK, +ß3SIZE, +(3, MB., +ß, PE;, +ß, INTERES, K +E, (2) 
In equation (2), CAAR is defined as in equation (1); a stands for constant; 
LEVERAGE is measured as the ratio of total debt to total equity plus debt; RISK is 
the market risk estimated over the preceding five years; SIZE refers to the log of total 
market capitalisation; MB and PE refer to the ratio of market-to-book and the ratio of 
price to earnings respectively; INTEREST refers to the average monthly Bank of 
England (BoE) rate over the portfolio holding period; and c is the error term. 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) 
I estimate equation (2) using panel data estimated by GMM estimators and 
fixed effects for firms. I use panel data in order to test the impact of leverage on stock 
returns in the cross-section as well over time. It will help identify and measure effects 
that are not detectable in pure cross-section and time series data. Additionally, it 
allows us to construct and test more complicated behavioural models than purely 
cross-section or time-series data. The economic aspects that I hope to get insights into 
by using panel data include if leverage can explain returns after controlling for firm 
characteristics and other risk factors. It will also help explain if capital intensive 
industries actually earn higher returns than those sectors which are less capital 
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intensive. The regression in equation 2 will use panel data estimated by GMM with 
fixed effects in the panel to control for firm characteristics. 
GMM is a robust estimator in that, unlike maximum likelihood estimation, it 
does not require information of the exact distribution of the disturbances. The 
theoretical relation that the parameters should satisfy are usually orthogonality 
conditions between some function of the parameters f (0) and a set of instrumental 
variables Zt: 
f(e)'Z1=0 
Where 
0= the parameters to be estimated. 
The GMM estimators selects parameter estimates so that the sample 
correlation between the instruments and the function f are as close to zero as possible, 
as defined by the criterion function: 
f (0)'Zt = (m(0))' Am(0) 
Where m (0) =f (0)'Z and A is a weighting matrix 
Thus, considering the properties of the sample, I run the regressions in panel 
using GMM estimators and fixed effects with whitening in the cross-section. White 
cross-section indicates that GMM uses weights that are formed assuming that there is 
contemporaneous correlation between cross-sections. Following Flannery et al (2004), 
I use fixed effects for firms in the panel to account for the richness of individual 
firms' unique information and for the possibility of varying degrees of risk acceptance 
in ownership decisions (Schwartz, 1959). 
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3.3.3 Methodology of Capital Structure and Stock Returns: MM Model 
In this empirical chapter, I test MM proposition II by adopting the explicit 
valuation model of MM. I estimate stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate in the 
time-series for firms. However, unlike MM, I extend the test to various sectors 
including utilities and oil and gas sectors. This chapter expands the limited work 
carried out on leverage and stock returns by examining leverage as an independent 
variable and its impact on returns. I also test for linearity of leverage in stock returns. 
a) Calculation of Excess Returns 
In Chapters 5,6 and 7,1 use excess returns calculated as R1 
- 
Rff where Rff is 
the risk free rate denoted by the 1 month UK treasury bill discount rate and is 
obtained from DataStream (LDN: FT). 
b) Regression Analysis 
Following MM (1958), 1 test whether the average returns at the stock level can 
be explained by the leverage of the firms. Next, I add its square to test if there is 
linearity between returns and leverage. Thirdly, I add beta and a number of 
idiosyncratic risk factors to the explanatory variables including size, and market-to- 
book ratio. As before I use GMM estimators and fixed effects for firms when 
running the regressions. 
I run the following regressions presented in equations (3) through (5) in 
the full sample first. Then, I partition the data according to the different sectors 
represented by each industry and test formally for the effect of leverage on stock 
returns in each sectors. 
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R1=a+ßLEVERAGE+EN (3) 
R. =a+ ßLEVERAGE + ß: LEVERAGE' + E, t (4) 
R,, 
=a+ß, LEVERAGE + ß, BETA + p3SIZE + ß, MB + E,, (5) 
Where, R; t is the average stock returns in excess of the risk free rate for 
company i, at time t, R; t is the monthly stock returns in excess of the risk free rate for 
company i, in month t, a stands for constant, LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to 
total equity plus debt and LEVERAGE 2 its square, BETA is the market risk estimated 
over the past five years, SIZE refers to the log of total market capitalisation, MB 
refers to the ratio of market to book. 
3.3.4 Methodology of Capital Structure and Expected Stock Returns 
The main aim of this study is to examine the relationship between 
leverage and returns. In Chapter 4,1 examined the relationship by investigating firm 
leverage and CAARs, and in Chapter 5, the relationship is tested by examining firm 
leverage and stock returns in excess of the risk 
-free rate by adopting the MM model. 
Now there is a need to undertake analysis at the portfolio level which I plan to do in 
this chapter. Here, I use the Fama-Macbeth (1973, henceforth FM) methodology with 
some improvements. In their paper, FM tests the relationship between return and risk 
for NYSE stocks. They form portfolios from ranked beta computed from data of one 
time period but then using a subsequent time period to obtain the beta of the portfolios 
that is used to test the relationship between beta and expected returns. 
In this study, I apply the FM methodology with modifications. I form 
portfolios from ranked leverage computed from data of one time period but then using 
a subsequent time period to obtain the leverage of the portfolios that is used to test the 
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relationship between leverage and expected returns. One advantage of the FM 
methodology is that it allows for the inclusion of several variables in the monthly 
regressions (Dimitrov et al 2005). I also account for several risk factors, including 
market-to-book and others described by FF (1992). 
Model specification and estimation 
I use two year sub-periods that go from 1982-1983 to 2003-2004. The choice 
of two year sub-periods is to minimize the possible changes in the parameters during a 
sub-period while retaining reasonable degrees of freedom in t-statistics. 
Table 2 presents the periods for the portfolio formation, estimation and testing 
periods for our sample. Using the first 2 years (1980-1981) of leverage data, ten 
portfolios are formed on the basis of ranked leverage of individual securities. Next, 
the following 2 years (1982-1983) of data on leverage are then used to re-compute the 
LEVERAGE; and these are averaged across securities within portfolios to obtain 10 
initial portfolio leverages. The month by month returns on the 10 portfolios, with 
equal weighting of individual securities each month are also computed for the 2 year 
period 1984-1985. For other sub-periods, these procedures are identical except that all 
periods are advanced by the appropriate number of years. 
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I add a square term to the estimated leverage ratio to test for the presence a direction 
of curvature (MM 1958). 1 also test if firm leverage has an impact on the average returns. 
Finally, I conduct tests of a number of idiosyncratic risk factors in the cross section that 
control for changes in cost of capital in the environment in the time series. Idiosyncratic risk 
factors include, market risk, size, and price to book ratio. Values of explanatory variables are 
not updated within a sub-period. Both the portfolios and the values of explanatory variables 
are updated for each new sub-period. Secondly, the explanatory variables are calculated for 
each stock. I run the following regressions (6-8) in the full sample first. Then, I partition the 
data according to the different sectors represented by each industry and test formally for the 
effect of leverage in each sectors while accounting for the effect of these additional factors on 
returns: 
R 
=a+ (3, LEVERAGE, 
_, 
+i (6) 
R 
=a+ß, LEVERAGE, 
_, 
+ß 2LEVERAGE _, 
_, 
+c, (7) 
R., 
=a+ß, LEVERAGE, 
_, 
+ ß2ExRM, 
_, 
+ ß, SIZE, 
_, 
+ p4MB, 
_, 
+c (8) 
In equations 6-8, R; t is defined as returns in excess of risk-free, a stands for constant, 
LEVERAGE is measured as the ratio of total debt to total equity plus debt, ExRM is the 
excess market return over the one year UK treasury bill discount. SIZE refers to the log of 
total market capitalisation, MB refer to the ratio of market to book and c is the error term. I 
estimate equations 6-8 using OLS. 
3.3.5 Methodology of Capital Structure and Common Risk Factors in Stock Returns 
The main aim of this empirical chapter is to explore the effect of leverage mimicking 
factor portfolio in explaining stock return variations. I form portfolios to mimic the 
underlying risk factor related to leverage of firms. I follow the procedure in FF(1993). I also 
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undertake estimations to see if returns can be explained by firm leverage even if portfolios 
constructed to mimic other factors related to market risk, momentum, size and market-to- 
book to capture variation in returns is in the time series regression. 
In May of each year, we sort all the companies on the basis of leverage, ranking from 
low to high. The companies are divided into 10 deciles. Companies with the lowest leverage 
(LL) values comprise decilel and decilel0 comprise companies with the highest leverage 
(HL). These 10 deciles are then further subdivided into 3 groups (FF (1993), Carhart 1997). 
The portfolios are re-balanced yearly. 
Following FF (1993), 1 also form size and market-to-book portfolios. In May of each 
year from 1980 to 2003, the stocks are ranked on size. The median size is then used to split 
the stocks into 2 groups, small and big(S and B). Next we sort all stocks on market-to-book 
and these are divided into three based on the break-points for the bottom 30% (Low), middle 
40% (medium) and top 30% (high). 
Following Carhart (1997), 1 form momentum based portfolios to capture the 
momentum factor in stocks. I rank all stocks according to the past months' returns and 
allocate them into three groups based on the break-points for the bottom 30% (Low), middle 
40% (medium) and top 30% (high). 
I run the following regressions presented in equations (9) through (14) in the full 
sample first. Then, I partition the data according to the different sectors represented by each 
industry and test formally for the effect of leverage on stock returns in each sectors. 
R 
=a+ß, HLMLL+E 
R 
=a+ß, ExRM +c 
(9) 
(10) 
Rµ =a+ß, ExRM+ß2SMB+ß3HML+E (11) 
R 
=a+ß, SMB+ß2HML+ß, ExRM+ß, Moments+ck (12) 
R. 
=a+ß, HLMLL+ ß, SMB + ß, HML + ß, ExRM + ß, Moments +c (13) 
R 
=a+ß, LEVERAGE+ß, SMB+ßHML+ß, ExRM+ß, Moments+c (14) 
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Where, R;, is the monthly stock returns in excess of the risk free rate for company i, in 
month t, a stands for constant, HLMLL is returns on equal-weighted, factor-mimicking 
portfolio for leverage. It is the difference each month, between the average returns of high 
leverage (HL) companies and the average returns of low leverage companies (LL). SMB 
mimics the risk factor related to size. It is the difference, each month, between the small and 
big portfolios with about the same weighted average book-to market equity. HML is meant to 
mimic the risk factor in returns related to market-to-book. It is the difference between the 
average returns of high market-to-book portfolios and the average returns between low 
market-to-book portfolios. ExRM is the excess return on the FTSE All Share index. The risk 
free rate used is the 1 month UK Treasury discount bill. Moments is meant to mimic the risk 
factor in returns related to momentum. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total equity 
plus debt. 
3.3.6 Conclusion 
This section has primarily presented the methodologies that are going to be adopted 
by taking into account the manner that each empirical chapter aims to test the relationship 
between leverage and stock returns. In the first empirical chapter I attempt to test if leverage 
is value relevant to an equity investor. I estimate cumulative abnormal returns in excess of 
market returns over one year and examine if leverage can be used as the basis of a profitable 
investment strategy. In the second empirical chapter, I test the relation between leverage and 
stock returns by estimating returns in excess of the risk free rate. In the third empirical 
chapter, I aim to test the relationship between portfolio leverage and expected returns by 
adopting the FM methodology. Finally, following FF, I test if leverage is priced as a risk 
factor by constructing a leverage factor. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
The main aim of this study is to investigate if leverage can explain returns. This 
chapter dealt with the data, descriptive statistics and methodologies that are applied in this 
study to test the relationship between returns and leverage. In order to test this relationship, I 
estimate returns in various forms such as abnormal returns, expected returns and portfolio 
returns, and leverage at the firm level, industry level and portfolio level. The explanatory 
variables used are leverage, beta, size, market-to-book, price-earnings ratio, interest rates, 
average industry leverage, leverage mimicking factor portfolio (HLMLL), size mimicking 
factor portfolio(SMB), market-to-book mimicking factor portfolios(HML), momentum 
mimicking factor portfolio (MOMENTS) and ExRM (market risk) The dependent variable is 
stock returns. Following MM, this study uses a time frame of one year. 
Chapter 4 investigates whether capital structure is value-relevant to the equity 
investor. My focus is to show that leverage ratios can be used as the basis of a profitable 
investment strategy and the relationship might indeed be negative or u-shaped for some 
sectors as they have differences in asset structures and production processes. I integrate MM 
into an investment approach by estimating abnormal returns on leverage portfolios in the 
time-series for various sectors as defined by the industries they operate in. Returns are 
defined as cumulative abnormal returns over a period of one year. The variables used here are 
leverage, beta, size, market-to-book, price-earnings, interest rates and industry leverage. 
In the next empirical chapter I test MM proposition II by adopting the explicit 
valuation model of MM. I estimate stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate in the time- 
series for firms. However, unlike MM, I extend the test to various sectors including utilities 
and oil and gas sectors. This chapter expands the limited work carried out on leverage and 
stock returns by examining leverage as an independent variable and its impact on returns. I 
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also test for linearity of leverage in stock returns. The variables used here are leverage, beta, 
size and market-to-book. 
Chapter 6 examines the relationship between portfolio leverage and expected returns. 
In Chapter 4,1 examined the relationship by investigating firm leverage and CAARs, and in 
Chapter 5, the relationship is tested by examining firm leverage and stock returns by adopting 
the MM model. Now there is a need to undertake analysis at the portfolio level which I plan 
to do in this chapter. Here, I use the Fama-Macbeth (1973, henceforth FM) methodology with 
some improvements. One advantage of the FM methodology is that it allows for the inclusion 
of several variables in the monthly regressions (Dimitrov et al 2005). The variables used here 
are leverage, market risk, size and market-to-book. 
The main aim of the last empirical chapter is to explore the effect of leverage 
mimicking factor portfolio in explaining stock return variations. I form portfolios to mimic 
the underlying risk factor related to leverage of firms. I follow the procedure in FF(1993). I 
also undertake estimations to see if returns can be explained by firm leverage even if 
portfolios constructed to mimic other factors related to market risk, momentum, size and 
market-to-book to capture variation in returns is in the time series regression. 
The following chapters will describe the findings of the different approaches used to 
define the relationship between leverage and returns. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND ABNORMAL 
RETURNS 
ill 
4 CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND ABNORMAL RETURNS 
4.1 Introduction 
The first empirical chapter of this thesis investigates whether capital structure is 
value-relevant to the equity investor. I use excess returns as this is a more robust measure of 
returns as I investigate whether capital structure is value-relevant to the equity investor by 
estimating excess returns over a period of one year. My focus is to show that leverage ratios 
can be used as the basis of a profitable investment strategy and the relationship might indeed 
be negative or u-shaped for some sectors as they have differences in asset structures and 
production processes. I integrate MM into an investment approach by estimating abnormal 
returns on leverage portfolios in the time-series for various sectors as defined by the 
industries they operate in. The contributions are as follows: 
First, I hope to overcome the restrictions imposed by the limited samples and different 
methodologies employed by previous studies such as Hamada (1972), Bhandari (1988), 
Korteweg (2004), Dimitrov&Jain (2005), George and Hwang (2006) and Penman (2007) by 
using a measure that is easier for the investor to interpret; abnormal returns over a holding 
period of one year similar with MM time frames; 
Second, I test the original idea in MM that capital structures vary in different sectors as asset 
structures and production processes vary and the book value of leverage measures the 
relevant measure of cash inflows to the firm which management has discretion in decisions 
regarding the capital structure (Schwartz, 1959); 
Finally, I use additional risk factors of Fama and French (1992) and the particular 
environment's cost of borrowing in order to account for changes in the cost of capital in the 
time series. I estimate the effect of leverage on abnormal returns in a cross-section of firms, 
taking into account several risk factors, including market-to-book and others described by 
Fama and French (1992). Results are robust with regard to other risk factors. 
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I show that equity returns increase in leverage for some sectors but decrease in 
leverage for others. I find that firms in sectors such as the utilities and oil & gas sectors have 
abnormal returns that increase in leverage. These results are similar with the findings of MM, 
who employ these industries in their empirical tests. Firms in most other sectors experience 
abnormal returns that decrease in leverage, supporting the findings of authors who use mixed 
samples of firms. The results show that low-levered companies have significant abnormal 
returns, which are extremely high for the smallest companies. 
4.2 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Leverage 
Table 3 reports Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs). For the full 
sample, the mean leverage for low debt firms is 0.28%; for high debt firms it is 62%. The 
mean leverage increases monotonically to 5% in decile 2, then to 12% in decile 3. Deciles 4 
and 5 have a mean leverage of 18% and 24%, respectively. The mean leverage in decile 6 is 
29%; decile 7 has a mean leverage of 34%; and deciles 8 and 9 have mean leverages of 39% 
and 46%, respectively. 
Cumulative abnormal returns for the full sample at the end of the twelve month 
holding period are presented in column 3 of Table 3. Figure 1 presents the CAARs for each 
leverage decile monthly over the 12-month holding period. For the full sample, the CAAR for 
low levered firms of decile 1 is 6.28%. On the other hand, firms in decile 10 (i. e., those with 
the highest leverage) earn CAARs that are not significantly different from zero. For the full 
sample, the CAAR decrease as leverage increases. Firms in deciles 2 and 3 earn 6% and 
6.49%, respectively, during the holding period. Cumulative abnormal returns decrease to 
3.52% and 5.54% for firms in deciles 4 and 5, respectively; then decline continues for deciles 
6,7 and 8, reaching 2.3%, 1.84% and 2.6%, respectively. 
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1. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero for firms in 
deciles 9 and 10. If leverage was used as a trading strategy and an investor was to invest in 
the lowest leverage firms with an average leverage burden of 0.28%, he would be able to earn 
a cumulative abnormal return of 6.28% in one year's time and a staggering 491% during the 
25-year research period. Alternatively, if he was to invest in firms with the highest leverage 
and carry an average debt burden of 62%, he would earn a negative annual average abnormal 
return of 
-0.99%, which, with annually rebalanced portfolios, would amount to a loss of 78% 
during the 25-year research period. 
Figure 1 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) across the leverage deciles. Stock returns for 
each company are calculated on a monthly basis and are defined as the percentage difference of consecutive 
closing prices adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The returns are accumulated from May of year t 
over a one-year period (CAARs). Leverage is observed as of the beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: 
WC08221). It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in equation (1). The 
CAARs of all non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the 
data requirements for the research study are allocated to the 10 leverage portfolios. Portfolio assignments are 
made yearly at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year t+1. Leverage decile I denotes firms 
with the lowest leverage and leverage decile 10 represents firms with the highest leverage. 
CHARS ACROSS LEVERAGE DECILES OVER THE HOLDING PERIOD 
2 
Ep 
d 
-z 
-4 
-6 
1 2 3 4 5 8 10 11 12 
Period(Months 1 to 12) 
Decile 1 
Decile 2 
Decile 3 
Decile 4 
-t Decile 5 
Decile 6 
Decile 7 
-- 
Decile 8 
- 
Decile 9 
Decile 10 
In Table 3, columns 4 through 12 and Figure 2 present CAARs for each leverage 
decile within each sector. Cumulative average abnormal returns decline in leverage for the 
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Consumer Goods, Consumer Services and Industrials industries. For the Consumer Goods 
industry which includes firms in the automobile and parts, beverages, food producers, 
household goods, leisure goods, personal goods and tobacco sectors, CAARs of firms in the 
lowest leverage decile are 7.48% while CAARs of firms in the highest leverage decile are not 
significantly different from zero. For the Consumer Services industry which includes firms in 
the food and drug, general retailers, media and travel and leisure sectors, firms with the 
lowest leverage earn CAARs of 10.30% in one year, while firms in the highest leverage 
decile earn CAARs of 
-3%. In the Industrials industry which includes firms in the 
constructions and materials, aerospace and defence, general industries, electronic and electric 
equipment, industrial engineering and industrial transportation sectors, firms in the lowest 
leverage decile earn CAARs of 3.55%, while CAARs for those in highest leverage decile are 
not significantly different from zero. These results are similar with the results of the full 
sample. 
Figure 2 
Figure 2 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) across the leverage deciles. Stock returns for each 
company are calculated on a monthly basis and are defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices 
adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The returns are accumulated from May of year t over a one-year period 
(CAARs). Leverage is observed as of the beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the 
total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in equation (1). The CAARs of all non-financial companies 
listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are 
allocated to the 10 leverage portfolios. Portfolio assignments are made yearly at the beginning of May in year t until 
the end of April of year t+1. Leverage decile 1 denotes firms with the lowest leverage and leverage decile 10 
represents firms with the highest leverage. 
RETt1RN3i°ýý - 
CAARS ACROSS LEVERAGE DECILES FOR DIFFERENT SECTORS 
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Firms in the Basic Materials industry exhibit CAARs that are U-shaped in leverage. 
The Basic Materials industry includes firms in the chemicals, forestry and paper, industrial 
metals and mining sectors. Those firms with the lowest leverage earn CAARs of 5.18% and 
those with highest leverage earn 9.07%, while firms in decile 5 earn negative CAARs of -1%. 
In this sectors, CAARs are U-shaped in leverage: CAARs are high for firms with either very 
low or very high leverage, while they are either low or negative for firms with leverages 
closer to the median. Firms in the Telecommunications industry also exhibit U-shaped 
CAARs. CAARs are positive and high for the lowest levered firms; the CAARs in the highest 
leverage decile earn positive but low CAARs. The Telecommunications industry includes 
firms in the fixed-line telecommunications and mobile telecommunications sectors. Those 
firms with the lowest leverages earn CAARs of 44.81% and those with the highest leverages 
earn 18.14%. Firms in deciles 5 and 8 earn CAARs of 1.17% and 11.17%, respectively. 
Firms in the Healthcare industry exhibit inverted U-shaped CAARs that are either 
negative or very low for the very low levered and highly levered deciles, while firms with 
leverage ratios near the median enjoy high CAARs. The Healthcare industry includes firms in 
the healthcare equipment and services, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology sectors. Those 
firms with lowest leverage earn CAARs of -2.28% and firms with highest leverage earn - 
1.28%, while firms in decile 5 earn CAARs of 9% and those in decile 8 earn CAARs of 31%. 
The Technology industry reveals high but negative CAARs in the lowest leverage decile and 
low but positive CAARs in the highest leverage decile. Firms in the Technology industry 
include those in the software and computer services and technology hardware and equipment 
sectors. Those firms in the lowest leverage decile earn CAARs of -13.23% and firms in the 
highest leverage decile earn 0.64%. Firms in decile 5 and 8 earn CAARs of 10.09% and 
16.88%, respectively which exhibits inverted U-shaped CAARs. 
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CAARs increase in leverage for the Utilities and Oil and gas sectors. The Utilities 
industry exhibits CAARs that negative in the lowest leverage decile and positive but low 
CAARs in the highest leverage decile. Firms in the Utilities industry include those in the 
electricity and gas, water and multi-utilities sectors. Firms in the lowest decile earn -15.56% 
in the ls` decile and those in the highest decile earn 8.91%. Firms deciles 5 and 8 earn 8.78% 
and 2.07%, respectively. The Oil and Gas industry is the last sectors in which CAARs 
increase in leverage. Firms in the Oil and Gas industry include those in the oil and gas 
producers and oil equipment and services sectors. Companies with the lowest leverage earn 
negative CAARs of -2.3%; firms in decile 5 earn 3.95%; and firms with the highest leverage 
earn 6.52%. These results are similar with MM. The Oil & Gas and Utilities industries are 
two sectors that contain the highest average leverage ratios and in which the leverage ratios in 
the cross-section of the industry's firms are least dispersed. 
The relationship between leverage and holding period returns is not the same for all 
sectors. For most sectors i. e. Consumer Goods, Consumer Services and Industrials industries, 
CAARs decrease in leverage; firms with low leverage ratios can earn significantly higher 
CAARs than can firms with high leverage. For others such as the Basic Materials industry 
and the Telecommunications industry, the relationship between leverage and CAARs is U- 
shaped; CAARs are high for the highest levered and lowest for the low levered firms. For the 
Utilities and Oil and Gas industries CAARs increase in leverage. This is similar with the 
theoretical model of MM as well as with their empirical tests conducted for these sectors in 
the U. S. I show that this is not the case for the other sectors. 
I show that the relationship between leverage and CAARs is not similar across 
industries. Later, when I run regressions, I use the average industry debt ratio as a separate, 
independent variable in order to explain CAARs. 
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Since MM, other risk factors have been introduced which have become popular in 
academic as well as practitioner-oriented contexts. Various studies have defined investment 
strategies based on momentum (Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Debondt and Thaler (1995)), 
price-earnings ratio (Campbell and Schiller (1988)), size (Banz (1981) and Chan and Chen 
(1991)), market-to-book ratio (Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991)) or a combination of 
these factors (Fama and French (1992; 1996)) as determinants in investors' value 
maximisation. Of course, the question arises whether leverage ratio is the sole contributing 
factor or rather only one of the contributing factors in the cumulative returns. Below, I will 
undertake a series of tests in order to investigate if other factors or combination thereof could 
have contributed to the obtained results. 
4.2.1 Are the Results Calendar-Varying? 
Table 4 reports the results of the year-by-year analysis of portfolios formed during the 
research period. Overall, I do not observe any dependence on calendar time with regard to the 
relationship between leverage and CAARs. When the CAARs of the portfolios formed during 
the 1980's, 1990's and 2000's are investigated, I observe similar with the results of the full 
sample, that firms in the lowest leverage deciles with moderately lower leverage levels 
outperform the market when compared to companies with higher leverage. However, there 
are a few exceptions. For example, in 1987, the year of the stock market crash, companies 
with the highest leverage outperform the market when compared to companies with the 
lowest leverage. In 1993 and 2001, years of technology bubbles, companies with the highest 
debt ratio outperform companies with the lowest leverage. The UK markets experience high 
interest volatility during the research period. The range of interest rates in the environment 
during this period is between 3.7% and 15.3% yearly. For example, in 1987 interest rates are 
low and debt is comparatively cheap for companies to procure. Companies might have used 
this opportunity to increase their leverage. In 1993 and 2001, interest rates 
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drop considerably, making debt cheaper and more attractive for companies to meet their 
financing needs. Later, when I run regressions, I take the cost of debt in the particular 
environment into account by using interest rate as an explanatory factor for CAARs. 
4.3 Leverage and Risk 
Table 5 reports CAARs for portfolios based on leverage as well as on market risk. 
Overall, cumulative abnormal returns are higher for companies with low market risk and low 
leverage. For example, companies in the lowest beta coefficient decile and the lowest debt 
decile earn excess returns of 8.33%, while companies in the highest market risk and highest 
leverage deciles earn negative abnormal returns of 
-3%. Companies with high beta 
coefficients and low debt levels earn high abnormal returns of up to 14.21%, while 
companies with high beta coefficients and high leverage earn negative abnormal returns as 
low as 
-2.95%. Companies with low market risk earn positive abnormal returns in most 
leverage levels, with higher abnormal returns for lower leverage levels. 
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TABLE 5 
-Leverage and Risk Table 5 reports the results of the portfolios based on leverage ratio and beta for 1980-2004. Leverage is 
observed as of the beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the total debt to total 
financing of the firm. The market risk measure is the beta coefficients estimated over five years using monthly 
data and is observed as of the beginning of May of year t. Stock returns for each company are calculated on a 
monthly basis and are defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices adjusted for dividends, 
splits and rights issues. The returns are accumulated from May of year t over a one-year period (CAARs). The 
CAARs of all non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the 
data requirements for the research study are allocated to the 10 leverage portfolios. Portfolio assignments are 
made yearly at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year t+l. Each leverage decile is 
subdivided into 10 beta portfolios. Leverage decile 1 (LOW) denotes firms with the lowest leverage ratios and 
Leverage decile 10 (HIGH) represents firms with the highest leverage. Beta decile 1 represents low risk firms 
and beta decile 10 represents firms with high risk. 
LEVERAGE 
DECILES 
I (LOW) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (HIGH) 
8 33' 8.43' 7.88* 8.65' 13 68' 7.02' 
-2.10' 9.26' "2.64' 5.73' 
812" 9.32' 
-0.66' -0.17" 7.91 * 1.60' 9.63' 4.48' "2.73' -6.20' 
2 75" 2 02" 5.36' 4.35' 5 64" 2.75' 0.13' 4.71' 
"2.61 * 8.26* 
3 76' 2.13* 9.30' 1.88' 3.82' 2.10* 
-1.60' 0.86' 7.68' 
-0.99' 
. 
3,34" 6.17' 4.95' 0.26* 10.44* 
-1.78' 3.08' 3.91' 0.85' 0.16* 
7.90' 4.33" 4.95' 
-0.55' 5.87* 
-0.69' "2.10' -2.56 0.58' 3.80' 
13 24' 2 64" 11.79' "1.56' 1.90' 4.60' 7.24' 
-0.74 -2.66' 
-5.61' 
9 57' 6.06' 7.44' 6.75' 1.96' 3.58* 2.16' 0.14" 9.54' 
-2.16* 
-1.32' 4.98' 8.71' 0.54" 0.73' 4.03* 3.55' 2.37* -1.60' 
-6.31 
14 21* 9.90' 6.05' 13.83* 4.34' "1.29' -0.56' 3.84' "5.28' 
-2.95' 
6 51 5.77 6.49 3.52 5.60 2.24 1.84 2.60 0.42 
-0,99 
** 5% significance leve l *10% significance level 
4.4 Leverage and Price-Earnings Ratio 
Table 6 reports CAARs for portfolios based on leverage and price-earnings (PE) 
ratios. Overall cumulative abnormal returns are higher for companies with low leverages and 
low PE ratios. For example, companies in the lowest PE and lowest leverage deciles 
outperform the market by 16.51% in one year, while companies in the highest leverage and 
highest PE deciles under-perform, with CAARs of 
-7.47%. Cumulative abnormal returns are 
positive for all leverage levels for low PE firms, although CAARs decline from 16.51% in the 
lowest leverage and lowest PE deciles to 5.52% for firms in the highest leverage and lowest 
PE deciles. Similarly, for firms in the highest PE ratio decile, CAARs decline from 3.27% for 
low leverage firms to 
-7.49% for the highest leverage firms. 
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TABLE 6 
-Leverage and Price-Earnings Ratio 
Table 6 reports the results of the portfolios based on leverage and price-earnings ratio for 1980-2004. Leverage 
is obtained as of the beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the total debt to total 
financing of the firm. The price-earnings ratio (Datastream code: PER) is the price divided by the earnings rate per 
share and is taken as of the beginning of May of year t. Each leverage group is subdivided into 10 price-earnings 
portfolios. Leverage decile 1 (LOW) denotes the lowest leverage and leverage decile 10 (HIGH) represents firms with 
the highest leverage. PIE decile 1 denotes firms with the lowest price-earnings ratio and PIE decile 10 contains firms 
with the highest price-earnings ratio. Stock returns for each company are calculated on a monthly basis and are 
defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The 
returns are accumulated from May of year t over a one-year period (CAARs). Portfolio assignments are made yearly 
at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year W. All non-financial companies listed on London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are allocated to the 10 
leverage portfolios. 
LEVERAGE 
DECILES 
P/E Decile 1 (LOW) 2 3 4 
5 6 7 8 9 10 (HIGH) 
I (LOW) 16.51' 7.81 17.36* 6.57* 14.20' 5.51* 3.47' 2.86' 7.75' 5 52* 
2 9.59' 12.14' 6.78' 9.70' 1.99* 1.58' 5.85* 2.56' 
-3.34" "3.53* 
3 3.15* 4.70* 9.83' 3.13' 10.07' 6.52' 
-1.03* "1.64' -1.62' 2.54' 
4 3.94* 11.08* 1.07* 8.95* 5.83' 0.53* 
-0.53' 3.46* 2.51' 
-2 62' 
5 12.15' 
-3 22* 4.52* -1.23* 2.84* 3.54' 3.98* 3.90* 
-5.57' 1.18' 
6 9 39' 6.56' 6.89* 
-7.69* 5.16' -1.45' -0.84' -0.75' 3.44" 2.11* 
7 7.00* 6.99* 1.14* 3.86' 0.41 * 1.55* 0.29* 0.83* 
-1.92' 
-2.23' 
8 4 10* 10.60' 5.70* 0.89' 6.24' 2.92' 
-0.16' 1.40" 5.63' 
-6.24' 
9 1.79 
-1.51 0.83 1.89 2.52 0.55 0.22 5.76 1.20 
-0.70 
10 (HIGH) 3.27' 3.47' 9.46' 10.67* 8.00' 0.50* 10.42' 7.15' 
-0.06' 
-7.47' 
Grand Total 6.51 5.77 6.49 3.52 5.60 2.24 1.84 2.60 0.42 
-0.99 
** 5% significance level *10% sig nificance level 
4.5 Leverage and Market-to-Book Ratio 
Table 7 reports CAARs for portfolios based on leverage and market-to-book value. 
Our results indicate that CAARs are higher for companies with low leverage and low market- 
to-book. For example, companies in the lowest leverage and lowest market-to-book deciles 
outperform the market by 20% and 24%, respectively, while companies in the highest 
leverage and highest market-to-book deciles have abnormal returns that are not significantly 
different from zero. CAARs for companies in the lowest market-to-book decile are positive 
and significant in all leverage deciles, while CAARs for companies in the highest market-to- 
book decile are not significantly different from zero in any leverage decile. In all leverage 
deciles, CAARs decrease in market-to-book. 
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TABLE 7-Leverage and Market-to-Book 
Table 7 reports the results of the portfolios based on leverage and price-to-book ratio for 1980-2004. Leverage is 
obtained as of the beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the total debt to total 
financing of the firm. The price-to-book value (Datastream code: PTBV) of companies is the share prices of 
companies divided by the net book value and is observed as of the beginning of May of year t. Stock returns for 
each company are calculated on a monthly basis and are defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing 
prices adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The returns are accumulated from May of year t over a one-year 
period (CAARs). Portfolios are formed yearly at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year t+1. All 
non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for 
the research study are allocated to the 10 leverage portfolios. Portfolio assignments are made yearly at the beginning 
of May in year t until the end of April of year W. Each leverage group is subdivided into 10 price-to-book ratio 
portfolios. Leverage decile I (LOW) denotes firms with the lowest leverage and leverage decile 10 (HIGH) represents 
firms with the highest leverage. PTBV decile 1 denotes firms with the lowest price-to-book ratios and PTBV decile 10 
denotes firms with the highest price-to-book ratios. 
LEVERAGE 
DECILES 
I. ioBook 1 (LOW) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (HIGH) 
; LOW) 19 58' 24.04' 15.25* 6.79* 15.59* 5.27" 12.98* 9.72' 7.96* 23 64' 
2 8.97" 4.33* 15.50* 2.77* 6.44* 0.45' 5.11* 1.81* 1.83* 2.07* 
3 3.93* 8.14* 4.52" 4.46* 9.80' 7.21 " 4.70' 
-3.62" 9.76* 3 73' 
4 3.45' 7.25* 11.61* 8.89" 
-0.22* -2.65* 9.61* 0.71' "5.54* 11.44" 
S 14.08* 7.35* 6.90' 4.47" 4.85' 12.77* 
"1.16' 3.38* 3.75' 
"7.28' 
6 13.86* 
-1.37* 3.67" 2.38* 3.76' 2.42 0.23 
-0.63 -1.21 
-7.72' 
7 5.20' 
-1.61 * 5.56* 0.56" 7.02" 2.33" 
-3.09' 4.54* 4.33' 
"14 52' 
8 5.15 8.52 3.26 5.60 5.44 
-6.58 
-5.91 4.28 
-6.22 
-10.56 
9 1.37' 0 21 * 
-8.17* -4.20' -5.57" -0.37" -5.32* -0.59' "7.32' 
-6.63' (HIGH) 
-2.65 5.25 6.54 0.58 2.08 
-4.26 -5.17 5.88 
-4.22 
-018 
nd Total 6.51 5.77 6.49 3.52 5.60 2.24 1.84 2.60 0.42 
-0.99 
**5 % significan ce level *10% significance level 
4.6 Leverage and Size 
Table 8 reports CAARs for portfolios based on leverage and size. Our results indicate 
that CAARs are slightly higher for small companies with low leverage. The smallest 
companies (in size decile 1) earn abnormal returns between 8% and 14% if they have 
leverage ratios below the median, and between 6% and 
-3% if they have leverage ratios 
above the median. Large companies earn slightly lower CAARs, ranging between 
-4% and 
3.5% yearly. 
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TABLE 8 
-Leverage and Size 
Table 8 reports the results of the portfolios based on leverage and size for 1980-2004. Leverage is observed as of the 
beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm. 
The market value (Datastream code: MV) of companies represents the size factor of companies in the sample. This is 
the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue as of the beginning of May of year t. Stock returns 
for each company are calculated on a monthly basis and are defined as the percentage difference of consecutive 
closing prices adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The returns are accumulated from May of year t over a 
one-year period (CAARs). All non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the 
criteria of the data requirements for the research study are allocated to the 10 debt portfolios. Portfolio assignments 
are made yearly at the beginning of May in year t until the end of April of year t+1. Each leverage group is subdivided 
into 10 portfolios. Decile 1 (LOW) denotes firms with the lowest leverage and decile 10 (HIGH) represents firms with 
the highest leverage. Size decile 1 denotes the smallest firms and size decile 10 denotes the largest firms. 
LEVERAGE 
DECILES 
Size Decile 1(LOW) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10(HIGH) 
1(SMALL) 8.13* 11.20* 9.95* 14.02' 10.40' 1.87* 4.58' 6.64' 
-2.81" 0.05' 
2 7.47* 6.38' 10.55' 9.89' 5.92* 6.00' 
-0.84' -0.74' -2.45* -4.64' 
3 9.51* 4 34" 7.06' 8.61 * 7.38' 
-0.47' 2.08' -1.22* 2.82' 6.12' 
4 1.27* 8 57' 12.18* 1.30' 11.83* 4.49' 7.06' 9.33' 
-0.28' -4.37* 
5 9.79' 5.68' 2.13' 1.17" 1.81* 1.66' 
-2.50" 8.25* 2.30" 
-11.10' 
6 8.73' 6.17" 7.97' 
-0.79* 4.46* -0.04" 2.82* 6.31 " 1.71' 
-0.50* 
7 5.23 5.20 
-0.60 -4.17 6.43 1.39 1.63 0.12 3.91 
-10.88 
8 6.71 " 
-1.28* 5.47' 0.94* 2.26' 3.77" 2.55* 1.03* 1.79' 7.28* 
9 
-6 84* 5.87' 5.40* 6.45* 3.96' 3.79" 0.07" 0.20* 
-2.36' 0.92* 
10(SIG) 
-399* 0.84' -0.99* 0.31* 3.42* 1.08* 3.33" 0.50* 
-1.96* 3.49' 
Grand Total 6.51 5.77 6.49 3.52 5.60 2.24 1.84 2.60 0.42 
-0.99 
**5% significance level *10% significance l evel 
4.7 Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
Table 9 reports the results of the cross-sectional regressions for the full sample as well 
as for the different sectors8. For the full sample, cross-sectional regressions reveal a negative 
and significant relationship between lev erage and cumulative abnormal returns9. Cumulative 
abnormal returns decline in leverage. A 1% increase in leverage is associated with a 0.1% 
decline in CAARs. All other variables, including price-earnings ratio, price-to-book ratio, 
size, beta and interest rates'°, have negative and significant coefficients. CAARs are higher 
II repeat estimations using OLS. Conclusions do not change (Refer Appendix 5). 
9I repeat estimations were using random effects. Conclusions do not change (Refer Appendix 6). 10 I repeat estimations with an interaction term between leverage and beta and find that the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms are not significant in most of the cases (Refer Appendix 7). 
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for low PE, low BTMV, low beta and small companies as ill as during periods of low interest 
rates. Although I account for the effect of several idiosyncratic and macro-economic risk 
factors, the negative effect of leverage on CAARs remains significant. 
I repeat the estimations for all sectors. The coefficients for interest rates and size are 
negative and significant across all sectors. The coefficients for PE, PTBV and beta are either 
negative and significant or insignificant for all sectors. Only the coefficient estimates for 
leverage have different signs for different sectors. Coefficient estimates for leverage are 
negative and significant for Consumer Goods, Consumer Services and Industrial firms. In the 
Consumer Goods sector CAARs decline by about 0.33% per 1% increase in leverage. In the 
Consumer Services industry, CAARs decline by about 0.18% per 1% increase in leverage. 
For Industrial companies, CAARs decline by about 0.15% per 1% increase in leverage. 
This is similar with the results of the full sample. For all other sectors, except for 
Utilities, coefficient estimates for leverage are not statistically significant. In the Utilities 
sectors, the coefficient estimate of leverage is positive and significant. CAARs increase by 
about 0.5% per 1% increase in leverage. This is similar with the results reported by MM, who 
reveal a coefficient estimate of 0.01% in this industry and a co-efficient estimate of 0.05% in 
the oil companies. However my results reveal that the Oil and gas sector are not significant. 
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Table 10 reports the results for the regressions with one additional explanatory 
variable: the average industry leverage. Similar to results reported in Table 9, coefficient 
estimates are either significantly negative or insignificant for all other variables except for 
firm leverage and industry leverage. The coefficient estimate for firm leverage is negative for 
the full sample and positive for industry leverage. This finding illustrates that CAARs are 
higher for companies with lower leverage ratios, whilst at the same time CAARs increase 
with the overall industry leverage. This means that for 1% increase in firm leverage, CAARs 
decrease by 0.22%, while they increase by about 1.1% per 1% increase in a firm's sectors's 
average leverage. 
Next, I run regressions for each sectors. For the Consumer Goods, Consumer Services 
and Industrials sectors, CAARs are higher for firms with low leverage, while CAARs are 
higher for periods with higher averages of industry leverage. For companies in Consumer 
Goods, Consumer Services and Industrial sectors, the coefficient estimates for level of firm 
leverage are 0.5%, 0.3% and 0.25%, respectively, and 1.71%, 1.79% and 1.57% for the 
average level of leverage in the sectors. For the firms in the Technology sectors, the 
coefficient for the average industry leverage is positive with a coefficient estimate of 1.57%, 
while the coefficient estimate for firm leverage is not significantly different from zero. These 
results are similar with those of the full sample. 
For two sectors-Basic Materials and Healthcare-the coefficient estimates for 
average industry leverage are negative, while the coefficient estimates for firm leverage are 
not significantly different from zero. 
For the Oil & Gas sectors, both coefficients are positive but insignificant. For 
Utilities, the coefficient estimate for firm leverage remains positive but declines from 0.5% to 
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0.35%, while the coefficient estimate for industry leverage is positive and insignificant. " 
Clearly, the empirical results of MM for the Utilities industry are supported by our findings. 
This could be because Utilities is a highly regulated and capital intensive industry; hence, the 
industry's debt requirements could be higher than the other sectors. A possible explanation 
for the discrepancy between the empirical results of MM for this one specific sectors and 
more recent work of Korteweg (2004) and George and Hwang (2006) that use a cross-section 
of all firms could lie in ignoring changes in average leverage within each sectors. 
I run alternative regressions using all the other variables and industry average leverage as the only leverage 
variable (excluding the firm leverage variable). Coefficient estimates for average industry leverage have the 
same significance levels and signs as in Table 9, except that the coefficient estimate for Utilities remains 
positive and significant (Refer Appendix 8). 
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4.8 Conclusion 
This study investigates whether capital structure is value-relevant to the equity 
investor. My focus is to show that leverage ratios can be used as the basis of a profitable 
investment strategy and the relationship might indeed be negative or u-shaped for some 
sectors as they have differences in asset structures and production processes. I integrate MM 
into an investment approach by estimating abnormal returns on leverage portfolios in the 
time-series for various sectors as defined by the industries they operate in. 
The results reveal that abnormal returns increase in leverage for some sectors and 
decrease in leverage for others. Firms in industries such as Utilities and Oil and gas, that MM 
employ in their empirical tests, have abnormal returns that increase in leverage. Firms in most 
other industries experience abnormal returns that decrease in leverage, which supports the 
findings of authors using mixed samples of firms. 
I also show that a sectors's average level of leverage has additional explanatory 
power. Abnormal returns increase as the average leverage level increases in a sectors. This is 
an interesting result, as it implies that MM's proposition-that returns increase in leverage- 
holds true for overall increases in leverage in a sectors, while for individual firms that 
increase in leverage, returns fall-as shown in more recent studies (Korteweg (2004)). The 
separation of the average level of an industry's external financing and that of a particular firm 
is important. The Utilities and Oil & Gas sectors for which MM report their empirical results 
are in fact the two sectors in the U. K. that have high concentration ratios with firm leverage 
ratios very close both to each other and to the industry average. For other sectors, this is not 
the case and the results reported by Korteweg (2004), using a cross-section of all firms, 
reflects this. 
Utilities, for example is one sector where I observe a positive relationship between 
leverage and abnormal returns. This could be because Utilities is a capital intensive industry 
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and thus the industry's debt requirements could be higher than in other sectors. It is also a 
highly regulated sector and hence it may be relatively easier to procure debt to meet its 
capital requirements. A possible explanation for the discrepancy between the empirical 
results of MM for this one specific sectors and more recent work of Korteweg (2004) and 
George and Hwang (2006) that use a cross-section of all firms could lie in ignoring changes 
in average leverage within each sectors. 
I acknowledge the fact that debt requirements for each sectors differ and that certain 
heavy industries require a higher leverage, while also acknowledging that average leverage 
levels within a sectors may differ due to macroeconomic factors such as interest rates, yet 
each company within a sectors may have its own unique reasons for a capital structure 
preference. 
My results are robust with regard to other risk factors. CAARs decline in PE, MTB, 
size, market risk and interest rates. Firms' capital structure policies appear to be largely 
similar with the existence of leverage targets. Because capital structure is endogenous, I 
argue that the optimal financial policy might be one that advocates low leverage, so as to 
mitigate agency problems while preserving financial flexibility. Profitable firms may keep 
their leverage levels low so as to prevent a proportion of profit being used for interest 
payments. This notion leads to another school of thought: i. e., whether firms, in their attempt 
to keep leverage levels low, avoid taking on profitable opportunities and investments, hence 
throwing away their firm value. The negative relationship between returns and leverage 
could also be due to the market's pricing of the firm's ability to raise funds if need be. 
In the next chapter, I undertake a direct and `raw' test of MM proposition II by 
adopting the explicit valuation model of MM. The main distinguishing factor between the 
first and second empirical chapters is the manner in which the returns will be estimated. In 
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the next chapter, stock returns will be estimated in excess of the risk-free rate in the time- 
series for firms. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND STOCK 
RETURNS: MM MODEL 
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5 CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND STOCK RETURNS: MM MODEL 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I test MM's proposition II by adopting the explicit valuation model of 
MM. I estimate stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate in the time-series for firms. 
However, unlike MM, I extend the test to various sectors including utilities and oil and gas 
sectors. This chapter expands the limited work previously carried out on leverage and stock 
returns by examining leverage as an independent variable and its impact on average returns. 
I also test for linearity of leverage in stock returns. According to the theory of capital 
structure tests propagated by the traditionalists (Lintner (1956), Gordon (1952), there exists 
an optimal capital structure towards which the management ought to strive in the interests 
of the shareholders. They argue that there exists a curvilinear, U-shaped, relation of the 
kind between the cost of capital and leverage. On the other hand, MM found that contrary 
to the traditional hypothesis, they do find a linear relationship between the cost of capital 
and leverage. Lastly, I undertake robustness checks with FF factors. 
The results are mixed. In the full sample, returns decrease in leverage. In the various 
sectors, I show that returns increase in leverage for some sectors but decrease in leverage 
for others. The main finding in this chapter is that even with an alternate estimation of 
returns to that of the first empirical chapter, I find that that returns decrease in firm 
leverage, similar to the findings in the first empirical chapter. When I compare the various 
sectors, I find once again that the results are similar to the findings in the first empirical 
chapter. 
MM (1958) limited their sample to the Utilities and Oil and gas industries. Indeed, I 
also find that equity returns increase in leverage in the utilities sectors. However, firms in 
most other sectors experience average returns that decrease in leverage, supporting the 
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findings of authors (Korteweg, 2004, Dimitrov and Jain, 2005 and Penman, 2007). 1 show 
that the sectors the firms belong to has an important bearing of the sign and relationship 
between leverage and stock returns. 
5.2 Stock Returns and Leverage 
Table 11 reports the results of the cross sectional regressions for the full sample as 
well as the different sectors when I use leverage as a sole explanatory variable. For the full 
sample, I find that returns decrease in leverage. For every 1% change in leverage, returns fall 
by 0.03%. 
When I examine the effect of leverage on returns in the various sectors, I find that the 
leverage coefficient is negative in the Consumer Goods, Consumer Services and Industrials 
sectors. For every I% fall in leverage, returns will increase by 0.05% in the Consumer Goods 
sector which comprise the automobiles and parts, beverages, food producers, household 
goods, leisure goods, personal goods and tobacco. The leverage coefficient is -0.03% in the 
Industrial sectors which comprise the sectors of construction and materials, aerospace and 
defence, general industries, electronic and electric equipment, industrial engineering and 
industrial transportation. The leverage coefficient is 
-0.04% in the Consumer Services sector 
which comprises food & drug retailers, general retailers, media and travel& leisure sectors. In 
the remaining sectors of basic materials, healthcare, oil and gas, technology, 
telecommunications and utilities, I find that there is no significant relationship between 
leverage and returns. 
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TABLE 11-Regression results of leverage as the sole explanatory variable 
Table 11 presents the regression results of leverage as a sole independent variable with returns as described in 
equation (3). We have a total of 7954 year end observations for a sample of 792 companies for the period 1980- 
2004. All non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data 
requirements for the research study are classified into 9 main industries; oil&gas (0001), basic 
materials( 1000), industrials(2000), consumer goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer services(5000), 
telecommunications(6000), utilities(7000) and technology(9000). We use GMM estimators and fixed effects for 
firms with weights in the cross-sections to undertake the regressions. Stock returns for each company are 
calculated on a monthly basis in excess of the risk-free rate and defined as the percentage difference of 
consecutive closing prices that were adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The risk free rate is the 1 
month UK Treasury discount bill and is obtained from Datastream (LDN: FT). The returns are averaged from 
May of year t over a one-year period. Leverage is observed as of beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: 
WC08221). It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm. 
C LEVERAGE R2 
Full sample 1.17' 
-0.03'" 0.14 
Sectors 
Basic Materials 
-0.28' 0.02 0.1 
Consumer Goods 1.46' 
-0.05** 0.14 
Consumer Services 1.33' 0.04* 0.15 
Healthcare 1.09 
-0.02 0.31 
Industrials 1.21' 
-0.03" 0.11 
Oil&Gas 1.16 
-0.03 0.18 
Technology 0.77 
-0.04 0.15 
Telecommunications 0.51 0.01 0.34 
Utilities 
-0.07 00 05 
** 5% significance level *10% significance level 
Table 12 reports the empirical results from estimations of equation (4) in the full 
sample as well in the various sectors. I find that returns decrease in leverage in the full 
sample. For every 1% change in leverage, returns will fall by 
-0.02%. 1 do not find the square 
of leverage to be significant. 
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TABLE 12-Regression results of leverage and its square 
Table 12 presents the regression results of leverage and its square as independent variables as described in 
equation (4). We have a total of 7954 year end observations for a sample of 792 companies for the period 1980- 
2004. All non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data 
requirements for the research study are classified into 9 main industries; oil&gas (0001), basic 
materials(1000), industrials(2000), consumer goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer services(5000), 
telecommunications(6000), utilities(7000) and technology(9000). We use GMM estimators and fixed effects for 
firms with weights in the cross-sections to undertake the regressions. Stock returns for each company are 
calculated on a monthly basis in excess of the risk-free rate and defined as the percentage difference of 
consecutive closing prices that were adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The risk free rate is the 1 
month UK Treasury discount bill and is obtained from Datastream (LDN: FT). The returns are averaged from 
May of year t over a one-year period. Leverage is observed as of beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: 
WC08221). It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm. 
SQUARE 
C LEVERAGE LEVERAGE R2 
Full sample 1.29* 
-0.02"" -0.06 0.14 
Sectors 
Basic Materials 1.86 0.12 
-0.94 0.1 
Consumer Goods 2.17* 
-0.01 -0.37 0.15 
Consumer Services 1.64* 
-0.02 -0.19 0.15 
Healthcare 0.43 
-0.06 0.32 0.31 
Industrials 1.23" 
-0.03" -0.01 0.11 
Oil&Gas 1.3 
-0.02 -0.08 0.18 
Technology 
-2.06'" 
-0.24** 1.84' 0.18 
Telecommunications 0.08 
-0.01 0.2 0.34 
Utilities 
-2.90' -0.10" 1.11 "0 08 
** 5% significance level *10% significance level 
However when I repeat the estimations for each sectors, I find that in the technology sector 
which includes the sectors of software and computer services and technology hardware and 
equipment, the linearity test to be significant and positive indicating a non-linear 
relationship. Similarly, in the utilities sector that includes the sectors of electricity and gas, 
water and multi-utilities, I find that in the linearity test to be significant and positive 
indicating a non- linear relationship. 
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5.3 Stock Returns and Leverage, Risk, Size, Market-to-Book 
Table 13 reports the empirical results from estimations of equation (5) in the full 
sample as well in the various sectors. Explanatory variables include firm leverage, risk, size 
and market-to-book. The coefficient estimates for market-to-book and risk is negative. The 
coefficient estimates for the size variable is negative which is similar to the results obtained 
in the earlier studies (Campbell and Schiller 1988; Banz 1987). The results are robust to the 
inclusion of these variables. In the full sample, the coefficient estimate for firm leverage is 
negative while the idiosyncratic factors except risk have additional explanatory power. 
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TABLE 13-Regression results of leverage and other risk factors 
This table reports the cross-sectional regression results on average stock returns and leverage, size, market-to-book 
ratios, market risk (beta) as described in equation (5). We have a total of 7954 year end observations for a sample of 
792 companies for the period 1980-2004. All non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which 
meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are classified into 9 main industries; 
oil&gas(0001), basic materials (1000), industrials(2000), consumer-goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer 
services(5000), telecommunications(6000), utilities(7000) and technology(9000). We use GMM estimators and fixed 
effects for firms with weights in the cross-sections to undertake the regressions. Stock returns for each company are 
calculated on a monthly basis in excess of the risk-free rate and is defined as the percentage difference of consecutive 
closing prices that were adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The risk free rate is the 1 month UK Treasury 
discount bill and is obtained from Datastream (LDN: FT). The returns are averaged monthly from May of year t over a 
one-year period. Leverage is observed as of beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents 
the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in equation (1). Market-to-Book ratio (Datastream code: 
PTBV) represents price divided by its book value. Size (Datastream code: MV) represents the market capitalisation of 
the companies. Market risk (beta) is the beta coefficients estimated over 5 years using monthly data. 
C Leverage Market-to-Book Size Risk R2 
Full sample 6.59' 
-0.02" -0.01** -1.11" -0.19 0.19 
Sectors 
Basic Materials 8.94' 0.032 0.06 
-1.47" -1.55 0.16 
Consumer Goods 4.58' 
-0.04"" 0.01" -0.59" -0.49 0.16 
Consumer Services 6.35* 
-0.02'" 0 -1.03" -0.15 0.19 
Healthcare 9.97" 
-0.03 -0.11 -1.72' 0.84 0.41 
Industrials 5.97" 
-0.02"` -0.01 -1.03" -0.1 0.17 
Oil and gas 6.32' 
-0.03 -0.22' 
-0.88"" 0.79 0.23 
Technology 14.09' 
-0.01 -0.04* 
-2.95** 0.69 0.29 
Telecommunications 9.59" 0.04 
-0.05 -1.50" 0.31 0.39 
Utilities 11.37" 0.03' 
-0.21 -1.76'* 0.29 0.18 
** 5% significance level *10% significance level 
Next I repeat the estimations for each sector. For firms in Consumer Goods, Consumer 
Services and Industrials, the coefficient estimates for leverage is negative. Interestingly, the 
coefficient for leverage is positive in the Utilities sector which is similar to the results 
140 
and robust to the findings of Chapter 5. It should be noted that despite alternate estimations of 
returns (the returns were estimated in excess of the market return in Chapter 4 and in this 
chapter, returns were estimated in excess of the risk-free rate), the results are similar. 
In the next chapter, I will be testing the relationship between leverage and expected 
returns by adopting the Fama-Macbeth (1973) methodology. There is a need to test if the 
results that are obtained in the first and second empirical chapters persist when I undertake a 
portfolio level analysis. I propose to do this by forming portfolios from ranked leverage 
computed from data of one time period but then using a subsequent time period to obtain the 
leverage of the portfolios and examining its impact on expected stock returns. 
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6. CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND EXPECTED STOCK RETURNS 
6.1 Introduction 
In this empirical chapter, I report the results of the relationship between expected 
returns and leverage. In order to test this relationship, I adopt the Fama-Macbeth (1973, 
thereafter FM) methodology. I form portfolios from ranked leverage of individual securities 
computed from data of one time period but then use a subsequent time period to re-compute 
the leverage of the individual securities and these are averaged across portfolios within 
securities to obtain 10 initial portfolios LEVERAGEp for the return-leverage tests. 
This chapter documents several findings. First and foremost unlike the earlier 
empirical chapters (Chapters 4and 5) where I found that returns decline in leverage, in this 
chapter I find that leverage has a positive relationship with expected returns. When I divide 
the sample into the various sectors, my results show that the positive relation persists in two 
sectors, namely, healthcare and consumer goods. When I test for the linearity of the 
relationship between leverage and stock returns, my results are similar with the findings of 
MM who found a linear relation. Thirdly, the results are robust when I use other risk factors 
such as market risk, size, and market-to-book. 
6.2 Expected Stock Returns and Leverage 
Table 14 reports the results of the cross sectional regressions for the full sample as 
well as in various sectors when I test leverage as a sole explanatory variable using equation 
(6). For the full sample, cross-sectional regressions reveal a positive relationship between 
leverage and returns. I find that the returns increase in leverage. A one percentage point 
increase in leverage is associated with a 0.01% increase in returns. This is similar with MM's 
findings who found that the co-efficient estimates for leverage to be positive at 0.02% and 
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0.05% in the utilities and oil companies respectively. In his results, Bhandari (1988) reported 
a positive co-efficient of 0.13% for leverage. 
When I examine the effect of leverage in the various sectors, the coefficient estimate 
for leverage is positive in the Consumer Goods and Healthcare sectors. The coefficient 
estimate for the consumer goods sector is 0.01% and that of the Healthcare sector is 0.04%. 1 
find that the co-efficient estimates are not significant in the Basic Materials, Consumer 
Services, Industrials, Oil and gas, Technology, Telecommunications and Utilities sectors. 
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TABLE 14-Regression results of portfolio leverage as the sole explanatory 
variable 
This table presents the regression results of leverage as a sole independent variable with returns as described in 
equation (6). We have a total of 88770 year end observations for a sample of 744 companies for the period 
1980-2004. All non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the 
data requirements for the research study are classified into 9 main industries; oil&gas (0001), basic 
materials( 1000), industrials(2000), consumer goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer services(5000), 
telecommunications(6000), utilities(7000) and technology(9000). Stock returns for each company are calculated 
on a monthly basis in excess of the risk-free rate and defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing 
prices that were adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The risk free rate is the 1 month UK-Euro 
Treasury bill and is obtained from Datastream (LDN: FT). Leverage is observed as of beginning of May of year t 
(Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in 
equation (1). All non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of 
the data requirements for the research study are allocated to 10 leverage portfolios. Portfolio assignments are 
made yearly at the beginning of May in year t till end of April of year t+lon the basis of the ranked firm 
leverage. The 10 leverage portfolios are formed on the basis of ranked leverage of individual securities. The 
following 2 years (1982-1983) of data on leverage are then used to re-compute the LEVERAGEi and these are 
averaged across securities within portfolios to obtain 10 initial portfolio leverages. The month by month returns 
on the 10 portfolios, with equal weighting of individual securities each month are also computed for the 2 year 
period 1984-1985. 
C LEVERAGE R' 
Full sample 
-0.1 0.01** 0.1 
Sectors 
Basic materials 0.33 
-0.02 0.12 
Consumer Goods 
-0.37" 0.01"" 0.3 
consumer Services 0.01 0 0.61 
Healthcare 
-1.22'" 0.04"" 0.25 
Industrials 
-0.1 0 0.18 
Oil and gas 0.34 0.01 0.14 
Technology 0.16 0.01 0.32 
Telecommunications 0.02 
-0.01 0.23 
Utilities 
-0.31 0 025 
** 5% significance level *denotes 10% significance level 
Table 15 presents results of the cross-sectional regressions estimated using 
equation (7). 1 find that in the full sample, the co-efficient estimate for leverage is positive 
and the coefficient estimate for its square term is negative. This clearly indicates a linear 
relationship which supports the findings of MM (1958) in the utilities and oil companies. 
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The co-efficient for the Consumer Services and Industrials is positive with leverage 
and its squared terms have coefficients which are negative, indicating a linear relationship in 
these sectors. 
TABLE 15-Regression results of portfolio leverage and its square 
This table presents the regression results of leverage and its square as described in equation (7). We have a total 
of 88770 year end observations for a sample of 744 companies for the period 1980-2004. All non-financial 
companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the 
research study are classified into 9 main industries; oil&gas (0001), basic 
material s(1000), industrials(2000), consumer goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer services(5000), 
telecommunications(6000), utilities(7000) and technology(9000). Stock returns for each company are calculated 
on a monthly basis in excess of the risk-free rate and defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing 
prices that were adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The risk free rate is the 1 month UK Treasury 
discount bill and is obtained from Datastream (LDN: FT). Leverage is observed as of beginning of May of year t 
(Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in 
equation (1). Portfolio assignments are made yearly at the beginning of May in year t till end of April of year 
t+ Ion the basis of the ranked leverage. The 10 leverage portfolios are formed on the basis of ranked leverage of 
individual securities. The following 2 years (1982-1983) of data on leverage are then used to re-compute the 
LEVERAGE; and these are averaged across securities within portfolios to obtain 10 initial portfolio leverages. 
The month by month returns on the 10 portfolios, with equal weighting of individual securities each month are 
also computed for the 2 year period 1984-1985. 
SQUARE 
C LEVERAGE LEVERAGE R' 
Full sample 0.15 0.02** 
-0.14'" 0.2 
Sectors 
Basic Materials 
-0.08 -0.04 0.23 0.25 
Consumer Goods 
-0.08 0.03 -0.15 0.4 
consumer Services 0.42 0.03' 
-0.25'" 0.2 
Healthcare 
-1.95'" -0.02 0.52 0.35 
Industrials 0.49' 0.04'" 
-0.31'" 0.28 
Oil and gas -0.73 -0.08 0.74 0.11 
Technology 0.11 0 0.03 0.28 
Telecommunications 
-2.27 -0.12 1.06 0.18 
Utilities 0.16 0 02 
-024 0.19 
**denotes 5% significance level *denotes 10% significance level 
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6.3 Expected Stock Returns and Leverage, Market Risk, Size, and Market-to-Book 
Table 16 reports the empirical results from estimations of equation (8) in the full 
sample as well in various sectors. In the full sample, I find that the co-efficient for leverage to 
be positive. The coefficient estimates for the excess market return and market-to-book is 
positive and that of size is negative. 
TABLE 16-Regression results of portfolio leverage and other risk factors 
This table reports the cross-sectional regression results on monthly stock returns and leverage, size, price-to- 
book ratios, market risk and industry sector classifications. We have a total of 82770 year end observations for a 
sample of 744 companies for the period 1980-2004. All non-financial companies listed on London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are classified into 9 
main industries; oil&gas(0001), basic materials(1000), industrials(2000), consumer- 
goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer-services(5000), telecommunications(6000), utilities(7000) and 
technology(9000). Stock returns for each company are calculated on a monthly basis in excess of the risk-free 
rate and is defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices that were adjusted for dividends, 
splits and rights issues. The risk free rate is the 1 month UK Treasury discount bill and is obtained from 
Datastream (LDN: FT). Leverage is observed as of beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It 
represents the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in equation (1). Portfolio assignments are 
made yearly at the beginning of May in year t till end of April of year t+lon the basis of the ranked leverage. 
The 10 leverage portfolios are formed on the basis of ranked leverage of individual securities. The following 2 
years (1982-1983) of data on leverage are then used to re-compute the LEVERAGE; and these are averaged 
across securities within portfolios to obtain 10 initial portfolio leverages. The month by month returns on the 10 
portfolios, with equal weighting of individual securities each month are also computed for the 2 year period 
1984-1985. 
Market-to- 
C Leverage ExRM Book Size R2 
Full sample 0.45" 0.01'" 0.07" 0.01' 
-0.13'" 0.13 
Sectors 
Basic Materials 0.58 
-0.01 0.08' -0.03 
-0.05 0.15 
Consumer Goods 0.27 0.02** 0.06'" 0.01 
-0.17"' 0.23 
Consumer Services 0.58" 0 0.08" 0 
-0.130" 0.15 
Healthcare 
-0.93 0.04"' -0.02 -0.05 
-0.02 0.24 
Industrials 0.47** 0.01 0.07'" 0.01** 
-0,14" 0.18 
Oil and gas 2.67"' 0.01 
-0.07 -0.04 
-0.41" 0.26 
Technology 1.42" 0 0.11 0 
-0.32"' 0.18 
Telecommunications 
-0.93 0 0.15 
-0.04 0.14 0.18 
Utilities 0 05 0 
-0.04 
-05 0.05 0.4 
** denotes 5% significance level * denotes 10% significance level 
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Next I repeat the estimations for each sector. For firms in Consumer Goods and Healthcare, 
the coefficient estimates are positive. This is similar to the findings I obtained where leverage 
was the sole explanatory variable 13. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The main focus of this chapter is to examine MM proposition II by analysing the 
relation ship between portfolio leverage and expected returns. I use the FM methodology with 
modifications to test this relationship. FM form portfolios from ranked ßi computed from one 
data period but then using a subsequent time period to obtain the (3p of the portfolios that is 
used to test the relationship between risks and returns. I modify the methodology by forming 
portfolios from ranked leverage computed from data of one time period but then using a 
subsequent time period to obtain the leverage of the portfolios that is used to test the 
relationship between leverage and expected returns. I do this because forming portfolios on 
ranked leverage causes bunching of positive and negative sampling errors within portfolios. 
But this regression phenomenon to a large extent is avoided by forming portfolios from 
ranked leverage computed from data of one time period but then using a subsequent time 
period to obtain the leverage of the portfolios. 
Leverage has a positive relationship with expected returns in the full sample. When I 
include the square term of leverage to test for linearity, I find that a linear relationship exists 
in the full sample which is similar to the findings of MM (1958). I find that the portfolio 
leverage to be positive in the full sample when other idiosyncratic factors are included as 
well. The evidence presented here has clear implications that leverage has an important role 
to play in explaining stock returns, be it expected stock returns or contemporaneous returns. It 
13 I repeat the estimations with leverage, its square, market risk, size and market-to-book. Results reveal that the 
portfolio leverage is positive and significant at 10% and the coefficient estimate for its square term not 
significant. The results in the Oil and gas sector reveal that a non- linear relationship exists (Refer Appendix 
10). 
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should be noted that the results obtained in this chapter differs from my earlier results 
obtained in the fourth and fifth empirical chapters. One possible explanation could be 
econometric; at the portfolio level, leverage is being averaged across firms and time whilst 
undertaking analysis at the portfolio level; hence this may lead to loss of firms' information 
at the portfolio level. On the other hand, at the firm level, we estimate leverage as the 
leverage of each individual firm. Another possible reason could be economic, where the 
availability of cheap debt has enabled many firms in the portfolio to take advantage of cheap 
credit for expansion and investment purposes. Yet another possible explanation could be due 
to the fact that the firm-level risk may vary from that of the portfolio risk, where at the firm 
level, firms try to maintain low leverage levels due to the risk involved with high levels of 
leverage. Finally yet another possible explanation could be the presence of highly capital 
intensive sectors in the portfolio. 
In the next chapter, the impact of leverage on returns is investigated by exploring the 
effect of leverage mimicking factor portfolio in explaining stock return variations. The main 
aim here is to investigate if leverage is priced as a risk factor in the market. 
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7 CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND COMMON RISK FACTORS IN STOCK RETURNS 
7.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this empirical chapter is to test whet leverage is an asset 
pricing factor by exploring the effect of leverage mimicking factor portfolio in explaining 
stock return variations. Following Fama and French (1993, thereafter FF) procedure in 
forming size and market-to-book mimicking portfolios, I form leverage mimicking factor 
portfolios to explain the returns in the full sample as well as in the different sectors. 
Leverage is an important risk factor which has been ignored in the asset pricing literature due 
to the overwhelming influence of the theoretical work of MM in corporate finance. To my 
knowledge, this chapter extends the asset pricing test in three ways: 
It provides the first comprehensive study of adjusted returns as the dependent variable 
and the effect of leverage mimicking factor portfolio in explaining stock return variations. I 
expand the set of variables used to explain returns. In addition to Fama and French (1992)'s 
size, excess returns on market and market-to-book factors and Carhart (1997). ` s momentum 
factor, I extend the list to leverage which is a source of financial risk but has been largely 
ignored in the asset pricing literature. I also undertake the test in various sectors. 
Additionally, I also undertake robustness tests to examine if returns can be explained by firm 
leverage even if portfolios are constructed to mimic other risk factors related to size, market- 
to-book, market risk and momentum to capture variation in returns in the time-series 
regressions. 
Following Fama and French (1993), this chapter uses a times-series regression 
approach of Black, Jensen and Scholes (thereafter BJS, 1972) and Gibbons, Jensen and 
Shanken (thereafter GSR, 1989). Here both BJS and GSR test if the intercept in the time- 
series regression is zero with GSR testing to see if any particular portfolio is ex ante mean- 
variance efficient. Merton (1973) concluded that estimated intercepts provide a good 
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explanation and a formal test of how well different combinations of the common factors 
capture the cross-section of average returns. FF concluded that judging the viability or 
performance of asset pricing models on the basis of the intercepts in excess returns 
regressions imposes a stringent standard. 
Firstly, stock returns in excess of risk free rate are regressed on leverage mimicking 
factor portfolio in the full sample as well as in the different sectors. Next, the stock returns 
are regressed on the market portfolio and then on mimicking portfolios for size, market-to- 
book, momentum and leverage. 
I test the original idea in MM that capital structures vary in different sectors as asset 
structures and production processes vary and the book value of leverage measures the 
relevant measure of cash inflows to the firm which management has discretion in decisions 
regarding the capital structure (Schwartz, 1959). I find that leverage mimicking portfolio 
capture strong variation in returns. This is evidence that portfolios constructed to mimic risk 
factor related to leverage explains significant time series variations to a large extent. I 
interpret that leverage is indeed a risk which is priced and with a return premia to stocks of 
companies with higher leverage which is similar with MM. I also find that the leverage factor 
seems to explain stock variations in the various sectors. 
7.2 Stock Returns and Leverage 
Table 17 reports the results of the regressions for the full sample as well as the 
different sectors when I use the leverage risk factor which is returns on equal weighted, 
factor-mimicking portfolio for leverage as a sole explanatory variable. In the full sample, the 
leverage risk factor, HLMLL reveals a positive coefficient of 0.20%. Across the various 
sectors, I find that the factor-mimicking portfolio for leverage, leverage risk factor, has a 
positive coefficient in all sectors except for in the Healthcare, Technology and 
Telecommunications sectors. Consumer Services has a negative but insignificant coefficient. 
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TABLE 17-Regression results of leverage mimicking factor portfolio 
This table presents the regression results of equation (9) for the period 1980-2004. Stock returns for each company are calculated on 
a monthly basis in excess of the risk-free rate and defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices that were 
adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The risk free rate is the I month UK Treasury discount bill and is obtained from 
Datastream (LDN: FT). Leverage is observed as of beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the total 
debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in equation (1). In May of each year, we sort all the companies on the basis of 
leverage, ranking from low to high. Each month, the companies are divided into 10 deciles. Companies with the lowest leverage 
(LL) values comprise decilel and decilelO comprise companies with the highest leverage (I-IL). These 10 deciles are then further 
subdivided into 3 groups. HLMLL is returns on equal-weighted, factor-mimicking portfolio for leverage. It is the difference each 
month, between the average returns of high leverage companies and the average returns of low leverage companies. The companies 
are classified according to the Datastream industry classification. The 9 main industries are oil &gas (0001), basic material s(I 000), 
industrials(2000), consumer goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer services(5000), telecommunications(6000), utilities(7000) 
and technology(9000). 
C Leverage Risk Factor R' 
Full sample 0.05 0.20** 0.13 
Sectors 
Basic Materials 0.08 0.47** 0.16 
Consumer Goods 0.19* 0.57" 0.11 
Consumer Services 
-0.07 0 0.1 
Healthcare 
-0.65" -0.49" , 0.19 
Industrials 0.26" 0.54"" 0.15 
Oil and gas 0.4 0.28' 0.11 
Technology 
-0.75" "1.71" 0.19 
Telecommunications 
-0.22 
-1.15'" 0.17 
Utilities 0 05 0 28"1 02 
**5% significance level * denotes 10% significance level 
MM (1958) limited their sample to the Utilities and Oil and gas industries. Indeed, I also find 
that equity returns increase in leverage in the utilities sectors. The co-efficient estimates in 
the Utilities and Oil and Gas sectors are 0.28%. In MM (1958), their coefficient estimate for 
the Utilities sector and for Oil and gas was 
. 
01% and 0.05% respectively. 
7.3 Stock Returns, Leverage, Size, Market-to-Book, Momentum and Excess Returns on 
Market Portfolio 
Following Carhart (1997), we present out findings on which models best explain the 
variations between portfolios in a tabular format. Table 18 presents results of the regressions 
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estimated using equations (10) 
- 
(13). 1 first undertake estimations using CAPM to explain 
the stock return variations in the full sample and various sectors. Next, I undertake 
estimations using the FF three factors, namely, size (SMB), market-to-book (HML) 
mimicking portfolios, and excess returns on market portfolio. Then, I repeat these estimations 
by including the momentum (MOMENTS) mimicking portfolio in the full sample and 
various sectors. Finally these estimations are repeated using the leverage mimicking factor 
portfolio in explaining stock return variations. 
When CAPM was used in the estimations, I find that the co-efficient estimates are 
positive in the full sample. The coefficient estimate in decile 1 is 0.81% and in the 100' decile 
is 0.91%. However, the CAPM does not seem to explain the relative returns on these 
portfolios. The CAPM coefficient estimates on the top and bottom deciles are close to each 
other. -The CAPM alphas are not as significant as the portfolios formed on leverage. When I 
examine the results in the various sectors, I find that the CAPM alphas are not very 
significant. For e. g. in the Oil and gas, Industrials, Healthcare, Utilities, the CAPM alphas 
have no or little significance in explaining stock variations. The CAPM coefficient estimates 
on the top and bottom deciles are close to each other in the various sectors; hence the CAPM 
alphas do not produce much dispersion. Thus, the CAPM does not seem to explain the spread 
and pattern in these portfolios. This may be due to the fact that CAPM measures only market 
risk and market risk alone may be inadequate in capturing stock return variations. 
When I examine the results of the Fama-French 3 factor model, I find that in the full 
ý.. 
_ 
sample, "the co-efficient estimates are positive for SMB indicating that small size firms 
outperform big firms. The coefficient estimate for HML is significant in most of the deciles 
and the coefficient estimate for market risk improves significantly here. It appears that the 
Fama-French 3 factor model explains the relative returns on these portfolios better than the 
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CAPM model. However, the 3 factor model coefficient estimates on the top and bottom 
deciles are close to each other. 
When I examine the results in the various sectors, I find that the FF alphas are not 
significant in all the sectors. For e. g. in the Oil and gas, Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, 
Healthcare, Consumer Services, Telecommunications and Utilities, the FF alphas have no or 
little significance in explaining stock variations. The 3 factor model coefficient estimates on 
the top and bottom deciles are close to each other, hence the FF 3 factor model alphas does 
not seem to produce much dispersion. 
Now with the FF + Carhart four factor model, I find that the four factor model 
explains most of the spread and pattern in these portfolios with sensitivities to size, market 
risk and momentum factors accounting for most of the explanation. The portfolios of stocks 
sorted on one year past returns demonstrate strong variation in mean returns. The alphas are 
spread, over and seem to explain the relative returns. The co-efficients for SMB, HML, ExRM 
and MOMENTS are significant in the full sample. When I examine the results in the various 
sectors, -I find that the FF+Carhart alphas are significant in the sectors of Industrials and 
Consumer Goods. 
Now when I include the leverage factor (HLMLL) in the FF + Carhart four factor 
model, I find this is the model that explains the most of the spread and patterns in the 
portfolios, with sensitivities to the SMB, ExRM, MOMENTS and leverage risk factor 
accounting for most of the explanation. The co-efficient estimates for leverage risk factor, 
SMB, HML, ExRM and MOMENTS are significant in the full sample, hence the alphas 
reproduce far better dispersion than any other models that has been used. When I examine the 
results in the various sectors, I find that the FF+Carhart plus leverage risk factor alphas are 
significant only in the sectors of Industrials. 
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7.4 Firm Leverage and Four Factor Fama-French-Carhart Time Series Regressions 
Table 19 reports the empirical results from estimations of equation (14) in the full 
sample as well in the various sectors. Explanatory variables include firm leverage, size 
(SMB) and market-to-book (HML) mimicking portfolios, momentum (MOMENTS) 
mimicking portfolio and excess return of the 1 month UK Treasury discount bill over the 
FTSE All Share Index (ExRM). The coefficient estimates for SMB, ExRM and MOMENTS 
is positive. The results are robust to the inclusion of these variables. In the full sample, the 
coefficient estimate for firm leverage is negative while the idiosyncratic factors have 
additional explanatory power. For every 1% increase in leverage, returns will fall by 0.01%. 
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TABLE 19-Regression results of firm leverage and Fama-French Factors 
This table reports the time-series regression results on monthly stock returns, leverage and Fama-French risk 
factors of size, price-to-book, market risk and momentum factor as described in equation 14. We have a total of 
124836 month end observations for a sample of 792 companies for the period 1980-2004. All non-financial 
companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the 
research study are classified into 9 main industries; oil&gas(0001), basic material s(I 000). 
industrials(2000), consumer-goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer-services(5000), 
telecommunications(6000), utilities(7000) and technology(9000). Stock returns for each company are calculated 
on a monthly basis in excess of the risk-free rate and defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing 
prices that were adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The risk free rate is the 1 month UK Treasury 
discount bill and is obtained from Datastream (LDN: FT). Leverage is observed as of beginning of May of year t 
(Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in 
equation (1). SMB and HML are Fama-French factor-mimicking portfolios for size and book-to-market. SMB is 
the size-factor mimicking portfolio for the returns on small minus big stocks. HML is the book-to-market 
mimicking portfolio for the returns of high minus low book-to-market stocks and ExRM is the excess of the 1 
month UK Treasury discount bill over the FTSE All Share Index. Moments are the momentum factor- 
mimicking portfolios for the returns of high minus low momentum. 
C LEVERAGE SMB HML ExRM MOMENTS R' 
Full sample 
-239' -001"" 075** 001 0.99+ 013" 0.13 
Sectors 
Basic Materials 
-1.41** -0.03* 0.47** -0.21" 0.95" 0.11' 0.13 
Consumer Goods 
-1.97" -0.01"" 0.56 -0.22" 0.82" 0.13" 0.11 
Consumer Services 
-2.410 -0.01"" 0.76" 0.10" 0.94" 0.13" 0.22 
Healthcare 
-3.56" 0.02"" 0.95"" 0.29" 1.01" 0.12" 0.12 
Industrials 
-2.89" -0.01"" 0.69"" -0.18" 1.02" 0.16" 0.15 
Oil and gas 0.1 
-0.03 0.80" 
-0.30" 0.990 0.07 0.27 
Technology 
-2.44" -0.01 1.74"" 1.16+ 1.360 0.07"" 0.21 
Telecommunications 
-2.. 32" -0.05"" 1.09"º 0.97" 1.42" 0.140 0.21 
Utilities 
-1.41* 0 
-0.01 -029* 0.48+ 
-005 0.38 
**5% significance level *denotes 10% significance level 
Next I repeat the estimations for each sector. I find that returns have a negative relationship 
with leverage in the Basic Materials, Telecommunications, Consumer Goods, Consumer 
Services and Industrials sectors. In the Consumer Goods, Consumer Services and Industrials 
sectors, I find that for every 1% increase in leverage, returns will fall by 0.01%. This 
relationship is similar with our earlier findings in the first and second empirical chapters. In 
the Basic Materials sector and Telecommunications sector, I find that for every 1% increase 
in leverage returns will fall by 0.03% and 0.05% respectively. On the other hand, in the 
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Healthcare sector, for every 1% increase in leverage I find that returns increase by 0.02%. 
The coefficient in the oil and gas, utilities and technology is not significant14. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Leverage is an important risk factor which has been ignored in the asset pricing 
literature due the overwhelming influence of the theoretical work of MM in corporate 
finance. This chapter explores the effect of leverage mimicking factor portfolio on stock 
returns variation. I first undertake estimations using the leverage risk factor (HLMLL) as the 
sole explanatory variable. I find that leverage mimicking portfolio, HLMLL, helps to explain 
these variations. I also find that the HLMLL explains the stock market variations better in the 
various sectors. Firms in industries such as Utilities, that MM employ in their empirical tests, 
have returns that increase in leverage. Firms in other industries experience returns that 
decrease in leverage, which supports more recent findings of the authors (Korteweg 2004, 
Dimitrov and Jain 2005). 
Next I undertake estimations using CAPM. Here I find that the co-efficient estimates 
are positive in the full sample. The CAPM coefficient estimates on the top and bottom deciles 
are close to each other in the various sectors; hence the CAPM alphas do not produce much 
dispersion. Thus, the CAPM does not seem to explain the spread and pattern in these 
portfolios. This may be due to the fact that CAPM measures only market risk and market risk 
alone may be inadequate in capturing stock return variations. 
When I examine the results of the Fama-French 3 factor model, I find that in the full 
sample, the co-efficient estimates are positive for SMB indicating that small size firms 
14 I repeat the estimations with leverage, its square, market risk, size, market-to-book and moments. Results 
reveal that returns decline in firm leverage and the coefficient estimate for its square is not significant. The 
results in the Technology, Telecommunication and Utilities sectors reveal that a linear relationship exists (Refer 
Appendix 11). 
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outperform big firms. The coefficient estimate for HML is significant in most of the deciles 
and the coefficient estimate for market risk improves significantly here. It appears that the 
Fama-French 3 factor model explains the relative returns on these portfolios better than the 
CAPM model since it includes both size and market-to-book equity factors. However, the 3 
factor model coefficient estimates on the top and bottom deciles are close to each other, 
hence the FF 3 factor model alphas do not seem to produce much dispersion. 
Now with the FF + Carhart four factor model, I find that the four factor model 
explains most of the spread and pattern in these portfolios with sensitivities to size, market 
risk and momentum factors accounting for most of the explanation. The alphas are spread 
over and seem to explain the relative returns. The co-efficients for SMB, HML, ExRm and 
MOMENTS are significant in the full sample. 
Next when I include the leverage factor (HLMLL) in the FF + Carhart four factor 
model, I find this is the model that explains the most of the spread and patterns in the 
portfolios, with sensitivities to the SMB, ExRM, MOMENTS and leverage mimicking 
portfolio(HLMLL) factors accounting for most of the explanation. The co-efficient estimates 
for the leverage factor (HLMLL), SMB, HML, ExRM and MOMENTS are significant in the 
full sample, hence the alphas reproduce far better dispersion than any other models that has 
been used. 
Finally, I undertake estimations using firm leverage and portfolios constructed to 
mimic risk factors related to market risk, size, market-to-book and momentum. The aim of 
this estimation is to assess if returns can still be explained by leverage even if portfolios 
constructed to mimic risk factors related to market risk, size, market-to-book and momentum 
is in the time series regressions. I find that the returns decrease in Firm leverage in the full 
sample. 
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The results document that the leverage factor contributes to explaining time series 
variations in returns. Also, it can be clearly noted that the results of the analysis of leverage at 
the firm level and portfolio differs. Overall, the evidence is similar with the results of the 
earlier empirical chapters, i. e. leverage can explain returns. However, whether returns 
decrease and increase in leverage is dependent on the analysis undertaken at the firm or 
portfolio level. 
The following chapter will present the conclusions derived from all the empirical 
studies undertaken here. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
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8 CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
The main motivation of this study is to investigate the relationship between leverage 
and stock returns. MM II proposition states that the expected yield on equities should tend to 
increase with leverage and the relation should be linear. According to theory of finance, the 
rate of return on companies whose capital structure includes some debt should be rewarded 
by a premium related to the financial risk. On the other hand, the relationship could be 
negative. This could be because firms may maintain low levels of leverage to preserve 
financial flexibility and the market may price the firms' ability to raise additional funds 
favourably. I undertook four different empirical approaches to test this relationship. 
8.2 Summary of Main Findings 
In Chapter 4, I integrate the MM approach into an investment strategy by calculating 
cumulative abnormal returns in excess of the market return over one year. I found that returns 
decrease in leverage for the full sample similar with the recent work of Korteweg(2004), 
Dimitrov and Jain (2005) but found that returns increase in certain sectors, namely oil and gas 
and utilities similar with MM. The separation of the average level of external financing in an 
industry and of that in a particular firm is important as my results reveal that abnormal returns 
increase as average leverage in a sectors increases. The results are robust with regard to other 
risk factors. 
In Chapter 5,1 undertake test MM proposition II directly by using the explicit valuation 
model of MM. Unlike Chapter 4, here I estimate returns in excess of the risk free rate. I 
extend the test to other sectors and also undertake robustness tests using FF factors. I find that 
returns decrease in leverage in the full sample. Results are robust to the FF risk factors. When 
I test for the linearity of leverage using the explicit valuation model of MM, I find that the 
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coefficient for leverage remains negative and its square is not significant. These results are 
similar with the results I obtained in the first empirical chapter. It must be noted that in 
Chapters 4 and 5, the analysis is undertaken at firm level. 
In the quest to test MM II proposition, we have now seen that the relationship is not 
necessarily positive. From the first two empirical chapters, we have observed that returns 
decline in firm leverage in the full sample, but not in all sectors. We have also seen that the 
returns increase in average leverage of the sectors. Hence, there is a strong need to test if this 
relationship persists at the portfolio level. Thus in Chapter 6, I undertake a portfolio analysis 
of leverage and expected returns by using the FM methodology with modifications. I find that 
leverage has a positive relationship with expected returns in the full sample. When I include 
the square term of leverage to test for linearity, I find that a linear relationship exists in the 
full sample which is similar with the findings of MM (1958). I find that the portfolio leverage 
has a positive coefficient in the full sample when other idiosyncratic factors are included as 
well. The evidence presented here has clear implications that leverage has an important role 
to play in explaining stock returns, be it expected stock returns or contemporaneous returns. 
However, it should be noted that the results obtained in this chapter differs from our earlier 
results obtained in the fourth and fifth empirical chapters. This could be due to the fact that 
the analysis undertaken in this chapter is at the portfolio level. 
In Chapter 7, I explore the effect of leverage mimicking factor portfolio in explaining 
stock return variations. The main aim is to investigate if leverage is priced as a risk factor in 
the market. I find that the leverage mimicking portfolio helps to explain these variations in 
the full sample and in the various sectors. Results are similar with Chapter 6; the coefficient 
for leverage factor is positive. Finally, I undertake estimations using firm leverage and 
portfolios constructed to mimic risk factors related to market risk, size, market-to-book and 
momentum. The aim of this estimation is to assess if returns can still be explained by 
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leverage even if portfolios constructed to mimic risk factors related to market risk, size, 
market-to-book and momentum is in the time series regressions. I find that the returns 
decrease in firm leverage in the full sample which is similar with the findings in chapters 4 
and5. 
Overall, the evidence is similar with the results of the earlier empirical studies, i. e. 
leverage can explain returns. However, whether returns decrease and increase in leverage is 
dependent on whether the analysis undertaken at the firm or portfolio level. One possible 
explanation for the different results at the firm and portfolio level could be due to 
econometric issues; at the portfolio level, leverage is estimated by averaging firm leverage 
across firms and time to obtain the average leverage whilst firm leverage is observed as per 
the firms' annual leverage ratio. Another possible explanation could be due to the fact there 
due to the availability of cheap debt, there are firms in the portfolio which has taken 
advantage of the cheap debt for expansion purposes. Yet another explanation could be due to 
the unique sectors that the firms belong to; some sectors may be capital intensive and hence 
take on more debt in relation to sectors which are relatively less capital intensive. 
8.3 Contributions to Capital Structure Literature 
In this thesis I investigated the relationship between leverage and stock returns in 
detail by adopting four different and approaches and related methodologies using a 
comprehensive sample of non-financial companies. The first contribution of the thesis is that 
I conduct the analysis both at the firm and the portfolio levels. At the firm level, I first 
calculated cumulative returns to measure the profitability of an investment strategy based on 
leverage and next I estimated an improved version of the MM valuation model where firm 
returns are explained by firm leverage. At the portfolio level, I used both the FM and FF 
methodologies. The FM methodology allowed me to test for the risk-return relationship in the 
cross section while I estimated leverage in the time series. The FF methodology helped me to 
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construct leverage mimicking portfolios and price companies by using leverage as a risk 
factor. 
My second contribution is with regards to my sample. Previous studies such as 
Korteweg (2004) limited his sample to a sub-sample of firms that went that went through 
pure capital structure changes; Bhandari (1988)'s sample size included financial firms where 
the definition of leverage lacks clarity. But my sample size encompasses all non-financial 
firms across the nine sectors that cover the various sectors. Also my sample is large enough 
and is not limited to a small subset of specific firms. Thus, this enables me to undertake 
analysis in various sectors. I use panel data that contains information for a 25-year period and 
combines the cross-section with the time series. 
My third contribution is that following Schwartz (1959), 1 use the book values of 
leverage. The difference between the book and market values are captured by the market-to- 
book ratio (FF, 1992) used as an additional variable. Firms in various industries have 
different asset structures that are financed by cash flows generated from various forms of debt 
and equity. The use of book values of both variables ensures that I am measuring the capital 
structure via the cash flows generated at the time those assets were financed. 
My fourth contribution is that I represent equity returns as cumulative abnormal 
returns in excess of market returns. To my knowledge this is the first work on capital 
structure based on an investment strategy where leverage is investigated as an independent 
variable in explaining cumulative abnormal returns. Thus, this finding would be an important 
and useful tool to fund managers when they choose profitable strategies for their clients. 
My fifth contribution is that I use five additional variables that reflect idiosyncratic 
risk, including the risk factors described by FF (1992) and Carhart (1997) and the particular 
environment's cost of borrowing for robustness tests. I also examine the effect of industry 
leverage on stock returns where I find that returns decline in firm leverage but increase with 
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the average leverage in a sectors. I also undertake linearity tests between leverage and stock 
returns. Results are robust to alternative estimations of returns. 
My sixth contribution is that I undertake a firm analysis where I find stock returns 
decline in leverage and at the portfolio level, I find that stock returns increase in leverage. I 
construct a leverage factor to see if it can capture variations in stock returns. I find that the 
leverage factor indeed captures these return variations far better than CAPM, FF three factor 
model and FF plus Carhart Model. I find this is the model that explains the most of the spread 
and patterns in the portfolios, with sensitivities to the SMB, ExRM, MOMENTS and leverage 
mimicking portfolio (HLMLL) factors accounting for most of the explanation. 
In the next section, I present the limitations of this study and scope for further 
research. 
8.4 Limitations and Recommendations 
This thesis has shown that leverage can explain stock returns. However it has opened 
avenues for further research as it has led to more questions on capital structure. First, the 
question arises as to why a firm level and portfolio level analysis should reveal contradictory 
results. Further avenues of future work may include perhaps addressing these conflicting 
results which could be due to econometric issues involved in the estimations which this thesis 
has not explored. 
The econometric issue could be due to the fact that leverage is averaged across firms 
and time whilst undertaking analysis at the portfolio level. On the other hand, at the firm 
level, we estimate leverage as the leverage of each individual firm. As a result at the portfolio 
level, when leverage is averaged, it leads to loss of firm specific information and 
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characteristics in the process which may lead to the contradicting results at the portfolio and 
firm level. 
Another possible reason could be economic, where the availability of cheap debt has 
enabled many firms in the portfolio to take advantage of cheap credit for expansion and 
profitable investments. This may have led to firms in the portfolios to experience high stock 
returns even after deductibility of the cost of capital. 
Yet another possible explanation could be due to the fact that the firm-level risk may 
vary from that of the portfolio risk, where at the firm level, firms try to maintain low leverage 
levels due to the risk involved with high levels of leverage. 
Finally another possible reason could be the unique class of industry that the firms 
belong to. The presence of highly capital intensive sectors in the portfolio which takes on 
excess leverage for their processes versus relatively less capital intensive industries may lead 
to these contradicting results. For example, the utilities sector versus the consumer goods 
sector which is not a highly capital intensive sector. 
Future work can also examine the stock return performance of companies based on 
the changes in leverage of the firms relative to their sectors. It would be particularly 
noteworthy to examine the rate at which the information content of said changes is 
incorporated in the share prices of companies as well as in their long run returns. 
Research could also be undertaken to study the existence of optimal industry leverage 
separate from that of an optimal firm leverage. An optimal industry leverage ratio would 
indicate whether firms in the industry actually outperform the market when they adhere to 
this optimal industry leverage ratio. 
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8.5 Conclusion 
The main motivation of this study is to investigate the relationship between leverage 
and stock returns. MM II proposition states that the expected yield on equities should tend to 
increase with leverage and the relation should be linear This study undertook a 
comprehensive analysis of the methodologies, approaches and leverage definitions as 
compared to previous empirical studies. The results indicate that leverage can explain returns; 
however the relationship may not necessary be positive. In this chapter, I discussed my 
findings, my contributions and limitations of the research. 
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Appendix 2 Datastream Industry Classification 
Code Industry Sector 
1 Oil and gas Oil and gas Producers 
Oil Equipment&Services 
1000 Basic Materials Chemicals 
Forestry&Paper 
Industrial Metals 
Mining 
2000 Industrials Construction&Materials 
Aerospace&Defense 
General Industries 
Electronic&Electric Equipment 
Industrial Engineering 
Industrial Transportation 
Support Services 
3000 Consumer Goods Automobiles&Parts 
Beverages 
Food Producers 
Household Goods 
Lesiure Goods 
Personal Goods 
4000 Healthcare Healthcare Equipment&Services 
Pharmaceuticals&Biotechnology 
5000 Consumer Services Food&Drug Retailers 
General Retailers 
Media 
Travel&Leisure 
6000 Telecommunications Fixed Line Telecommunications 
Mobile Telecommunications 
7000 Utilities Electricity 
Gas, Water&Multiutilities 
9000 Technology Software&Computer Services 
Technology Hardware&Equipment 
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Appendix 3 Variables Definitions 
Variables Estimation 
Beta co-efficient(ß) estimated over five-year period in a rolling window using monthly returns 
Risk(beta) data 
Size I Market Value of Companies(Datastream Code: MV) 
Market-to-Book I Ratio of market value to book value (Datastream Code: MTBV) 
Price-Earnings Ratio I Ratio of Price-Earnings to Earnings Per Share (Datastream Code: PER) 
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Appendix 4 Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
This table reports the correlation matrix of the independent variables used in the study. The full sample consists 
of 7954 observations of 792 non-financial companies for the period 1980-2004. Leverage of each company is 
obtained from Datastream (DS CODE: WC08221) and represents the total debt to the total financing of the 
firms. Price-Earning ratio is the price divided by earnings per share. Market-to-book ratio represents price 
divided by book value. Size represents the market capitalisation of the companies. Risk is the beta coefficients 
estimated over 5 years using monthly data. Interest rates are obtained from Datastream (Code: LCBBASE). The 
interest rates are observed as of beginning of May of year t to the end of April of year t+1 is averaged over the 
12 month period. 
Correlation Matrix 
Variables Leverage Price/Earnings Market-to-Book Size (log) Risk Interest Rates 
Leverage 1.00 
Price/Earnings 
-0.03 1.00 
Market-to-Book 0.18 0.02 1.00 
Size (log) 0.18 
-0.03 0.05 1.00 
Risk 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.22 1.00 
Interest Rate 
-0.10 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 0.15 1.00 
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Appendix 5 Regression Results 
-OLS 
This table reports the cross-sectional regression results on monthly stock returns and firm leverage, size, price 
- 
earnings ratio, market-to-book ratios, market risk (beta) and industry sector classifications. The full sample 
consists of 7954 observations of 792 non-financial companies for the period 1980-2004. We broadly classify 
these 82 sectors into 9 main industries; oil and gas (0001), basic materials(1000) 
, 
industrials(2000), consumer 
goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer services(5000), telecommunications (6000), utilities(7000), and 
technology (9000). We sort all the sample companies industry-wise in the aforementioned manner and then rank 
the leverage of each company from low to high in each industry. Cumulative Abnormal Returns are calculated 
using monthly returns for each portfolio for 1 year for the sample firms of 792 from 1980-2004. Leverage of 
each company is obtained from Datastream (DS CODE: WC08221) and represents the total debt to the total 
financing of the firms. Price-Earning ratio is the price divided by earnings per share. Market-to-book ratio 
represents price divided by its book value. Size represents the market capitalisation of the companies. Risk is 
the beta coefficients estimated over 5 years using monthly data. Interest rates are obtained from Datastream 
(Code: LCBBASE). The interest rates are observed as of beginning of May of year t to the end of April of year 
t+l is averaged over the 12 month period. 
C Leverage Risk 
Price- 
Earnings 
Market-to- 
Book Size 
Interest 
Rates R2 
Full sample 24 70' 
-0 09" 0 34 -0 01" -0 10' -2.13" -1 84" 02 
Sectors 
Basic Materials 17.69 0.23 
-2.89 0 0.85 "5.1* "1.11" 0.3 
Consumer Goods 14.71 * 
-0.21 " -7.75* 0.03* 0.1 -3.16* "1.37" 0.3 
Consumer Services 22.87' 
-0.21' -0.65' -0.03 0.05 -1.90' -1.52' 0.21 
Healthcare 26.38' 0.06 
-1.84* -0.05* -0.45 "1.39* -2.09' 0.37 
Industrials 29.49* 
-0.05' 2.36' -0.01 -0.11" -5.03* -2.05* 0.4 
Oil and gas 51.08' 0.03 4.81 -0.02' -5.27' -4.12' -3.36' 0.2 
Technology 51.95" 0.02 0.72 
-0.17" -0.28* -6.87* -3.90" 0.38 
Telecommunications 39.24 
-0.07 16.84' -0.01 -0.8 -7.23" -2.83* 0.37 
Utilities 
"1 57 0.25* -9.05* -0.46' -1.63 -1 87* 06 0.25 
** denotes 5% significance level * denotes 10% significance level 
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Appendix 6 Regression Results 
-Random Effects 
This table reports the cross-sectional regression results on monthly stock returns and firm leverage, size, price 
- 
earnings ratio, market-to-book ratios, market risk (beta) and industry sector classifications. The full sample 
consists of 7954 observations of 792 non-financial companies for the period 1980-2004. We broadly classify 
these 82 sectors into 9 main industries; oil and gas (0001), basic materials(1000) 
, 
industrials(2000). consumer 
goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer services(5000), telecommunications (6000), utilities(7000), and 
technology (9000). We sort all the sample companies industry-wise in the aforementioned manner and then rank 
the leverage of each company from low to high in each industry. Cumulative Abnormal Returns are calculated 
using monthly returns for each portfolio for 1 year for the sample firms of 792 from 1980-2004. Average 
industry leverage is calculated by averaging the leverage of each company in May in year t in each industry 
sector. Leverage of each company is obtained from Datastream (DS CODE: WC08221) and represents the total 
debt to the total financing of the firms. Price-Earning ratio is the price divided by earnings per share. Market-to- 
Book ratio represents price divided by its book value. Size represents the market capitalisation of the companies. 
Risk is the beta coefficients estimated over 5 years using monthly data. Interest rates are obtained from 
Datatream (Code: LCBBASE). The interest rates are observed as of beginning of May of year t to the end of 
April of year t+ I is averaged over the 12 month period. 
Price- Market-To- Interest 
C Leverage Risk Earnings Book Size Rates R' 
Full sample 32 35" 
-010" 0 04 -0 02" -0.13" -5.20' -196* 0 31 
Sectors 
Basic Materials 22 03' 0.26 
-3.96 0 0.84 -6.82' "1.15' 0.28 
Consumer Goods 18 08* 
-0.23* -7.79" 0.03 0.09 1.88 -1.41* 0.35 
Consumer Services 27 63" 
-0.23* 0.58 -0.03" 0.04 -2.78" -1.58' 0.24 
Healthcare 38 47' 0.09 
-0.07' -0.05* -0.5 -7.42* -2.71' 0.28 
Industrials 34.64* 
-0.06' 2.3 -0.01' -0.13* "7.12' -2.15* 0.23 
Oil and gas 55.39' 
-0.01 3.16' -0.02" -5.27' -5.81' -3.35' 0.2 
Technology 51.95' 0.02 0.72 
-0.17' -0.28 -6.87' -3.90* 0.18 
Telecommunications 65.97' 0.2 11.75" 
-0.02 -0.88* -20.3' -2.11 0.22 
Utilities 
-1.57 0 25" -9.05" -0.46" -1.63 0.87" 06 0.25 
** denotes 5% significance level * denotes 10% significance level 
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Appendix 7 Regression Results with Interaction Term 
This table reports the cross-sectional regression results on monthly stock returns and firm leverage, size, price 
- 
earnings ratio, market-to-book ratios, beta and industry sector classifications. The full sample consists of 7954 
observations of 792 non-financial companies for the period 1980-2004. We broadly classify these 82 sectors 
into 9 main industries; oil and gas (0001), basic materials(1000) 
, 
industrials(2000), consumer goods(3000), 
healthcare(4000), consumer services(5000), telecommunications (6000), utilities(7000), and technology (9000). 
We sort all the sample companies industry-wise in the aforementioned manner and then rank the leverage of 
each company from low to high in each industry. Cumulative Abnormal Returns are calculated using monthly 
returns for each portfolio for 1 year for the sample firms of 792 from 1980-2004. Average industry leverage is 
calculated by averaging the leverage of each company in May in year t in each industry sector. Leverage of each 
company is obtained from Datastream (DS CODE: WC08221) and represents the total debt to the total financing 
of the firms. Price-Earning ratio is the price divided by earnings per share. Market-to-Book ratio represents price 
divided by its book value. Size represents the market capitalisation of the companies. Risk is the beta 
coefficients estimated over 5 years using monthly data. Interest rates are obtained from Datatream 
(Code: LCBBASE). The interest rates are observed as of beginning of May of year t to the end of April of year 
t+I is averaged over the 12 month period. The interaction term is between leverage and beta. 
C Leverage Risk 
Price- 
Earnings 
Market-to 
Book Size 
Interest 
Rates 
Interaction 
term R' 
Full sample 22 3* 
-0 03" -097 -0 02* -014 -40.16" -3 71' -0.12 0 26 
Sectors 
Basic Materials 99.86' 2.07 47.25 
-0.11' 0.25 -48.62" -3.12' -2.06' 0.29 
Consumer Goods 95.27' 
-0.26" -6.06 0.03* 0.13' -28.54'" -2.59' -0.08 0.22 
Consumer Services 124.12* 
-0.25" -6.52* -0.03 -0.03 -36.93'" -3.69' 0.08 0.23 
Healthcare 162.08* 0.38 22.41' 0.16 
-0.65 -60.99** -5.75* -0.59* 0.45 
Industrials 123 92' 
-0.14" -1.16 -0.02 -0.14' -40.47"" -3.83' -0.01 0 24 
Oil and gas 65156' 1.30'" 28.33' 
-0.03' -2.46* -18.90" -3.99' -1.46* 0.43 
Technology 196.59" 0.18 
-5.92 -0.10" -0.43" -69.32" -7.15' -0.33 0.35 
Telecommunications 216.18' 
-0.6 (27.78)' -0.02 -0.59 -55.19" -3.12 0.86' 0.51 
Utilities 69 72* 0 71 " 9 56 
-1 50' -3 47" -25.96" 1.77 -0.45' 0 38 
** denotes 5% significance level * denotes 10% significance level 
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Appendix 8 Regression Results with Average Industry Leverage 
This table reports the cross-sectional regression results on monthly stock returns and average industry leverage, 
size, price 
- 
earnings ratio, market-to-book ratios, beta and industry sector classifications. The full sample 
consists of 7954 observations of 792 non-financial companies for the period 1980-2004. We broadly classify 
these 82 sectors into 9 main industries; oil and gas (0001), basic materials(1000) 
, 
industrials(2000), consumer 
goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer services(5000), telecommunications (6000), utilities(7000), and 
technology (9000). We sort all the sample companies industry-wise in the aforementioned manner and then rank 
the leverage of each company from low to high in each industry. Cumulative Abnormal Returns are calculated 
using monthly returns for each portfolio for 1 year for the sample firms of 792 from 1980-2004. Average 
industry leverage is calculated by averaging the leverage of each company in May in year t in each industry 
sector. Leverage of each company is obtained from Datastream (DS CODE: WC08221) and represents the total 
debt to the total financing of the firms. Price-Earning ratio is the price divided by earnings per share. Price-to- 
Book ratio represents price divided by book value. Size represents the market capitalisation of the companies. 
Risk is the beta coefficients estimated over 5 years using monthly data. Interest rates are obtained from 
Datatream (Code: LCBBASE). The interest rates are observed as of beginning of May of year t to the end of 
April of year t+I is averaged over the 12 month period. 
Avg 
Industry Price- Market-To- Interest 
C Leverage Earnings Book Size Risk Rates R' 
Full sample 105.92 0.92** 
-0.02" -0.18' -44.83" -3.11 -3.38* 0.25 
Sectors 
Basic Materials 185.21 
-1.41 -0.07* 1.22 -45.54" -14.44 -2.82' 0.19 
Consumer Goods 62.69 1.20" 0.03 0.06 
-35.33" -7.46 -1.77' 0.22 
Consumer Services 99.56 1.48** 
-0.03' -0.05 -46.79" -3.60' -3.37' 0.24 
Healthcare 196.8 
-1.37 0.14 -0.47 -59.39* 6.19 -4.49' 0.44 
Industrials 91.77 1.30** 
-0.02 -0.13* -47.44" -0.47 -3.17' 0.25 
Oil and gas 119.72 
-0.52 -0.03' -2.48' -24.38" 0.29 -4.23' 0.39 
Technology 182.42 1.43'" 
-0.09 -0.46' -69.50" -10.14' -8.75' 0.35 
Telecommunications 180.56 2.31* 
-0.03' -0.82 -69.00" -8.15 -3.31 0.59 
Utilities 97.37 0.73' 
-1.1 -1.79 -37.16'" -4.58 1.19 0 35 
** denotes 5% significance level * denotes 10% significance level 
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Appendix 9 Regression results with leverage, squared leverage and other risk factors 
This table reports the cross-sectional regression results on average stock returns and leverage, squared leverage, size, 
market-to-book ratios, beta and industry sector classifications. We have a total of 7954 year end observations for a 
sample of 792 companies for the period 1980-2004. All non-financial companies listed on London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are classified into 9 main industries; oil 
and gas(0001), basic materials(1000), industrials(2000), consumer-goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer- 
services(5000), telecommunications(6000), utilities(7000) and technology(9000). We use GMM estimators and fixed 
effects for firms with weights in the cross-sections to undertake the regressions. Stock returns for each company are 
calculated on a monthly basis in excess of the risk-free rate and is defined as the percentage difference of consecutive 
closing prices that were adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The risk free rate is the 1 month UK Treasury 
discount bill and is obtained from Datastream (LDN: FF). The returns are averaged monthly from May of year t over a 
one-year period. Leverage is observed as of beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents 
the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in equation (1). Market-to-Book ratio (Datastream code: 
PTBV) represents price divided by book value. Size (Datastream code: MV) represents the market capitalisation of 
the companies. Risk is the beta coefficients estimated over 5 years using monthly data. 
Squared Market-to- 
C Leverage Leverage book Size Risk R2 
Full sample 6.73* 
-0.01 -0.08 -0.01' -1.11' -0.19 0.19 
Sectors 
BasIC Materials 10.30' 0.1 
-0.65 0.04 -1.48' -1.42 0.17 
Consumer Goods 5.31' 0 
-0.37 0.01 -0.61' -0.45' 0.18 
Consumer Services 6.52' 0.01 
-0.11 0 
-1.03' 0.14 0.19 
Healthcare 9.23" 
-0.07 0.39 
-0.1 . 1.74' 0.87 0.41 
Industrials 5.99* 
-0,02 
-001 
-0.01 -1.03' -0.1 0.17 
Oil and gas 6.87' 0 
-0.24 
-0.22 
-0.90' 0.76 0.23 
Technology 11.70' 
-0.19" 1.52' 
-0.03 
-2.96' 0.57 0.3 
Telecommunications 7.57' 
-0.07 1.12 
-0.05 
-1.61" 0.47 0.4 
Utilities 9 25' 0 04 0 77 
-0.13 
-1.72" 0.17 0.16 
** denotes 5% significance level * denotes 10% significance level 
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Appendix 10 Regression results with portfolio leverage, squared leverage and other risk 
factors 
This table reports the cross-sectional regression results on monthly stock returns and leverage, squared leverage, 
size, market-to-book ratios, market risk and industry sector classifications. We have a total of 82770 year end 
observations for a sample of 744 companies for the period 1980-2004. All non-financial companies listed on 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the research study are 
classified into 9 main industries; oil and gas(0001), basic materials(1000), industrials(2000), consumer- 
goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer-services(5000), telecommunications(6000), utilities(7000) and 
technology(9000). Stock returns for each company are calculated on a monthly basis in excess of the risk-free 
rate and is defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing prices that were adjusted for dividends, 
splits and rights issues. The risk free rate is the 1 month UK Treasury discount bill and is obtained from 
Datastream (LDN: FT). Leverage is observed as of beginning of May of year t (Datastream Code: WC08221). It 
represents the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in equation (1). Portfolio assignments are 
made yearly at the beginning of May in year t till end of April of year t+lon the basis of the ranked leverage. 
The 10 leverage portfolios are formed on the basis of ranked leverage of individual securities. The following 2 
years (1982-1983) of data on leverage are then used to re-compute the LEVERAGE, and these are averaged 
across securities within portfolios to obtain 10 initial portfolio leverages LEVERAGEp. The month by month 
returns on the 10 portfolios, with equal weighting of individual securities each month are also computed for the 
2 year period 1984-1985. ExRM is the market risk which is the excess of the I month UK Treasury discount bill 
over the FTSE All Share Index. Market-to-Book ratio (Datastream code: PTBV) represents price divided by its net 
book value. Size (Datastream code: MV) represents the market capitalisation of the companies. 
C LEVERAGE 
SQUARE 
LEVERAGE ExRM SIZE 
MARKET- 
TO-BOOK R° 
Full sample 0.56' 0.01* 
-0.07 0.13* -0.13" 0.00* 0.13 
Sectors 
Basic Materials 
-0.12 -0.06 0.42 0.07" -0.09 -0.01 0.19 
Consumer Goods 0.29 0.02 
-0.03 0.06' -0.17" 0.01 0.23 
Consumer Services 0.63' 0.01 
-0.06 0.08" -0.13" 0 0.16 
Healthcare 
-1.41" -0.01 0.44 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.26 
Industrials 0.25 0 0.08 0.07" 
-0.14"" 0.01" 0.2 
Oil and gas 0.99 
-0.20* 1.65* -0.07 -0.49"" 0 0.13 
Technology 1.24 
-004 0.3 0.11 -0.360' 0 0.19 
Telecommunications 
-1.36 
-0.05 0.39 0.15 0.12 
-0.03 0.21 
Utilities 0.76 0 08 
-058 -003 0.05 -0.62" 0.35 
** denotes 5% significance level * denotes 10% significance level 
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Appendix 11 Regression results with leverage, squared leverage and FF+Carhart risk 
factors 
This table reports the time-series regression results on monthly stock returns, leverage, its square and Fama- 
French risk factors of size, market-to-book, market risk and Carhart's momentum factor. We have a total of 
124836 month end observations for a sample of 792 companies for the period 1980-2004. All non-financial 
companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) which meet the criteria of the data requirements for the 
research study are classified into 9 main industries; oil and gas(0001), basic materials(1000), 
industrials(2000), consumer-goods(3000), healthcare(4000), consumer-services(5000), 
telecommunications(6000), utilities(7000) and technology(9000). Stock returns for each company are calculated 
on a monthly basis in excess of the risk-free rate and defined as the percentage difference of consecutive closing 
prices that were adjusted for dividends, splits and rights issues. The risk free rate is the 1 month UK Treasury 
discount bill and is obtained from Datastream (LDN: FT). Leverage is observed as of beginning of May of year I 
(Datastream Code: WC08221). It represents the total debt to total financing of the firm and is defined as in 
equation (1). SMB is the size-factor mimicking portfolio for the returns on small minus big stocks. HML is the 
market-to-book mimicking portfolio for the returns of high minus low market-to-book stocks and ExRM is the 
excess of the 1 month UK Treasury discount bill over the FTSE All Share Index. Moments are the momentum 
factor-mimicking portfolios for the returns of high minus low momentum. 
SQUARE 
C LEVERAGE LEVERAGE SMB HML ExRM MOMENTS R 
Full sample 
-2.51' -0.02" 0.06 0.75' 0.01 0.99' 0.13' 0.13 
Sectors 
Basic Materials 
-2.33' -0.07* 0.4 0.47' -0.21" 0.95' 0.12' 0.13 
Consumer Goods 
-1.79' -0.01 -0.08 0.56' -0.22' 0.82" 0.12' 0.11 
Consumer Services 
-2 22" 0 -0.11 0.76" 0.10' 0.94" 0.13' 0.12 
Healthcare 
-3.52' 0.03 -0.03 0.95* 0.290 1.01' 0.12' 0.21 
Industrials 
-2.66' 0 
-0.11 0.69' 
-0.18' 1.02" 0.16* 0.12 
Oll and gas 
-0.17 -0.05 0.18 0.80' 
-0.30' 0.99' 0 07 0.18 
Technology 
-3.51' -0.11' 0.82' 1.73' 1.16' 1.36' 0.08"" 0.21 
Telecommunications 
-6.29' -0.22" 1.66' 1.09* 0.98' 1.41" 0.17" 0.2 
Utilities 
-0.12 0 06' 0 67" 
-001 -0.29' 0.48' 
-004 0.17 
** denotes 5% significance level * denotes 10% significance level 
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